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Abstract 
 
 Since the completion of the Human Genome Project in 2004, 
understanding of genetic information has expanded, opening much greater 
possibilities with regard to identifying, diagnosing and treating genetic 
conditions. Within the National Health Service, a report produced by the 
Human Genomic Strategy Group (HGSC) aims to roll out a comprehensive 
system of genetic testing within the NHS, and Department of Health 
discussions are underway to implement it. 
 
 Given this, more individuals are informed about their genetic status and 
what it may mean than ever before. As the UK insurance industry operates on 
principles of mutuality, there was (and is) substantial interest in the potential 
this data holds when it comes to identifying those who will suffer from future 
disease. However, currently, within the UK, there is very little use of such data, 
as the industry complies with a voluntary moratorium first announced in 2005, 
now extended until 2017. As of the publication of this thesis, the moratorium 
has been in place for seven years, and little progress has been made in 
establishing what should replace it. 
 
It is here that this thesis makes a contribution. Using a Rawlsian methodology, 
this piece establishes first, under a system of mutuality such as that within the 
UK, what one should do when considering whether to use genetic information 
in the insurance context. This is done through examining  representative 
conditions, and assessing whether it would be justifiable to allow insurers to 
access data relating to these conditions. Second, the thesis then assesses how 
far the current UK moratorium complies with the principles of justice, and in 
cases where it does not, suggests feasible changes to make it more compliant. 
In this way, I hope to contribute, at least in part, to answering the question of 
where the UK should proceed post-2017. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
“Today, with genetic research continuing apace, many more conditions will be 
conclusively linked with a specific single gene mutation. But recent advances in 
medical science – in particular, the completion of the human genome – have opened 
up much greater possibilities, to understand the impact of genetic variation not just 
in a single gene but across multiple genes or even the whole genome.” - Human 
Genomics Strategy Group (2012).
1
 
 
 Since the completion of the Human Genome project in 2004, understanding 
of genetic information has increased significantly. A recent study by the United 
Health Group (part of United Health, a large US Health Insurer) shows that the cost 
of genetic testing for their customers alone was $500 million in 2010, and this is 
projected to increase year on year.
2
 Using estimates from 2006 to 2009 data, and 
extrapolating from this, they also demonstrate that national spending within the USA 
on genetic testing services reached $5 billion within 2010, which constitutes 
approximately 8% of national spending on clinical services. Further, they suggest 
that this sector could see further explosive growth over the next decade, estimating 
national spending of between $15 billion and $25 billion by 2021.
3
 Given genetic 
tests are also becoming cheaper to supply, this means that the market in these 
services is expanding year on year. 
 
Although I am unaware of a specific study such as this within the UK 
context, one can see a similar trend, with the most recent report of the UK Genetic 
Testing Network (UKGTN) suggesting a rapidly expanding repertoire of tests and 
care networks.
4
 Indeed, at the start of this year, Professor John Bell (in his role as 
chair of the Human Genomics Strategy Group) suggests a strategy for continued 
                                                 
1
 Human Genomics Strategy Group, Building on our Inheritance: Genomic Technology in 
Healthcare, January 2012, Accessible at: 
[http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/d
h_132382.pdf], Accessed 14-08-2012. 
2
 United Health, Personalized Medicine: Trends and Prospects for the new science of genetic testing 
and molecular diagnostics, Working Paper 7, March 2012, Accessible at: 
[http://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/hrm/UNH_WorkingPaper7.pdf] Accessed 07-04-2012. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 UK Genetic Testing Network, Supporting Genetic Testing in the NHS: Second Report of UKGTN, 
November 2010, Accessible at: 
[http://www.ukgtn.nhs.uk/gtn/digitalAssets/0/929_SECONDREPORT.pdf] Accessed 07-04-2012. 
2 
 
development of genetic testing within the UK, stating that “Genomic technologies 
have the potential to transform the delivery of healthcare in the UK, providing vital 
insights to support more accurate diagnosis of disease and inform therapeutic 
decisions…”5 This is a view also shared by the House of Lords Science and 
Technology Committee, who suggest that the science of human genetics will lead to 
real advances in medical care.6 
 
 With recent reports on the capability of genetic testing produced by the 
Department of Health and media outlets such as the BBC, and statements from 
political figures such as ex- Health Secretary Andrew Lansley, the public is now 
more aware than ever of the availability and potential importance of genetic testing.
7
 
and
 
8
 In addition to this, we are beginning to see a large market develop outside of the 
specific healthcare context. Direct to consumer genetic testing is now easily 
available, with several private companies offering everything from paternity testing 
and ancestry tracking to determining susceptibility to certain conditions. As an 
example, thatDNAcompany offer to provide: “An accurate DNA test; for the people 
and by the people who care”, and that they are, “…here to help you resolve family 
issues of fatherhood (paternity) at an affordable price. No frills, no bells, no 
whistles.”9 This is a service also offered by other providers such as GeneTrack UK.10 
Indeed, companies such as 23andMe offer an even wider variety of services, 
claiming to inform you about your risk of developing several different conditions or 
diseases such as diabetes or obesity.
11
 This information is easily available, with the 
individual merely needing to order an online kit, provide them with a sample through 
the post, and obtaining results online or through the post within a few weeks. 
 
                                                 
5
 Human Genomics Strategy Group, Building on our Inheritance: Genomic Technology in 
Healthcare, January 2012, op. cit. 
6
 House of Lords Science and Technology Committee. Genomic Medicine – Volume 1: Report. (2009) 
2nd Report of Session 2008–09. 
7
 Department of Health, Genomic Innovation will better target treatment in the NHS, January 25
th
 
2012, Accessible at: [http://mediacentre.dh.gov.uk/2012/01/25/genomic-innovation-will-better-target-
treatment/] Accessed 07-04-2012. 
8
 British Broadcasting Corporation, Genetic testing: NHS ‘must back revolution’, January 25th 2012, 
Accessible at: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-16725032] Accessed: 07-04-2012. 
9
 ThatDNACompany, Accessible at: [http://www.thatdnacompany.com/index.htm] Accessed 07-04-
2012. 
10
 GeneTrack UK, Accessible at: [http://www.genetrack.co.uk] Accessed 07-04-2012. 
11
 23andMe, Accessible at: [https://www.23andme.com/health] Accessed 07-04-2012. 
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 All of this means that individuals are now able to be more informed about 
their own genetic status than ever before. As the UK insurance market operates on 
the principle of mutuality, within which premiums are set to accord with the risk that 
an insured individual brings to the pool, there is prima facie a clear interest for 
insurers to be able to access and use this data, insofar as it is relevant to an 
individual’s future health status. 
 
1.1 – The UK Position 
 
 Indeed, even before the rapid expansion in the availability of genetic 
information to individuals, there was concern over the use of this information. The 
Human Genetics Advisory Commission (HGAC) suggested within its February 1997 
report that concern over the use of genetic data in life insurance decision making was 
warranted because: 
 
“For most people in the UK, life insurance is linked to home purchase and the protection of 
dependants. It matters to individuals, to society and, indeed, to the insurance industry itself 
that people are not excluded from life insurance without good reason.”12 
 
First suggested in 1998, the moratorium on the use of genetic test data was 
initially opposed by the industry at large, with them fearing that it paved the way for 
a more permanent ban on the use of such data.
13
 Eventually, feeling threatened by 
possible legislative action, the industry voluntarily enacted a five year moratorium 
on the use of genetic test data, starting in November 2001. This moratorium was 
subsequently extended until 2011, and then again until 2014, and most recently,  
2017.
 14,15
 This is a voluntary moratorium which the Association of British Insurers 
(ABI) is responsible for monitoring and enforcing. 
                                                 
12
 Human Genetics Advisory Commission, The Implications of Genetic Testing for Insurance, Issued 
December 1997, Accessible from: [http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/Archive/HGAC/index.htm] Accessed 
07-04-2012. 
13
 Masood, Ehsan, UK insurers oppose moratorium plea on use of genetic data, Nature (1998) 391 
(6662) p.3 
14
 Association of British Insurers, ABI News Release: Insurance Genetics Moratorium extended to 
2014, Accessible at: 
[http://www.abi.org.uk/Media/Releases/2008/06/Insurance_genetics_moratorium_extended_to_2014.
aspx], Accessed 30-07-2010. 
15
 Association of British Insurers, ABI News Release: Insurance Genetics Moratorium extended to 
2017, Accessible at: 
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 Specifically, the moratorium prohibits the use of all genetic test data for life 
insurance cover under £500,000 in value, or critical illness cover under £300,000 in 
value. This is the sum total of policies held, not the value of individual policies. As 
the moratorium document itself highlights, over 97% of policies held in 2004 were 
below this value.
16
 For policies held over these values, insurers may request the 
results of genetic tests pre-approved by the Genetics and Insurance Committee. 
(GAIC)  This committee (which was wound up on the 1
st
 July 2009) was responsible 
for hearing applications from insurers to use specific genetic tests, and evaluating 
their applicability, reliability and relevance
17
. The committee only ever approved one 
genetic test application, for Huntington’s disease in October 2000.18 Within the UK, 
there is therefore very little use of genetic test data by the insurance industry. For 
97% of policies, no data is used at all, and for the remaining 3%, insurers are only 
able to ask for the results of one specific test. 
 
1.2 – My Question 
 
 As a reminder, the question which I seek to answer in this thesis is: How far 
does the moratorium on the use of genetic data by insurers within the UK accord 
with the principles of justice? Within this, there are two sub-questions. First, what is 
the position which would be supported by the principles of justice? And then second, 
how far does the current moratorium accord with this position? 
 
 As my thesis is explicitly concerned with the UK and the current moratorium, 
it does assume certain facts, one of which has already been identified. For the 
purposes of this thesis, I will be assessing the potential use of this data by the UK 
insurance industry as it currently exists, that is to say, a private industry based on the 
principle of mutuality rather than solidarity. This will be important when I come to 
consider the potential consequences that allowing use of certain data could have. 
                                                                                                                                          
[http://www.abi.org.uk/Media/Releases/2011/04/Insurance_Genetics_Moratorium_extended_to_2017
.aspx], Accessed 10-02-2012. 
16
 Association of British Insurers, Concordat and Moratorium on Genetics and Insurance, op. cit. 
17
 Genetics And Insurance Committee, Summary, Accessible at: 
[http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/Archive/GAIC/index.htm], Accessed 10-02-2012. 
18
 Genetics and Insurance Committee, October 2000: Huntington’s Disease, Accessible at: 
[http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@ab/documents/digitalasset/d
h_087703.pdf], Accessed 30-07-2010. 
5 
 
Second, I will also be assuming the presence of a social healthcare system, namely 
the National Health Service (NHS) which provides healthcare free at the point of 
service, and is funded by taxation. 
 
 The reason for this is that I aim to provide an answer which has some real-
world relevance. Whilst I could base my thesis entirely in abstract theory, or consider 
the UK were it to adopt a life insurance system based upon solidarity, it would seem 
to me relatively unlikely that the UK will adopt such a system, at least in the near 
future, and therefore, the actual relevance of my thesis would be limited. The aim of 
the thesis is to provide some guidance as to what we should do about the use of 
genetic information within the current UK context, which requires consideration of 
the current position, not a hypothetical one. This is important, as both the use and 
understanding of genetic testing continues to advance. We are moving rapidly 
towards a position where genetic testing for many conditions will routinely be 
offered on the NHS (the aim of the HGSG report), and many individuals will be 
informed about their health status. A moratorium agreed in 2005 and simply renewed 
since is ill-equipped to cope with this changing situation. As Stirton argues, the 
moratorium has become a de facto inflexible and permanent response to the 
question, and one which is neither reflexive nor sufficiently credible.
19
 Specifically, 
she argues that whilst compliance is currently high, this depends on there being no 
great gain to be made from breaching the moratorium, and that this is threatened by 
developing science. I agree with this assessment. Further, I agree with the idea that 
within the seven years since the moratorium was agreed, progress should have been 
made on a more permanent solution. Indeed, looking to Stirton's other work, she 
suggests that legislating either abstractly for 'fairness' or specifically in an 
exceptionalist way is bound to fail, and that engagement is needed instead with 
specific policy questions.
20
 Whilst I feel that there are legitimate reasons to subscribe 
to a weak form of genetic exceptionalism (specifically, with regard to perceptions), I 
do agree that legislating as if all genetic information was uniquely special is 
misguided. Instead, I intend to contribute toward finding the answer to these difficult 
policy questions through the prism of justice. 
                                                 
19
 Stirton, Ruth, Insurance, Genetic Information and the Future of Industry Self-Regulation in the UK, 
upcoming in Law, Innovation and Technology, 2013. 
20
 Wilkinson(Stirton), Ruth, Genetic Information: Important But Not 'Exceptional', Identity in the 
Information Society (2010) 3 (3) p. 472. 
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1.2.1 – Research Plan 
 
 Within the thesis, I therefore intend to do the following. Briefly within the 
rest of Chapter One, I will explore the potential reasons that could be offered for 
focusing on data gathered from genetic tests above all other data (such as family 
history). Whilst I eventually conclude that there may be reason to subscribe to a 
weak form of genetic exceptionalism, given I am assessing the justifiability of the 
moratorium; I must focus on what said moratorium deems ‘genetic test data’ (an 
exceptionalist position). Within Chapter Two, I will then provide an explanation of 
my methodology, namely how the principles of justice are derived, and what they 
entail. I will then explain my reasons for focusing on the second principle in 
particular, the inequalities which I am specifically concerned about, and defend the 
focus of my thesis on income and particularly wealth. Having established these 
things, I will proceed to analysis. 
 
 First, Chapter Three will offer an initial analysis of the use of genetic test 
data, based on income and wealth, before I recognise and demonstrate the problems 
with this, and proceed to a more detailed development of typologies within Chapter 
Four. Within Chapter Five, I will then answer the first of my two sub-questions, 
namely, which data (if any) could justifiably be used by insurers under a system of 
mutuality, and which data should be prohibited from use. Finally Chapter Six will 
then provide a re-framing of my conclusions from Chapter Five, and an analysis of 
whether the moratorium is justifiable in each specific case. Finally, I will conclude 
by briefly relating my work back to the wider field. 
 
1.2.2 – Thesis Parameters 
 
 Whilst there are several different questions that could be answered here, it is 
important to note at this point the limits of the specific question I seek to answer. 
First, the question of whether or not we should use genetic data can be affected by 
considerations other than those identified within the thesis, for example, concerns 
over genetic privacy. However, within the thesis, I am explicitly attempting to 
answer the question from a Rawlsian perspective. As I will illustrate within Chapter 
7 
 
Two, these ideas are not explicitly relevant to a Rawlsian conception of justice. As 
such, there will be no discussion of genetic privacy within the thesis, although this 
could provide an interesting avenue for future work. As I illustrate above, I am also 
strictly considering justifiability within the existing system of mutuality, rather than 
solidarity. Analysing a hypothetical position of solidarity would detract from my 
ability to assess the status quo. It is also not at all clear that a Rawlsian would 
necessarily have to commit to a system of solidarity. The thesis is also not a creative 
re-imagining of the Rawlsian theory. With a few exceptions (notably the work of 
Norman Daniels and Amartya Sen), the thesis is simply an application of this theory. 
Fundamentally, the thesis then only seeks to answer one question.  Namely, whether 
the current position on the use of genetic information by insurers within the UK can 
be justified according to Rawls’ principles of justice. It is this narrowly defined 
question which I will now proceed to answer. 
 
1.3 – Genetic Exceptionalism 
 
 Both the moratorium, and therefore, my thesis, place special importance on 
data obtained from genetic tests. The most recent definition of ‘genetic tests’ offered 
by the Association of British Insurers (ABI) is: 
 
 
“A genetic test is defined as a test that examines the structure of chromosomes (cytogenetic 
tests) or detects abnormal patterns in the DNA of specific genes (molecular tests). A 
genetic test can be predictive or diagnostic:  
• a predictive genetic test is taken prior to the appearance of any symptoms of the condition 
in question  
• a diagnostic genetic test is taken to confirm a diagnosis based on existing symptoms. “21 
 
 The moratorium in particular concerns itself with the use of predictive 
genetic tests. This means that within the thesis, I will be assessing how far the use of 
certain predictive genetic tests is justifiable, using the above definition of ‘genetic 
test’. However, there is significant debate as to whether genetic information such as 
this is meaningfully different from any other data. This idea that genetic data is 
indeed special, and worthy of different protection or consideration is often termed 
                                                 
21
 Association of British Insurers, ABI Code of Practice, Genetic Tests, June 2008, Accessible at: 
[www.abi.org.uk/consumer2/disclosure.htm] Accessed 11-10-2012. 
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genetic exceptionalism. The following is a brief exploration of the literature in the 
area. 
 
Objections to genetic exceptionalism can be arranged under two major 
headings. Suter raises these broad concerns, which she terms “over” and “under-
inclusiveness”22 First, over-inclusiveness. According to Suter,  
 
“Concerns about the lack of control over one’s genes, the high level of predictiveness of 
genetic information, and its stigmatizing and hidden features do not apply equally to all 
genetic information.”23 
 
In other words, not all genetic information has these characteristics, and 
therefore to ground our differentiation on this concept is nonsensical. Our genetic 
information is broadly not unique; we share the majority of it with other individuals. 
Equally, Suter claims that certain ‘genetic’ traits such as blood type, eye colour and 
gender undermine genetic exceptionalism, as although genetic; they do not “seem 
particularly susceptible to discriminatory uses.”24 Whilst the fact that these are not 
susceptible to discriminatory uses is certainly open to question (especially gender), 
much more interesting is the question of under-inclusiveness. 
 
Here we must confront the claim that genetic information is not at all special, 
and shares its most important characteristics with information that would be 
considered non-genetic. To subscribe to genetic exceptionalism, it is claimed, is 
therefore to make an arbitrary distinction between the two, and to privilege genetic 
information without any substantial grounding. In order to determine whether we can 
overcome this objection, it is necessary to examine some of the most common 
reasons given for subscribing to the exceptionalist position. 
 
 The first is the concept of genetic information as ‘uniquely identifying’. 
Genetic exceptionalism is able to be justified because unlike any other information, 
my genetic code is absolutely unique to me. Using that code, you could identify me, 
and no-one else. This is not however something that is unique to genetic information. 
                                                 
22
 Suter, Sonia, The allure and peril of genetics exceptionalism: do we need special genetics 
legislation, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No.19, 2001, Accessible at 
[http://papers.sssrn.com/abstract=276875], Accessed 01/03/11 
23
 Ibid. p. 46. 
24
 Ibid. p.47. 
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In fact, given a sufficient quantity of information, almost any information could be 
used to identify me. Vehicle registration numbers, addresses, medical records 
indicating previous injuries and many other sources of information could potentially 
identify me just as accurately. My genetic code is not even unique in the sense that 
unlike the above example, it can identify me without amalgamation of data. The use 
of certain biometrics can allow someone to determine my identity just as accurately, 
and with just as little data. 25  My fingerprint is unique to me in the same way as my 
genetic code. Given this, it seems that the ‘uniqueness’ argument is utterly 
insufficient to ground any claim to genetic exceptionalism. To do this, we must look 
elsewhere. 
 
 Within the literature, we find that there are many other reasons provided for 
grounding a claim to genetic exceptionalism. Rothstein identifies them as the 
following: 
 
“ (1) genetic information has implications not only for the individual but also for family 
members; 
(2) genetic information may have implications for reproduction and characteristics of future 
generations; 
(3) genetic information may be predictive;  
(4) genetic information often carries stigma, and the misuse of genetic information has led to 
eugenics, racism, and genocide;  
(5) genetic information is regarded as unique by the public;  
(6) there are other “special” categories of medical information for which separate protections 
have been adopted, including HIV/AIDS and mental illness; and  
(7) the political reality is that there is greater support for genetic non-discrimination 
legislation than for more general and sweeping laws”26 
 
 He then proceeds to claim that reasons 1 through 3 can be dismissed as they 
are again not unique to ‘genetic’ data. Other aspects of my life, and indeed, other 
aspects of my medical record may have implications for future generations, my 
family members, and predict my future health. As an example, if I were HIV 
positive, this would have clear implications for my partner, and also be significantly 
predictive of my potential future health. Indeed, if we consider a woman who is HIV 
positive, this also fulfils reason 2, as her HIV status will have potentially important 
implications for any future children as her infection could be passed to the child 
during birth. 
                                                 
25
 Ibid. p. 50. 
26
 Rothstein, Mark, Genetic Exceptionalism and Legislative Pragmatism, The Journal of Law, 
Medicine and Ethics, (2007), 35 Supplement. 2, p. 61-62. 
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1.3.1 – Scope 
 
 So are there any reasons to support claims 1 through 3? Sticking with our 
HIV example, we can meaningfully begin to distinguish genetic information on the 
grounds of scope.27 It is difficult to envision a single non-genetic example which has 
the same scope as a genetic one. Although HIV status may potentially fit within 
claims 1-3, it does not tell me nearly the same amount about others that a genetic test 
does. To use an example, my discovery that my father has become HIV positive 
would not have implications for my own health. However, my discovery that my 
father possesses the gene for Huntington’s (an autosomally dominant disease) has a 
significant effect not only on my actual health, but on my future health and how I 
perceive it. 
 
 That genetic information is unique in scope is also a position supported by 
the Report on Genetic Exceptionalism presented to Congress in 2008. Within this, 
Sarata demonstrates the true scope of ‘genetic’ data, and is led to conclude that “…it 
may be argued that there is little medical or personal information that shares all of 
these characteristics with genetic information.” 28  I would agree with this 
assessment. It is difficult to imagine any piece of non-genetic information which is 
able to tell us the same amount as an individual’s genetic information. This is the 
image that Annas invokes when he refers to the concept of a “future diary”.29 He 
suggests that although other health information is relevant, and can certainly have 
important implications for the future health of individuals and their family members, 
when it comes to genetic information;  
 
“There is nothing else quite like this type of information.”30  
 
                                                 
27
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28
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Public Policy, 2008, Accessible at 
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 Annas, George et. al, Drafting the Genetics Privacy Act: Science, Policy, and Practical 
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30
 Annas, George, Genetic Privacy, Accessible at 
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 It would seem that initially we can therefore begin to justify holding a 
position of weak genetic exceptionalism, at least as distinguished from other medical 
information such as HIV status due to its unprecedented scope. One can find support 
for this position from many other commentaries, including Gostin, who claims that 
the exceptional nature of this information stems from: 
 
“…the sheer breadth of information discoverable; the potential to unlock secrets that are 
currently unknown about the person….and the generalizability of the data to families, 
genetically related communities and ethnic and racial populations.”31 
 
 However, this position begins to look weaker when we examine the case of 
family histories. Are we able to usefully distinguish these from the data gathered by 
genetic tests? Using only the justifications we have so far, this seems tenuous. There 
is no meaningful difference between the example above where my father has a 
genetic test for Huntington’s, and where I know that I have a family history of 
Huntington’s because my father has lived to an age where he is a sufferer. Anything 
that the results of that genetic test tell me about my own future health, my families, 
or my reproductive chances I can also discover from the family history. 
 
 We still perhaps have a very weak claim to genetic exceptionalism 
remaining, in that if we examine the characteristics of genetic information presented 
above, the family history does not seem to possess all of these components. It is 
difficult to see how a family history could impact communities in the same way as 
genetic information. A discovery that I am susceptible to Huntington’s does not have 
the same impact as a hypothetical discovery that all individuals of a certain subgroup 
are susceptible to a specific disease or set of diseases.
32
  
 
Indeed, if we consider reason 4 given by Rothstein, (that genetic information 
could carry stigma, and be used to promote racism, eugenics and genocide) we begin 
to find an important difference. This is a difference dismissed by many 
commentators, including Friedman, who claims that: 
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“…threats of discrimination and stigmatization will exist as long as there are differences and 
that these differences need not have a genetic basis, as current international conflicts 
illustrate.”33 
 
 It is difficult to argue that discrimination and stigmatisation would not exist if 
genetic differences were not brought to light. Individuals are likely to always find 
ways to discriminate against and stigmatise those who they feel are different. 
However, I do not accept this as a reason to dismiss the potential impact of genetic 
test data. It is apparent that this data could be used to discriminate against and 
stigmatise those who are different, and it could do so in a unique way. We already 
know that certain ethnic groups are prone to a higher incidence of genetic defects. It 
is not a stretch to suggest that Ashkenazi Jews could potentially suffer discrimination 
from merely being a part of this group. Genetic test data demonstrating that these 
groups suffer from certain defects could provide scientific ‘justification’ for 
discrimination.  If we believe that stigmatisation and discrimination against these 
groups is bad, then we must account for the fact that genetic test data may provide 
further reason for this to happen, and not simply dismiss it by reasoning that 
individuals will find a reason to discriminate anyway. 
 
Even given this, family history data possesses the majority of the 
characteristics above. This is unsurprising, as data gathered from family histories is a 
brute form of genetic data. Is there an essential difference between family history 
data and the data that can currently be gathered from genetic tests that justifies a 
distinction when we are speaking about individuals, rather than populations? 
 
1.3.2 – Predictive Ability 
 
 We can meaningfully begin to differentiate the two on the grounds of what 
they are able to predict. A family history indicating my father possesses the allele for 
Huntington’s means that I (and others) can infer that I have a 50% chance of 
developing the disease. If I undergo a genetic test for the allele and am found to have 
it, this increases to 100%. Equally, if the test proves negative, my chance of 
developing Huntington’s drops to 0%. The genetic test is able to provide me data 
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which the family history simply cannot. This data is incredibly relevant when 
attempting to assess my future health prospects, or when I come to consider my 
reproductive choices. 
 
Another good example is breast cancer. An individual who possesses a 
mutation of BRCA1 or BRCA 2 has a hugely increased risk of developing cancer.
34
 
Although this is also substantially affected by environmental or social factors (such 
as weight, diet and choice of contraception) the genetic contribution is still 
significant. Whether a woman actually carries this mutation can only be discovered 
through genetic testing. A woman with a family history of death from cancer may 
actually not possess a mutation and therefore be at no higher risk.  More dangerously 
for the woman, she may have a relatively clear family history, and yet still be a 
carrier. Given the importance of early intervention in lowering cancer mortality 
rates, it is medically important that she be made aware of the fact that she carries a 
mutation. A genetic test would do this, whereas her family history would not. These 
two types of data can therefore be distinguished again in this way. This view is 
shared by Friedman Ross, who suggests: 
 
“The exceptional nature of genetics, if it is exceptional, is due to its power to predict late 
onset, Mendelian conditions; its power to identify genes that increase susceptibility to 
multifactorial conditions but are neither necessary nor sufficient for the development of 
disease; and its implication for reproduction.”35 
 
 This is certainly true of some genetic information, for example Huntington’s 
and BRCA as explained above. Equally, genetic tests seem to be able to be 
differentiated from family history data on the grounds of sheer predictive ability. The 
predictiveness (often termed penetrance) of a specific genetic marker will become 
relevant later when I derive my typologies. 
 
However, the majority of conditions are multifactorial, and development of 
the eventual condition relies on a complex interplay between genes, environment and 
societal factors which we do not yet fully understand. Currently then, our claim to 
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genetic exceptionalism is very weak indeed, relying solely on the fact that in some 
cases, specific conditions can be diagnosed or identified much more accurately 
through genetic tests than through other means. When considering these 
multifactorial conditions, do we have any reason to distinguish between genetic data 
that might indicate an increased risk of heart disease, and obesity which may indicate 
an equally increased risk? 
 
1.3.3 - Perceptions 
 
 Whether genetic information is or is not in fact special, individuals certainly 
perceive it to be so. As an empirical example, in a study carried out at Columbia 
University, two groups of participants were given identical likelihoods of suffering 
from disease. One group was given an estimate based on ‘family history’ data, 
whereas the other was given the same estimate through the use of data derived from 
a genetic test. When asked about their perceptions of their risk, 73% of the genetic 
group judged their risk to be lower, compared to 25% of the family history group. 
67% of the members of the genetic group also reported lower anxiety about 
potentially suffering from the disease, compared to 26% of the family history group. 
The genetic group was also significantly less likely to believe that they would suffer 
from the disease.
36
 
 
 This perception of genetic test data as somehow more meaningful or more 
serious is also reported back through several policy documents produced on the 
issue. A report by the Human Genetics Commission (HGC) produced in contains 
echoes of this idea, stating that: 
 
“There is public concern about the extent to which existing safeguards and regulation of 
information may be effective in the face of what can be done with the new technologies.”37  
 
This perception of genetic test data as so much more important than other 
information begins to give us other grounds for subscribing to a weak form of 
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genetic exceptionalism. The difference between this data and other data is how it is 
perceived. This is important, because how the information is perceived directly 
impacts upon how it is used, and how it is used relates to what kind of impacts it is 
able to have on individuals. Indeed: 
 
“Our current obsession with genetic-sequence information means that it is likely to be taken 
more seriously than other information in a medical record that could also predict future risks, 
like high blood pressure or cholesterol levels.”38 
 
Genetic testing data has taken on a level of meaning that other data simply does not 
possess. This is one of the important differences which justifies an idea of genetic 
exceptionalism. In fact: 
 
“DNA has also been culturally endowed (emphasis mine) with a power and significance 
exceeding that of other medical information. Much of this significance is undoubtedly 
misplaced, but can be justified in so far as genetic information can radically change the way 
people view themselves and family members, as well as the way that others view them.”39 
 
Because of this, an individual is likely to take the use of genetic data much 
more seriously when considering what impact it may have on their life. Their 
perception will be that any impacts which stem from genetic testing data are 
somehow more important, and therefore, any adverse effects will be amplified.
40
 
 
It is for this reason that several bodies have begun to accord genetic 
information this special status. In their 2001 policy document, the ABI notes that: 
 
“…the popular and political perception appears to be that there is an important difference. In 
the absence of change in these perceptions insurers ought to make plans to deal with public 
policy interventions based on the argument that molecular genetic information is 
categorically different.”41 
 
Similarly, in a 2008 document presented to Congress, Sarata claims that when 
deciding whether to pursue genetically exceptionalist policies: 
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“…it is perhaps more relevant in terms of public policy to examine how the public views 
genetic information.”42 
 
When we are assessing the effects that the use of genetic data may have on the 
public, we cannot disregard public perception. If the public regard genetic data as 
special (which they appear to do) then it is justifiable to subscribe to a form of 
genetic exceptionalism in according it this special status, at least in the short term. 
 
 It is not just the public perception of genetic test data that raises issues 
however. There are serious issues with the patchiness of genetic test data which may 
affect how it is applied to individuals. Unlike much other information about 
individuals, we do not really fully comprehend what genetic data is actually able to 
tell us. Our understanding of how we are able to use this data is incomplete at best. 
As O’Neill explains: 
 
“…it might (because of the patchiness of information) be a context for ascribing much higher 
risks to some individuals than would be ascribed to them in the light of fuller information;”43 
 
We therefore have more reason for treating genetic information as exceptional. We 
do not really understand how we can apply genetic information properly, and as 
such, any application may well be misinformed. This could adversely affect 
individuals. Our understanding of genetic data is incomplete, and therefore, we can 
find reason for subscribing to a form of genetic exceptionalism in treating genetic 
data with the utmost care until we can determine what we are actually able to draw 
from it. 
 
1.3.4 – Conclusions on Exceptionalism 
 
In light of the analysis above, I believe there is good reason to subscribe to at 
least a weak form of genetic exceptionalism. This is not to be genetically 
determinist, clearly genetic data is not the end point of the discussion, nor does it 
constitute everything we are. Although the claims that genetic information is 
uniquely identifying or predictive appear to fail when we consider family history 
                                                 
42
 Ibid. p. 6. 
43
 O’Neill, Onora, Genetic Information and Insurance: Some Ethical Issues, Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of Biological Sciences. (1997) 352 (1357) p.  1091. 
17 
 
data (at least on the individual level), we can support this position using the public 
perception of genetic test data. It certainly seems that whatever the facts (of which 
we are still mostly unaware), genetic test data is viewed to be special in some way. 
Indeed, empirical studies show that individuals act differently when presented with 
risks derived from genetic data than with equal risk derived by other means. If 
individuals treat genetic data differently to non-genetic data, this means that genetic 
data may have a broader or deeper impact, and allows us to justify offering it special 
protection. This is especially true when we consider the limitations of what we 
actually know about genetic data. There is no guarantee that were genetic test data to 
be applied to make decisions about individuals, it would be applied in any 
meaningful way. Our level of understanding is compromised. It is therefore wise to 
subscribe to a weak form of genetic exceptionalism. 
 
Although this justification is theoretically important, the thesis seeks to 
answer specifically whether the position reached by the moratorium is justified. I 
will therefore be using the definition used by the ABI with regard to the moratorium, 
which is an exceptionalist position.. This will allow me to assess whether the 
moratorium, as understood by the ABI, accords with the justifiable position on the 
use of genetic data. This material on exceptionalism will however become relevant 
within Chapter Five, when I come to analyse whether individuals will be 
disincentivsed from obtaining genetic tests. 
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Chapter Two 
Methodology 
 
 The methodology I am using is Rawlsian, as initially put forward in A Theory 
of Justice and subsequent publications. I will also be making use of developments on 
the theory, specifically, those offered by both Norman Daniels and Amartya Sen. 
Within this Chapter, I will first explain the background to the theory, including how 
the two principles of justice are derived and supported. I will then explain why, 
within this thesis, the first principle of justice will not be significantly considered, 
before moving onto my focus, the second principle. Further, I will then present a 
detailed account of primary goods, explaining their relevance to the second principle 
of justice, and how specifically the primary good of income and wealth is relevant to 
my later analysis. Within this, I will also offer an explanation and brief analysis of 
the theory of capability sets as put forward by Sen, and the relevance of this theory 
to my thesis. Finally, I will then offer an examination of fair equality of opportunity, 
and demonstrate both how the principle operates and its relevance to my 
conclusions. Within this section I will also explain why it is specifically equal access 
to employment which I am considering within the context of this thesis. First, the 
theoretical background. 
 
2.1 – Background to the Methodology 
 
2.1.1 – The Initial Principles 
 
 Initially put forward within A Theory of Justice (first published 1971, revised 
1975), the Rawlsian conception of justice is one which revitalised interest in 
liberalism as a theory, and renewed wider interest in political philosophy. The theory 
itself espouses ideas of ‘justice as fairness’, and puts forward an essentially 
egalitarian account of justice, where the purpose of justice is to “mitigate the 
arbitrariness of natural contingency and superficial fortune.”1 
                                                 
1
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 These ideas of justice stem from the concept of the social contract, the idea 
that as individuals, we cede certain rights to the state in order to obtain certain 
benefits.
2
 In a hypothetical sense, we contract to give up, for example, our ability to 
kill others, in return for a guarantee that the state will also endeavour to prevent 
others from murdering us. In this regard, we gain benefits through this contractual 
behaviour that outweigh any freedoms we choose to sacrifice. In this way: 
 
“Social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to 
live solely by their own efforts”3. 
 
 The central theme of social contract theories is that the power of the state is 
limited by the hypothetical consent of the people within it. Clearly though, we have 
not actually contracted to be within the state. I happened, by chance, to be born 
within the United Kingdom, and at no point did I explicitly agree to the laws of this 
country, nor sign a contract. Given this, how are we to assess what I would choose, 
were I to have a free choice of terms? In order to determine what individuals would 
choose for themselves within the social contract, we must make use of two 
theoretical devices. The first of these is the original position. This requires that, 
when choosing which laws to be governed by, an individual imagines themselves in 
a situation where there exists no law. An individual is therefore not artificially 
limited by the constraints of current society, but instead puts themselves in a position 
where they are absolutely free. They can then legitimately decide which freedoms 
they wish to give up to obtain which benefits.
4
 
 
 However, the use of the original position as the only theoretical device is 
insufficient. If an individual is only to place themselves outside current constraints 
and then decide on what laws they would like to apply, it is possible that such laws 
would be discriminatory in nature. Operating from a position of rational self-interest, 
if I am currently wealthy, I am unlikely to see a benefit to myself in legislation 
protecting the poor. Indeed, measures which do protect the poor (such as 
redistributive taxation, or social healthcare) directly harm me by taking my wealth 
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and redistributing it to others. I am therefore unlikely to approve of a system in 
which this taxation features. Similarly, if I am a member of the majority ethnic 
group, I may not see any need for explicit policies against racism or other 
discrimination, as I do not envisage myself being subjected to them. The original 
position alone leads to a system which is potentially severely discriminatory. 
 
 To overcome this, Rawls employs a second theoretical device alongside the 
original position, termed the veil of ignorance.
5
 From behind the veil of ignorance, 
an individual has no idea of who they will become in the potential society that they 
are tasked with deciding upon. Every individual behind the veil is placed in the same 
position; they know that they will be a person within the future society, but little 
else. Indeed: 
 
“…no-one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know 
his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and 
the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his 
rational plan of life, or even the special features of his psychology such as his aversion to 
risk, or liability to optimism or pessimism.”6  
 
Given these individuals are making decisions based upon rational self-
interest; they therefore cannot have any biases either toward or against a certain set 
of characteristics. As I do not know whether I will be one of the poorest members of 
society, it no longer makes sense for me to construct a system within which the poor 
suffer severely. I become more willing to sacrifice some future wealth (should I be a 
rich person) in order to safeguard myself against the possibility of poverty. The use 
of these theoretical devices therefore requires a rational individual, “whatever his 
temporal position… [to] choose for everyone.”7 
 
 Through the use of these two theoretical devices, Rawls then argues that it is 
possible for us to then derive a “unanimous…conception of justice”8 upon which we 
all agree. Indeed, he in fact argues not only that we are able to come to unanimous 
agreement on a conception of justice, but that there exists only one conception of 
justice upon which we can all rationally agree, namely the Two Principles of Justice. 
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2.1.2 – The First Principle of Justice 
 
 It is first important to note that the principles are ranked in lexical order, with 
the first principle lexically prior to the second.
9
 So, what is the first principle? This 
principle, revised within Justice as Fairness reads: 
 
“Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic 
liberties which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all”10. 
 
 The purpose of this principle is to ensure that whatever position an individual 
occupies in society, their right to certain liberties is protected. As this is lexically 
prior, Rawls claims that this is the supreme value that any self-interested individual 
would choose under the required theoretical constraints. The importance of basic 
liberties is clear. If you do not possess certain basic liberties, then it is difficult to 
achieve other goals. The possession of liberty is essentially a value-neutral 
precondition to the ability to fulfil one’s own conception of the good, and a rational, 
self-interested individual should therefore choose to have an adequate scheme of 
them. 
 
 But what are the liberties that we are concerned with protecting? Within 
Political Liberalism, Rawls provides a list of the basic liberties to which the first 
principle relates. These are: 
 
“…freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; the political liberties and freedom of 
association, as well as the freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person; and 
finally, the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law.”11  
 
It is these liberties to which an individual has an indefeasible claim. These liberties 
arise from specific characteristics within individuals, which Rawls terms the “two 
moral powers.”12 These powers are explained as those necessary for individuals to be 
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“full participants in…social cooperation,” and are “a capacity for a sense of justice, 
and a capacity for a conception of the good.”13  
 
A capacity for a sense of justice requires that an individual be able to 
understand, apply, and act according to the requirements of justice. To possess the 
capacity for a conception of the good, an individual must be able to “form, to revise 
and rationally to pursue a conception of one’s rational advantage or good”.14 The 
conception of the good is therefore concerned with individuals being able to pursue 
life plans or goals. The justification for protecting the above liberties is that these are 
the liberties required: 
 
“…to guarantee equally for all citizens the social conditions essential for the adequate 
development and the full and informed exercise of these powers.”15 
 
In examining the two moral powers outlined above, it becomes clear how the 
basic liberties laid out by Rawls are necessary to preserve these powers. For 
example, political liberties and freedom of association are essential to allow the “full 
and effective exercise of citizens´ sense of justice, to the basic structure of society.”16  
Without these liberties, they are unable to apply their sense of justice to society and 
see it enacted (for example, through mechanisms such as voting). 
 
Equally, the liberties of conscience and freedom of association: 
 
“…are to secure the full and informed and effective application of citizens´ powers of 
deliberative reason to their forming, revising, and rationally pursuing a conception of the 
good over a complete life.”17 
 
A lack of these liberties would infringe upon this ability to form a conception of the 
good, and therefore infringe upon the full exercise of one of the two moral powers. 
In order for an individual to be able to fully exercise their two moral powers, they 
must therefore possess a fully adequate scheme of these basic liberties, fully 
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adequate to be understood with regards to the exercise of these powers. However, 
within the thesis, there is little room for first principle considerations. 
 
2.1.3 – The First Principle and My Question 
 
 Let us take the most extreme assumption as an example. Imagine an 
individual, who, when their insurer discovers their genetic status, sees their premium 
rise so that it is no longer affordable for them. Indeed, imagine that this individual is 
now essentially untouchable, and cannot obtain life insurance anywhere, from any 
insurer, for any price. It would not appear that this individual would see their access 
to a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties compromised. Moving through the list, 
it is difficult to envisage a situation whereby the denial of life insurance restricts 
either their freedom of thought or liberty of conscience, as this would appear to be 
much more relevant in cases of political repression by the state. Second, it would 
seem that their political liberties would not be meaningfully compromised either. It 
is important to remember here that within the UK we have full provision of social 
healthcare through the NHS, and that we are talking about life insurance rather than 
health insurance. As such, an individual will still be able to access healthcare, and 
their health will not deteriorate to the point where they are unable to exercise their 
basic liberties simply through the denial of insurance. Similarly, this individual 
would also retain bodily integrity, and any rights or liberties granted to them by the 
rule of law. Therefore, even under the most severe assumptions, the use or 
prohibition on use of this data by insurers does not have any meaningful effect on an 
individual’s access to a scheme of basic liberties. The first principle is therefore 
more concerned with restricting the actions of a totalitarian or dictatorial state, and 
the establishment of basic political structures. Given this, I will proceed to the 
second principle, as it is this which the use of genetic data may affect. 
 
2.1.4 – The Second Principle of Justice 
 
 Having established that my question does not meaningfully engage with the 
first principle of justice, we must move to the second. Again, the revised principle 
within Political Liberalism reads: 
24 
 
“Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached 
to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and 
second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.”18 
 
 We must first consider whether the ability to obtain social and economic 
goods (hereafter termed primary goods) is available under conditions of fair equality 
of opportunity, and then second, whether these inequalities are to the benefit of the 
least advantaged members of society. The second principle of justice is a rejection of 
strict egalitarianism. It recognises that, given equal basic liberties, it may in fact be 
beneficial to all of us to allow inequalities in primary goods to exist, rather than to 
each have a strictly equal share. As an example, it may be justifiable under the 
second principle to pay medical professionals more than other jobs, provided that the 
education and skills required to obtain this job are available to all under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity. The attachment of higher wages to this profession may 
encourage the most talented individuals to work in this field, and a society with the 
most talented medical professionals is beneficial to the poorest as they can obtain 
better medical care (assuming the presence of a social health system like that 
currently provided by the UK). We can also see from the second principle that the 
inequalities we concern ourselves with are merely “social and economic 
inequalities”, and not every inequality per se. To understand this requires a very 
brief exploration of the literature on social and natural inequality. 
 
2.1.5 – Social and Natural Inequality 
 
Within A Theory of Justice, Rawls draws a distinction between what he terms 
“natural good[s]” and social goods, natural goods being those which are not “directly 
under [the] control” of society.19 Within this section, he gives an individual’s health 
status as an example of a natural good. Of course this is true; we do not control the 
particular natural endowments that an individual may be born with, nor their genetic 
status.
20
 We do however control the structure of the society in which this individual 
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will find themselves in for example, their access to healthcare to mitigate their 
disadvantage, rules against discrimination based on natural characteristics, rules on 
accessibility for the disabled, etc. 
 
Indeed, even the first discussion of the theory within A Theory of Justice 
explicitly concerns itself with levelling natural inequality, searching as it does for: 
 
"…a conception of justice that nullifies the accidents of natural endowment ... as counters 
in quest for political and economic advantage...”21 
 
At the very least then, even if we either should not or cannot level natural inequality 
in itself, we are bound to nullify their effect on either political or economic 
advantage. As Buchanan notes, the central purpose of the whole endeavour, 
especially the second principle is to ensure that: 
 
“…individuals be compensated for having lower life-prospects as a result of their (less 
fortunate or undeserved) natural or social endowments”22 
 
Whether an individual is economically disadvantaged due to social or natural factors 
is utterly irrelevant here. If they are disadvantaged through no fault of their own, the 
principles of justice require us to intervene either to provide an equal distribution, or 
an unequal distribution which is to the benefit of members of the least advantaged 
group. 
 
 The question of whether we should attempt to correct natural inequality itself 
is outside the scope of this thesis. Instead, my specific focus within this piece is 
twofold. First, does the possession of a certain genetic status lead to an individual 
being unable to compete under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and 
therefore, prevent them from obtaining equal primary goods over the course of a 
whole life? Second, if there is such a disadvantage, how should we approach the use 
of this genetic data in order to fulfil our obligations under the principles of justice? 
The approach I am taking within the thesis is therefore the one explicitly suggested 
by Rawls, the use of social structures to compensate for inequality (insurance and 
genetic status respectively). 
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 As I am concerned with genetic data which may lead to the development of 
future illness, access to healthcare is also important here. When discussing this, I am 
grateful to Norman Daniels, who within Just Health (amongst other publications) 
makes the case for health and healthcare to be considered as concerns of Rawlsian 
justice. He does not however suggest that these should be added to the list of primary 
goods, as he fears to do so would leave us “likely to lose our shared political 
conception of the needs of citizens.”23 He identifies that several other essential goods 
such as food, clothing [and] shelter” are not primary goods per-se, but simply 
expected to be “adequately supported by fair shares of income and wealth”.24 
Instead, he suggests the appropriate mechanism through which we should confront 
health and healthcare inequalities is that of fair equality of opportunity. If an 
individual is unable to compete fairly for primary goods due to their health status, 
they are entitled as a matter of justice to assistance rectifying this unfairness.  A 
proper understanding of the difference principle also requires a concern for health 
inequality. Insofar as I am able to demonstrate that genetic status leads to ill-health, 
and that ill-health compromises either fair equality of opportunity or the ability to 
obtain primary goods, we must be legitimately concerned. Even under the most strict 
understanding of our obligations (dismissing any requirement to level natural 
inequality), we must still structure societal and political structures so as to fulfill the 
requirements of justice. Regulation relating to the use of genetic data is part of this. 
 
 Fair equality of opportunity is therefore as this denial of opportunity means 
that individuals are less able to obtain primary goods that they otherwise would be 
able to possess, something which violates the principles of justice. However, we 
must now answer two further questions before we are able to apply the principle. 
First, what are the primary goods we are concerned about distributing? And second, 
how are we to define fair equality of opportunity, and why is it relevant to the thesis 
question? The rest of the Chapter will be devoted to answering these two questions. 
First, the primary goods. 
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2.2 – The Primary Goods 
 
 Within this section, I will first offer a very brief account of which goods we 
are concerned about distributing, before proceeding to explain the concept of 
capability sets and its relevance to my question. Finally, I will defend my specific 
focus on the good of income and wealth. 
 
2.2.1 – What are the Primary Goods? 
 
 If we look again at the two principles, we find that both are concerned with 
distribution, to a Rawlsian, justice is all about distributing things fairly between 
different individuals. The currency we are concerned about distributing is that of 
primary goods.
25
 So, what are these primary goods? Within A Theory of Justice 
Rawls provides a basic list, suggesting that these goods are “rights, liberties, and 
opportunities, and income and wealth.”26 This list is somewhat unhelpful in its 
brevity, but further clarification is provided within later work, specifically a list of 
primary goods which reads as follows: 
 
“ 
a. basic rights and liberties, also given by a list; 
b. freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse 
opportunities; 
c. powers and prerogative of offices and positions of responsibility in the political and 
economic institutions of the basic structure; 
d. income and wealth; and finally 
e. the social bases of self-respect.”27 
 
Within this account, we have already discussed a. b. and c., as these relate to 
the list of basic liberties provided in 2.1.2.  Broadly speaking, the first principle is 
concerned with the distribution of those primary goods identified under a to c. and 
the second principle with the distribution of d. and e. Within the thesis, I will be 
primarily focused on the distribution of income and wealth rather than the social 
bases of self-respect. 
Looking again at the list of primary goods and the second principle of justice, 
we know that our starting point is that individuals should possess each of these 
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goods equally, unless an unequal distribution benefits the least advantaged group. 
We also know that the justification for the primary goods is that they constitute 
“things that every rational man is presumed to want” and which “normally have a 
use whatever a person’s rational plan of life.”28 It is therefore claimed that, as these 
individuals are both self-interested and rational, that “given human nature, wanting 
them is part of being rational.”29 The list of goods above is therefore perhaps better 
expressed as a list of citizens’ needs. Given that we wish to allow citizens to pursue 
rational plans of life, the political question then essentially becomes what do citizens 
need to pursue these plans? What the list describes is what should “be publicly 
recognised as citizens’ needs and hence as advantageous for all.”30 
 
What is important here is not that an individual accepts that primary good X 
is beneficial to their life plan, because it may not be. Instead, the individual merely 
has to accept that it may be necessary for other individuals’ life plans, and may have 
been necessary for a plan that they may have wished to pursue, or may wish to 
pursue in future. The individual does not have to value any of these specific goods; 
only recognise that they may indeed be valued by a different individual. 
 
2.2.2 – Primary Goods and Capability Sets 
 
 Before we proceed to examine fair equality of opportunity, there exists a 
problem with the primary goods account, identified by Amartya Sen. Specifically, he 
criticises the primary goods account as one which is unable to take account of 
differing capability between citizens, and therefore, an account which fails to 
produce a just system. Indeed, he claims that: 
 
“…equality of holdings of primary goods or of resources can go hand in hand with serious 
inequalities in actual freedoms enjoyed by different persons.”31 
 
 The focus here is on substantive freedom. Two individuals may possess the 
same bundle of primary goods, but one of them may be unable to convert these 
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bundles into actual freedoms. Given the research question is concerned with genetic 
markers which may be predictive of future disease, the potential for capability to be 
limited may be important here. As we acknowledged earlier, primary goods are 
simply means to ends, in that they are the basic necessities required for an individual 
to advance their conception of the good. Sen claims that inequalities can arise during 
the conversion of these all-purpose means to individual specific ends.  
 
 So what of the distribution of the primary goods under the second principle? 
Thinking specifically about genetic data and the potential for future ill health, what 
about the individual who cannot use their primary goods as well as another because 
they are disabled, or ill? They would seem neither to have chosen this, nor to be able 
to rectify this by changing their preferences. This is a concern first highlighted by 
Arrow in his 1973 paper, and it would seem similar to the concerns which Sen 
expresses.
32
  
 
 One way of beginning to solve this objection is to consider the scope of the 
primary goods. Earlier in the Chapter, I briefly explained how we are able to 
consider health and healthcare needs as facilitative of fair equality of opportunity, 
and the ability to obtain primary goods. Let us start with an idea of what health is. 
For our purposes: 
 
“…the basic idea is that health is the absence of disease, and diseases (I include deformities 
and disabilities that result from trauma) are deviations from the normal functional 
organization of a typical member of a species."
33
 
 
Therefore, if an individual has sub-normal functioning for a member of their species, 
they are considered to have a disease. If they function normally, they are considered 
to be healthy. Accepting this definition, we can begin to form a claim that the second 
principle of justice does indeed deal with the criticisms levelled at it by Arrow and 
Sen. Specifically, our commitment to the idea of fair equality of opportunity means 
that a justifiable application of these principles will somewhat solve this problem. 
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There is no doubt that this individual may be less able to compete for 
opportunities (such as employment) to which primary goods are attached due to their 
disease or disability. However, a proper application of these principles will 
necessitate provision of adequate healthcare, as the healthcare an individual receives 
for their condition can determine whether they are able to compete under conditions 
of fair equality of opportunity. A commitment to allowing these individuals to 
compete fairly means that we are committed to rectifying or mitigating the effects of 
any disease, as possession of a disease would mean that they were functioning and 
therefore competing sub-normally. 
 
However, this commitment to provide healthcare does not completely satisfy 
this objection. As we will come to find later in the thesis when we discuss my 
representative conditions, certain conditions cannot be cured, and their symptoms 
cannot currently be mitigated. As such, there will exist individuals whose capability 
is compromised through no fault of their own, and who we are unable to assist 
through providing access to healthcare. These individuals are entitled to receive aid 
through the structure of society more widely, and it may therefore be unjustifiable to 
allow the use of their genetic data. Indeed, it would seem that our underlying 
commitments bind us to considering reduced capability when considering whether it 
is legitimate to allow the use of their data. The purpose of the second principle is to 
“attempt to mitigate the arbitrariness of natural contingency and superficial 
fortune.”34  
 
Indeed, as we know from earlier, this is one of the guiding principles of our 
entire theory. The idea of justice as fairness starts from the belief that the fact that 
certain individuals are advantaged or disadvantaged through the operation of natural 
and social lotteries is unjustifiable, and we should work to rectify this. Indeed, within 
Political Liberalism, Rawls explicitly assumes that everyone within society will be a 
“normal cooperating member of society” and therefore must never confront the 
situation where these genetically disadvantaged individuals exist.
35
  This focus on 
normal members of society, along with the fact that it was written in the early 1970’s 
explains why there is no explicit answer to the question of genetic inequality within 
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his work. As my thesis concerns the real world rather than the ideal, I must be able to 
account for these genetically disadvantaged individuals within my methodology, 
especially given that they are the focus of my research question.  
 
Although the Rawlsian theory is an ‘ideal theory’, offering as it does a 
picture of the ideal world rather than strategies for dealing with the non-ideal world 
in which we currently live, we do have anecdotal evidence which suggests he would 
have approved of corrective measures such as this. Indeed, Thomas Nagel recalls 
Rawls expressing strong support for affirmative action programs within the United 
States, recognising that African-American individuals were unable to compete 
normally under the status-quo.
36
 Corrective efforts to either return these individuals 
to being able to compete normally or to compensate for their disadvantage are 
therefore within the spirit of the Rawlsian ideal. 
 
As such, we must consider the fact that these individuals are unable to 
convert their primary goods into their own conceptions of the good as effectively as 
others, merely through bad luck in the natural lottery. This inability to convert their 
goods as effectively will become important later when I begin to assess both which 
individuals are likely have either their fair equality of opportunity or capability to 
use primary goods compromised, and therefore whether individuals such as this can 
be legitimately disadvantaged further. 
 
2.2.3 – Why Income and Wealth? 
 
 Within the thesis, I intend to assess the distribution of one specific primary 
good, that of income and wealth.  This section will provide an explanation of why 
the other primary goods will not be considered here.  We know from 2.2.1 that a., b. 
and c. in the list relate to the first principle rather than the second, and from 2.1.3 
why I am not considering basic rights and liberties within the context of this thesis. 
But what of e)? The reasoning is again fairly simple, but it is worth highlighting in 
brief here. 
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First, what are the social bases of self-respect? Within the theory, the good of 
self-respect serves to, in wider form, represent a “stronger variant of the Kantian 
idea, that is, the idea of always treating persons solely as ends and never in any way 
as means.”37 This idea of self-respect is fleshed out within a later paper on Kantian 
Constructivism, which claims these bases are: 
 
“…those aspects of basic institutions which are normally essential if individuals are to have a 
lively sense of their own worth as moral persons, and to be able to realize their higher order 
interests and advance their ends with zest and self-confidence.”38 
 
Further, within A Theory of Justice, we find a longer description of the reasoning 
behind these bases, which reads: 
 
“We may define self-respect . . . to have two aspects. First of all . . . it includes a person’s 
sense of his own value [understood as] his secure conviction that his conception of the good, 
his plan of life, is worth carrying out. And second, self-respect implies a confidence in one’s 
ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfil one’s intentions.”39 
 
 This definition of self-respect requires two things be fulfilled, first, that an 
individual feels that their conception of the good is seen as valid by society and 
second, that they are able to advance this conception with confidence. Indeed, Rawls 
claims that this principle requires that individuals be able to access both communities 
of similar shared interests, and that their individual aims are respected by others.
40
 
However, in much the same way as the basic liberties discussed within 2.1.3, the use 
or prohibition on use of genetic test data within the insurance industry does not 
meaningfully impact the social bases of self-respect. Again taking the most extreme 
assumption from 2.1.3, where an individual finds themselves completely unable to 
obtain life insurance, this is unlikely to significantly undermine their ability to live 
within a community which validates and confirms their conception of the good. 
Indeed, much like the basic liberties, this primary good would appear to concern 
itself with preventing the state from affirming certain conceptions of the good, or 
from explicitly or implicitly condemning other conceptions as wrong. 
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 When considering the ability to obtain life insurance, and the potential 
variance in premium pricing that could result from the use or prohibition on use of 
genetic test data, it is the good of income and wealth which is affected. It is this 
which grounds the specific focus on income and wealth as the primary good of 
relevance within the thesis as a whole.  In addition to this primary good, the ability 
to obtain it and compete under conditions of fair equality of opportunity is also 
relevant. It is to there we now proceed. 
 
2.3 – Fair Equality of Opportunity 
 
 We know from the second principle of justice that we are also concerned 
with fair equality of opportunity. However, we still do not know what equality this 
principle requires, nor the relevance of the principle to the thesis question. It is this 
which will be discussed here. 
 
2.3.1 – What is Fair Equality of Opportunity? 
 
 Again looking to A Theory of Justice first, we find that the concept of fair 
equality of opportunity is designed to ensure that: 
 
“In all sectors of society there should be roughly equal prospects of culture and achievement 
for everyone similarly motivated and endowed”.41 
 
Within the context of the basic liberties, this means that: 
 
“…the worth of the political liberties to all citizens, whatever their social or economic 
position, must be approximately equal, or at least sufficiently equal, in the sense that 
everyone has a fair opportunity to hold public office and to influence the outcome of political 
decisions.”42 
 
Moving away from the basic liberties and toward the second principle, we can see 
above that the principle of fair equality of opportunity is one which applies to all 
sectors of society. Specifically, we are concerned about an individual having an 
equal chance, whatever their social or economic position, to obtain the positions to 
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which primary goods are attached. Take for example, employment. If two 
individuals both aspire to be doctors, given the same amount of effort from both of 
them, fair equality of opportunity would require they have equal prospects of 
achieving their goals. If one of these individuals grows up in a rich household and 
attends private school whilst the other has parents who are unable to afford such an 
education, it is likely that the wealthier child will have a higher chance of success. 
This is a violation of fair equality of opportunity, and something which the state 
must act to correct. In this case it could, for example, offer tutoring or higher quality 
education to the poorer child funded by the state in order to increase their 
opportunity. The principle is essentially one which requires a level playing field, it 
does not mandate that individuals do in fact achieve equally, only that they have 
equal prospects to, unhindered by factors which they have not chosen (such as their 
parents, social background or genetic makeup). 
 
 Fair equality of opportunity (or the denial of it) is therefore capable of 
affecting the distribution of primary goods, in our case, income and wealth. To fulfil 
this requirement, individuals with roughly equal desire to achieve should be able to 
achieve roughly equal shares of income and wealth, regardless of their social or 
natural circumstances, and society should be constructed to aid them in this end.
43
 As 
we are concerned with roughly equal access to shares of income and wealth, we must 
therefore concern ourselves with roughly equal access to the ability to obtain and 
maintain employment, as it is through employment that an individual will earn the 
vast majority of their lifetime share of income and wealth. An individual should 
therefore be roughly equally able to access the same employment regardless of their 
starting position within either the natural or social lottery. Given this, how is this 
relevant to the question I wish to answer? 
 
2.3.2 – How does fair equality of opportunity engage with genetics? 
 
 The concept of fair equality of opportunity becomes relevant when we 
examine which individuals we are going to consider. These individuals are those 
who possess genetic markers which point to the development of future disease, as 
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these are the markers which would interest insurers.
44
 Because of this, there exists 
the possibility (or near certainty) of these individuals developing future disease 
through no fault of their own.  
 
 First, this means that these individuals may have their fair equality of 
opportunity compromised with regard to access to employment, as an individual 
suffering from a severe disease may be unable to compete equally with an identical 
individual who does not suffer from the disease. One possible way of rectifying the 
situation would be through provision of healthcare to the individual, curing or 
substantially mitigating their condition and returning their ability to compete fairly. 
When considering the ability of these individuals to obtain income and wealth over 
the course of a whole life, some of these individuals will be disadvantaged. The fact 
that they are no longer able to compete fairly for positions of employment means that 
they are also less likely to be able to obtain the income and wealth which is attached 
to those positions. Therefore this loss of opportunity may also lead to a loss of 
important primary goods. This means that they are meaningfully disadvantaged, and 
that it may be unjust to disadvantage them further through the use of their data. 
Depending on the extent of the condition and resulting disadvantage, it may even be 
that these individuals could meaningfully be considered members of the least 
advantaged group over the course of their life. Membership of this group becomes 
relevant when we assess whether it is justifiable to potentially disadvantage them 
further through allowing the use of their test data by insurers. If they are not 
members of this group, it may also be that preventing the use of their data is 
unjustifiable, as that may also operate to harm members of the least advantaged 
group. These are all factors I will consider within my later analysis, specifically 
within Chapter Five.  
 
2.4 – Conclusions 
 
 Within my later analysis, there are therefore three factors to consider. These 
are: 
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a) Whether fair equality of opportunity is compromised by possession of 
this genetic data, and whether this affects the ability to obtain primary 
goods, 
b) Whether capability is compromised by possession of this genetic data, 
and 
c) The effect of prohibiting the use of this data on members of the least 
advantaged group 
 
If the possession of a certain genetic status leads an individual to be 
disadvantaged either in terms of fair equality of opportunity (and therefore 
possession of primary goods), or the capability to use them, then allowing the use of 
their data might be unjustifiable. However, it may also be possible that not allowing 
this use harms members of the least advantaged group, in violation of the difference 
principle. If members of this group are harmed through denying use of this data, it 
may then be that the interests of justice require us to allow insurers access to the data 
in question. However, before I proceed to substantially analyse fair equality of 
opportunity and capability in this context, allow me to first offer a preliminary 
assessment of justifiability premised on membership of the least advantaged group, 
and identify the problems with that account. This will be the substantive content of 
Chapter Three.  
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Chapter Three 
Preliminary Assessment of Justifiability 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 Within this Chapter I will provide a preliminary assessment of justifiability, 
focusing on the possession of income and wealth. First, I will establish both that 
within the insurance context, the use (or prohibition on use) of test data is capable of 
affecting wealth through the mechanism of premium pricing, and second, that it is 
possible to identify those individuals who possess high income and wealth through 
the use of policy value as an appropriate proxy. I will then proceed to provide a 
preliminary assessment of justifiability focusing on the identification of individuals 
who are members of the least advantaged group, and as such, those individuals who 
it is unjustifiable to further disadvantage through allowing the use of their data. 
Finally, I will identify several significant problems with the assessment of 
justifiability in this way. The purpose of this Chapter is both to defend my use of 
policy value as a proxy, and to demonstrate both the insufficiency and difficulty of 
assessing the issue purely through reference to membership of the least advantaged 
group. This will then inform the more nuanced analysis offered within Chapter Four 
and more substantially within Chapter Five. 
 
3.1.1 – How is Wealth to be assessed? 
 
From Chapter Two, we know that when assessing the use of genetic 
information by insurers, the only primary good which may be meaningfully affected 
is that of income and wealth. It is through the distribution of these primary goods 
that we assess which individuals are members of the least advantaged group, and 
specifically in this case, whether the distribution of wealth is in accordance with the 
principles of justice. The issue here is the variation in insurance policy price an 
individual would receive were insurers to be able to use their test data. Looking at 
the list of primary goods, it is only iv), income and wealth, that could be affected by 
a change in policy price. Even in the worst case scenario where an individual is 
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priced out of insurance altogether, they will not have their possession of any of the 
other primary goods affected. When we assess which individuals may be members of 
the least advantaged group, we are in this case assessing an individuals’ possession 
of income and wealth. If a policy further disadvantages members of the least 
advantaged group it is unjustifiable. If it does not, it may not be. Further, it is 
reasonable to suggest that there exists a level of income and wealth whereby an 
individual can no longer be considered a member of this group.  One suggested 
boundary is the lowest wealth quartile.
1
 If we are able to identify these individuals 
who are not members of the least advantaged group, it is not prima facie 
unjustifiable to disadvantage them through allowing insurers to use their test data. 
This becomes relevant later when we discuss adverse selection, as it is possible that 
preventing insurers from using certain data could disadvantage all policy holders, 
including those who are members of the least advantaged group. 
 
3.1.2 – Why does the use of test data affect wealth? 
 
The issue here is one of increasing premiums. The UK insurance industry 
operates broadly on a system of mutuality, whereby an individual pays a 
differentiated premium representative of the risk that they bring to the insured pool. 
These individual risks are aggregated to produce wide risk categories within which 
an individual will fall. Assuming rational economic behavior and profit motives, the 
insurance company will charge a higher premium to an individual if they present a 
higher risk to the pool, that is, if they are more likely to make a claim (or make a 
larger claim) on their policy. Specifically within the life insurance context, we 
therefore care about how likely an individual is to die over the insured period, and 
how much is to be paid out as a result of death. If an individual carries genetic 
markers predisposing them to a certain condition, they will in many cases be at a 
higher risk of developing this condition than someone who does not carry said 
markers. If this condition is sufficiently serious, they may then be at a higher risk of 
death during the insured period. If insurers are allowed to use this data when 
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assessing risk, the individual may be seen as more risky to insure, meaning they will 
pay a higher premium for the same level of cover. This directly affects the 
individuals’ total level of wealth, a primary good. If the individual can legitimately 
be considered a member of the least advantaged group, further disadvantaging them 
in this way is unjustifiable. 
 
 Preventing the use of this genetic data also potentially raises an issue with 
respect to premium pricing. In theory, an individual who knows that they are at 
higher risk due to the results of a genetic test will likely purchase a higher level of 
insurance than an individual at lower risk, as they are more likely to need to claim on 
the policy. Equally, individuals who know they are at low risk of developing specific 
conditions may choose to purchase a less comprehensive policy, or not purchase 
insurance at all, confident that they will not need to make a claim. The insured pool 
then contains many individuals whose risk is higher than their risk assessment would 
suggest, and fewer individuals whose risk is perhaps overestimated. The insurer 
therefore suffers a hit to profit as they pay out on more policies than their risk 
assessment would suggest. This cost to the insurer is then passed to the consumer in 
the form of an increase in premiums. A denial of actuarially relevant information to 
insurers in this case leads to what the industry terms ‘adverse selection’. This is a 
state in which the “insurer cannot determine some characteristics of the insured that 
are relevant to the determination of the probability of the future state of nature.”2 
Essentially, this is an issue of asymmetric information where the insured individual 
is able to better assess their risk than the insurer.
3
  This increase in premiums as a 
result of adverse selection means that denial of actuarially relevant information may 
act to harm those who are members of the least advantaged group, and therefore, that 
this denial of information would be unjustifiable under the difference principle. 
 
 Moving beyond the theoretical, empirical studies such as Cawley and 
Philipson’s studies on the US life insurance market4, and Cardon and Hendel’s 
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studies on US health insurance
5
 both find that this positive correlation between risk 
and possession of insurance is not necessarily supported. Indeed, in the life insurance 
studies, the authors “…found evidence of bulk discounts, multiple contracting, and a 
negative covariance between risk and quantity. Each of these is the opposite of the 
predicted pattern.”6 Specifically, Cawley and Phillipson find that within the US life 
insurance context, there is actually a neutral or negative relationship between the risk 
an individual poses, and the amount of insurance they possess. Further, it is 
suggested that this might be because insurers act, over time, to limit coverage to high 
risk individuals, or that insurers may be able to overcome information asymmetry 
through analysis of costs of production and market trends. 
 
In contrast, evidence of adverse selection due to asymmetric information can 
be found both in US Automobile insurance
7
, and a substantial amount of literature 
relating to health insurance markets.
8
 Support for this positive correlation can also be 
found in US studies by Ettner
9
 and Finkelstein
10
, and a Swiss study by Gardiol et. 
al.
11
 Finally, an assessment of the potential impact of a specific Medicare reform 
found that adverse selection would lead to an increase in premium price for those 
remaining in the Medicare ‘fee-for-service’ program.12 The empirical evidence from 
the US is therefore mixed.  
 
 We can find help with the UK context by examining a study of the UK 
Annuity market published in 2004. Within this study, we find that whilst there is 
little evidence that adverse selection affects the amount payable if the insured event 
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occurs, there is significant evidence that both mortality rates and policy pricing do 
act consistently with adverse selection.
13
 The study stresses the importance of 
studying different dimensions of the insurance contract, as some may be vulnerable 
to adverse selection whilst others are not. This could also offer an explanation of the 
divide in the literature. Again, as highlighted in the study, the amount of payment if 
the insured event occurs is the dimension of the contract most studied in other 
papers, and is the dimension that does not show adverse selection.
14
 
 
 Of the studies cited, the only one which considers multiple dimensions of the 
insurance contract is that performed by Finkelstein and Poterba. Equally, this is the 
only study which relates to the UK insurance market, and their results support the 
theoretical position outlined earlier, namely that a positive correlation exists between 
an individuals’ perceived risk and their possession of insurance. If higher risk 
individuals purchase more insurance, and insurers cannot account for this, then 
adverse selection occurs. Further, this study demonstrates that the insurer response to 
adverse selection is a rise in premium price for all. Another 2008 study carried out 
on behalf of the Institute for Fiscal Studies found that “…adverse selection is present 
in the British private health insurance market.”15  
 
 The risk of adverse selection is even higher within the life insurance context. 
Unlike health insurance, where the predicted costs of healthcare impose a soft limit 
upon the coverage an individual will purchase, there is no such limit on life 
insurance.
16
 In addition, these individuals are also able to purchase coverage from 
more than one provider, or buy more than one policy, preventing the use of limiting 
mechanisms such as price quantity contracts or non-linear pricing.
17
 The impact of 
adverse selection may therefore be considerable, as can be seen in empirical studies 
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by Subramanian et. al. which show that even under strict underwriting conditions, 
adverse selection (in this case, for BRCA mutations) produces premium increases.
18
 
 
 The empirical studies above suggest both a) that adverse selection is capable 
of occurring when information asymmetry occurs, and b) that this is responded to by 
an increase in premium pricing, especially in the life insurance context. Both the use 
of, and prohibition on the use of test data are therefore capable of affecting 
individual wealth, and therefore affecting a primary good. If an individual is wealthy 
enough to not be considered a member of the least advantaged group, it may be 
justifiable to disadvantage them by allowing the use of their test data in order to 
prevent a rise in premiums for all (and therefore for members of the least advantaged 
group) as a response to adverse selection. 
 
3.2 – Policy Value as a Proxy for Individual Wealth 
 
 Of course, in order to assess whether these individuals are or are not 
members of the least advantaged group, I first need to be able to identify who these 
individuals are, and how much income and wealth they possess. A possible solution 
is through the use of the sum insured as a proxy for individual wealth. If this is an 
appropriate proxy, then policy setting may become easier, as we may be able to 
identify a level of coverage that cannot possibly include any members of the least 
advantaged group. But is this a valid proxy? 
 
3.2.1 – Do increased policy values correlate with wealthier consumers? 
 
 First, it can be demonstrated empirically that an increase in the wealth 
possessed by individuals does indeed lead to increased possession of life insurance. 
Early studies found that an increase in life insurance correlated with an increase in 
income
19
, as well as total assets, and net worth.
20
 This correlation between increased 
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individual income and increased insurance possession can also be found in surveys 
of consumer finances both in the past,
21
 and more recently.
22
 Indeed, the recent 
survey cited found that: 
 
“Ownership of cash value insurance is broadly spread across demographic groups, with a 
tendency toward increasing rates among families with higher levels of income and wealth 
and those with older family heads.”23 
 
 The correlation is further reinforced by a 2002 study on household portfolio 
allocations, which demonstrates that as earnings rise, so does the tendency to invest 
in non-liquid assets such as insurance. Chambers and Schlagenhauf found that whilst 
the lowest earning quartile held approximately 70.9% of their portfolio in liquid 
form, this fell sharply when considering the second quartile of income, and even 
further beyond that.
24
 Therefore, as individual wealth rises, the likelihood of an 
individual possessing life insurance at all also rises. This correlation is also 
suggested by industry publications on the demand for health insurance, such as those 
by Deloitte.
25
 In addition to the early empirical studies, survey data and industry 
publications, we can also find comprehensive academic work demonstrating the link 
between individual incomes and an increase in the sum insured, such as those offered 
by Berekson,
26
 Anderson,
27
 and Greene.
28
 However, as later studies demonstrate, 
wealth is not the only determinant of the sum held. 
 
                                                 
21
 Katona, G. et. al., 1964 Survey of Consumer Finances (1965) Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, 
Institute of Social Research, University of Michigan. 
22
 Bucks, B. et. al., Recent Changes in US Family Finances: Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey 
of Consumer Finances, Accessible at: 
[http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/financesurvey.pdf] Accessed 08-02-12. p. A11. 
23
 Bucks, B. et. al., Recent Changes in US Family Finances: Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey 
of Consumer Finances, op. cit., p. A17. 
24
 Chambers, M. and Schlagenhauf, D., Household Portfolio Allocations, Life Cycle Effects and 
Anticipated Inflation, (2002) Working Paper, Accessible at: [http://mailer.fsu.edu/~dschlage/garnet-
dschlage/money.pdf] Accessed 08-02-12. 
25
 Deloitte Access Economics, Macroeconomic drivers of private health insurance coverage, (2011), 
Accessible at: 
[https://www.deloitteaccesseconomics.com.au/uploads/File/nib%20report%20WEB%20 
final%20010911.pdf] Accessed 08-02-12. 
26
 Berekson, L., Birth Order, Anxiety, Affiliation and the Purchase of Life Insurance, The Journal of 
Risk and Insurance (1972) XXXIX. (1) 93-108. 
27
 Anderson, D. and Nevin, J., Determinants of Young Marrieds’ Life Insurance Purchasing 
Behaviour: An Empirical Investigation, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, (1975) XLII. (3) 375-387. 
28
 Greene, M., Attitudes Toward Risk and a Theory of Insurance Consumption, The Journal of 
Insurance, (1963) XXX (2) 165-182. 
44 
 
 For example, several publications also highlight other factors. Anderson 
identifies that both the level of education of the purchaser, and the behaviour of the 
insurance agent both influence the amount of insurance purchased.
29
 Further, 
individuals who rely upon an insurance agent demonstrate different purchasing 
behaviour than those who do not.
30
 In a later study on married couples, Ferber and 
Lee find that while “The primary determinant of life insurance purchases tends to be 
some measure of financial status”31; other characteristics are also influential, 
including whether the husband is in control of the family finances, and the attitudes 
of the couple towards saving.
32
 Other studies find correlations between an increase in 
insurance purchase and factors such as city size, education, occupation, and age.
 33,34  
 
 So far then, it would certainly appear that an individual may hold a larger 
policy value for many reasons, only one of which being an increase in their wealth. 
We now need to determine how significant a contributor wealth is to this purchasing 
decision in order to be able to tell whether the amount of life insurance held is a 
legitimate proxy for individual wealth. A 1984 study by Burnett and Palmer can 
help. Within the study, they examined the relation of differing levels of life 
insurance ownership to the presence of certain demographic and psychographic 
characteristics. These characteristics were then assessed using multiple classification 
analysis in order to determine the significance of their contribution to the amount of 
insurance held. At the conclusion of this study, Burnett and Palmer found that of the 
nine demographic variables studied, three were of statistical significance, namely 
income, level of education and number of children.35 Meanwhile, amongst the 
twenty-two psychographic characteristics considered, fourteen were statistically 
significant, including whether the individual classified themselves as a risk taker, 
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valued religion, or considered themselves assertive.
36
 This significant statistical 
correlation between both income and number of children supports the HGAC 
position that life insurance purchase is important for the protection of dependents.37 
 
 These statistically significant variables were then classified according to 
relative importance. Through this process, we find that the five most significant 
contributing factors to the amount of life insurance held are all psychographic, 
namely Work Ethic, Fatalism, Socialisation Preference, Religion Salience and 
Assertiveness, ranging in score from .98 to .80.
38
 Of the three statistically significant 
demographic indicators, Income ranks the lowest, at a relative score of .39.
39
 At first 
glance, it would therefore certainly appear that an individual’s level of income, 
whilst a statistically significant contributor, is far less important than other factors. It 
is however possible to make more of individual wealth than the relative score 
income receives would indicate. Of the other demographic factors, Education 
receives a relative score of .59, indicating that those who possess higher levels of 
education are more likely to possess higher levels of life insurance. As educational 
attainment correlates with increased individual income and wealth, both in the UK
40
 
and the US,
41
 it is reasonable to suggest this also be used as predictive of individual 
wealth. From this study, individual income and wealth can be understood as a 
significant contributor to the amount of life insurance possessed, but not the only 
one, nor indeed the most important one. In addition, this study is somewhat limited, 
both because it only considered a small sample size in the Midwest US, and because 
it excluded the “extremes of [the] income continuum”42 both the very rich and the 
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very poor. It must also be noted that this study is now relatively old, having been 
carried out in the early 1980s. So, is this conclusion borne out by more recent work? 
 
 Looking at a 2007 study of OECD
43
 countries, we again find a positive 
correlation between wealth and sum insured. When examining life insurance demand 
across these countries, Li and others find that “…Disposable income and financial 
development are positively associated with life insurance demand”44 and “…income 
is highly correlated with life insurance purchases”45 They also offer a possible 
theoretical explanation for this, suggesting that individuals who are higher earners 
stand to suffer a greater loss of utility upon losing their income stream than 
individuals who earn lower amounts.
46
 Indeed, this study returns similar results to 
the 1980 one, finding that: 
 
“There appears to be a combination of wealth and preference effects as life insurance 
consumption almost doubles over the two central quartiles, whereas little difference is 
observed in terms of average income. On the other hand, the difference between the upper 
and lower quartiles reflects a strong wealth effect. In fact, average demand in the upper 
quartile is 3 times higher than in the next quartile for average incomes only 50 percent 
higher. Likewise, life insurance demand falls to an average of only US$71.8 [in the lowest 
quartile] revealing a high income elasticity at low income levels.”47 
 
 From this, it would appear that the central two quartiles of insurance demand 
are largely influenced by factors other than income, as insurance demand rises 
rapidly whereas income remains relatively similar. However, at the extremes of the 
continuum (those excluded in the 1980 study), wealth would appear to have a much 
greater effect. Demand for life insurance is significantly lower amongst those in the 
bottom income quartile, and significantly higher within the highest income quartile. 
This seems reasonable, as the wealthy may suffer the greater cost of utility 
highlighted earlier, whereas the very poor may just be unable to afford premiums 
past a certain level, and therefore, policies above a certain amount. Indeed, in this 
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study, demand for insurance amongst the lowest income quartile rapidly falls off, 
suggesting this is plausible. 
 
 In conclusion, the empirical studies suggest that, whilst not the most 
important contributor, a rise in individual income and wealth correlates with an 
increase in the amount of insurance held. For the median earner it would appear that 
although income is still relevant, psychographic factors far more strongly correlate 
and may go a significant way to explaining the amount of insurance held. However, 
at the extremes of the income continuum, we see that individual income and wealth 
becomes more dominant, and could be said to be the dominant causal factor. Within 
the thesis, I am therefore able to use amount of insurance held as a legitimate proxy 
for their individual wealth, as higher premiums correlate significantly with wealthier 
consumers, especially at the extremes of the income and wealth continuum. As I am 
explicitly attempting to identify those who are members of the least advantaged 
group, the proxy is even more appropriate. These individuals will reside toward the 
lower extreme of the income and wealth continuum, and only be able to afford 
premiums below a certain amount, and therefore only possess a certain value of 
policy. Again, within Chapter Two, one suggested boundary for membership of the 
least advantaged group is membership of the lowest income quartile. If we are to use 
this as our boundary, it would appear that this proxy becomes more useful, as 
possession of life insurance rapidly tails off with wealth upon reaching this quartile, 
which indicates a strong correlation between wealth and insurance demand. This has 
implications when I come to consider justifiability, as it may be possible to use data 
for policies over a certain amount, where this policy value is only accessible by those 
individuals who find themselves within the top three wealth quartiles. In this way, 
we may be able to use genetic test data while avoiding harm to members of the least 
advantaged group, either through use of their data, or through adverse selection. 
 
3.3 – Is the status quo justifiable? 
 
 In order to determine whether the current moratorium is justifiable, and 
whether it could be made more so, we must first identify which individuals are 
members of the least advantaged group. The following sub-section will provide a 
48 
 
brief summary of the efforts made so far. Having established this, I will attempt to 
assess how far the moratorium accords with the ideal position derived from the 
principles of justice. 
 
3.3.1 – Who are the members of the least advantaged group? 
 
 When we discuss membership of this group, we are not looking for the 
absolute most disadvantaged individual, but instead are aggregating this to a group 
level; we are looking for the least advantaged class of individuals, the “average taken 
over this whole class.”48 However, in the absence of comprehensive empirical work 
(something outside the scope of this thesis) it is impossible to offer a claim as to 
which specific individuals are members of the least advantaged class. The fact that 
this method of identifying the least advantaged group is somewhat arbitrary is 
something explicitly conceded by Rawls himself.
49
 The primary good we are 
concerned with in this case is income and wealth, and as such it is legitimate to 
suggest that the individuals who are the least advantaged with regard to this primary 
good reside in the lowest wealth quartile, as Rawls does.
50
 
 
 Although this is somewhat arbitrary, for now, let us accept the idea that the 
members of the least advantaged group are those individuals who find themselves in 
the lowest wealth quartile. Given the correlation between the sum of insurance held 
and individual income and wealth, I would then suggest that there exists a policy 
which no members of the least advantaged class will be able to obtain, likely because 
they would be unable to afford the premiums this policy would demand. 
 
3.3.2 – Assessment of Justifiability 
 
 We are now able to assess whether the status quo within the UK is justifiable, 
and whether it could be made more so. In order to do this, I am essentially asking 
                                                 
48
 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice: Original Edition, op. cit. p.98. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Ibid. 
 
49 
 
one question, namely, does the status quo provide benefit to, or avoid harming, 
members of the least advantaged group?  
 
 We know that a failure to allow insurers use of certain genetic information 
may lead to adverse selection and that this leads to a rise in premium prices across 
the board. This would then lead to the least advantaged individuals either paying 
increased premiums for the same policy, or being priced out of the insurance market 
altogether. Both of these mean that these individuals are further disadvantaged with 
regard to possession of primary goods. It therefore follows that we must only prevent 
the use of actuarially relevant data by insurers where the harm to members of the 
least advantaged group would be greater than the harm caused by the insurers’ 
response to adverse selection. In other words, we should not use data which relates to 
members of the least advantaged group (as this would raise their premiums directly) 
and we should use data relating to individuals who are not in this group (to prevent 
indirect premium rises). The question then essentially becomes: 
 
Which individuals can never be considered members of the least advantaged 
group, and as such, which individuals may we be able to justifiably 
disadvantage in order to protect those who are members of the least 
advantaged group? 
 
 First, let us consider the issue of policy value. Larger insurance policies are 
held by individuals who possess larger amounts of income and wealth, something 
which becomes even more true at the extreme ends of the income continuum. It is 
therefore reasonable to make the claim that there exists a policy value which no 
member of the least advantaged group could hold, likely because they could not 
afford the premiums which this policy would require. Let us term this policy value 
X. 
 
 Following on from this, it would therefore be justifiable to allow the use of 
genetic test data for policy values greater than value X. Allowing this use would 
disadvantage the holders of these policies, whilst benefiting the individuals who hold 
lower value policies by preventing significant information asymmetry, and therefore 
adverse selection. This then protects them from the premium rises that would occur 
50 
 
as a response to this phenomenon. As the holders of these higher value polices 
cannot be considered members of the least advantaged group, disadvantaging them is 
not unjustifiable under the second principle, and indeed, the interests of justice 
demand we do this to avoid disadvantaging members of the least advantaged group 
who are likely to reside in the group of policies below value X. Whilst it is not 
possible in the absence of significant empirical work to suggest what X might be or 
at the exact level it may be set, it must exist at some level. 
 
3.3.3 – Problems with the assessment thus far. 
 
 There are however two key problems with the account thus far. First, as we 
know from Chapter Two, we are concerned with individuals over the course of a 
whole life,
51
 and that we are examining the “lifetime expectations of the least 
advantaged representative persons.”52 As we are examining income and wealth, this 
becomes an issue, as this is likely to change over the course of a lifetime. Currently, 
my analysis only assesses their income and wealth up to the point they purchase 
insurance. Over the course of their lifetime, they may earn far more or less than they 
currently do, and as such, possess a significantly different amount of lifetime wealth 
than this assessment would suggest. Specifically, it is this concern which motivates 
my development of a typology and analysis of representative conditions within 
Chapter Four. Due to the nature of genetic conditions and health and life insurance 
more widely, the individual will always be purchasing insurance in advance of the 
event occurring (in this case, the development of the genetic condition). As such, 
when they develop said condition, this may operate to change either their level of 
income, or their possession of wealth, to the point where they move to being a 
member of the least advantaged class (when considered over the course of a whole 
life). Further, the assessment so far takes no account of the effect the development of 
a genetic condition may have either on fair equality of opportunity, or an individual’s 
capability to use their existing primary goods. As we know from Chapter Two, both 
of these need to be considered to provide an adequate account of justifiability. 
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 Different genetic predispositions will also have different effects on 
individuals, and affect their risk profiles in different ways. To treat all genetic data as 
the same is a key failing of the account so far. This is also dealt with within Chapter 
Four, through the development of a typology, and identification of specific 
representative conditions. As different predispositions affect risk profiles in different 
ways, they also differ in their potential to cause adverse selection. This means that 
allowing or denying the use of some genetic data may be justifiable, whereas it may 
not for another type. This will also need to be considered to provide a fully 
defensible conclusion. 
 Also, and perhaps most fatally to the account so far, I am not performing 
large empirical studies. I therefore have significant difficulty with determining the 
level at which an individual is or is not a member of the least advantaged group, 
something which is key to the whole account. In the absence of significant data 
relating to wealth distribution within the UK, I am unable to identify which 
individuals may be members of the least advantaged group. Even if we accept the 
somewhat arbitrary conclusion that the members of the least advantaged group are 
those who find themselves in the bottom wealth quartile (which is questionable in 
itself), we are unable to identify exactly where the boundary of this quartile falls, and 
therefore what value X should be. Even more concerning, we are (again as we know 
from Chapter Two) actually concerned with an individual’s actual capability to use 
their primary goods, not merely whether they possess them. As such, the more 
appropriate approach is perhaps to identify members of the least advantaged group as 
those individuals who fall within the bottom quartile when assessing their capability 
of using their primary goods. This is all but impossible in the absence of significant 
empirical work, and my methodology is not equipped to help me identify these 
individuals.  
 
3.3.4 – Problems with Policy Value ‘X’ 
 Let us accept for the moment that the individuals we are concerned about 
have genetic predispositions which do develop into future disease. Depending on the 
genetic condition the individual possesses, the policy value at which they can be 
considered a member of the least advantaged group also changes. Allow me to 
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illustrate. The median individual income within the UK is approximately £419 per 
week, or £21,788 per annum.
53
 Therefore, income at the boundary of the lowest 
quartile is approximately £10,894 p/a. Assuming continual employment at this level 
for 49 years (age 16 to retirement at age 65), an individual stands to earn lifetime 
earnings of £533,806 at the boundary of the lowest wealth quartile. Under the metric 
above then, value X would be the policy that is unaffordable by the individual who 
earns £209.50 a week, but is affordable by those who earn more than this. 
 However, when we look at the development of genetic conditions, the 
purpose of lifetime earnings becomes apparent. Let us take a comparative individual 
who earns the median income. When they come to purchase insurance, they would 
likely purchase a policy above value X, as they would be able to afford it, earning 
twice as much a week as our previous individual. However, this second individual 
also carries a genetic mutation which means they will become seriously ill and 
unable to continue employment from age 40. This means that: 
 
Individual A - £10,894 p/a for 49 years = £533,806 
Individual B – £21,788 p/a for 24 years = £522,912 
 As we can see, Individual B therefore earns less over the course of his life 
than Individual A. With regard to lifetime possession of the primary good of wealth, 
it is no longer clear that Individual A is a member of the least advantaged group, 
whilst B is not. If we consider the first individual a member of this group, it seems 
consistent to regard any individual who earns less than them as also a member of this 
group. This is true even under the assumption that Individual B also begins 
employment at 16, something which is unlikely as higher incomes correlate with 
more time in education, and therefore a later start to employment. If however 
Individual B does not suffer from the condition until age 45, then the situation is as 
follows: 
 
Individual B (at age 45) -  £21,788 p/a for 29 years = £631,852 
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and the individual moves out of the lowest wealth quartile again. The legitimate 
metric for measuring membership of the least advantaged group is still wealth, but 
assuming we are using the boundary of the lowest wealth quartile as our line, it is 
important to assess the lifetime wealth an individual will likely obtain rather than 
their current income. This makes the problems with specificity and identification of 
the least advantaged group harder, as it means we must extrapolate likely future 
wealth. 
 Further, at the point an individual purchases insurance, the policy they will 
be able to access does not depend upon their lifetime wealth earnings, but upon their 
current income. Individual B would be able, even in the first scenario, to purchase a 
policy of higher value than Individual A, even though they are less advantaged over 
the course of their whole life. This means that if we are to use value X as a metric, 
that this metric shifts depending upon the condition the individual is likely to suffer 
from. In simple terms, the more severe the conditions effect on income and wealth 
long-term, the higher value X must be, in order to account for the future effects of the 
disease on lifetime wealth. In the absence of substantial empirical work, it is 
impossible to reasonably speculate where any of these policy values may be set. If 
we are to use this metric, this will be an exercise which requires significant co-
operation between government, groups such as the Institute for Fiscal Studies and 
insurers. 
 
3.3.5 – Where do we go from here? 
The account so far therefore has several key weaknesses, specifically with 
regard to identification of individuals who are members of the least advantaged 
group over the course of a whole life. It is therefore difficult to draw a clean line 
around the data we should not use under the difference principle. All we know so far 
is that we cannot use the information of those individuals who are members of the 
least advantaged group, as this would cause their premiums to rise and disadvantage 
them contrary to the principles of justice. 
In order to provide more specific and useful conclusions, I will now examine 
the problem from a different perspective, and determine which data we should 
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legitimately be able to use when looking at individuals who are not members of this 
group. This will allow me to classify data into two broad groups: 
a) Data which can legitimately be used providing it does not relate to an 
individual who is a member of the least advantaged group, and 
b) Data which should not be used, regardless of whether the individual is a 
member of the least advantaged group.  
Illustrated through the use of specific representative conditions, generalisable to 
conditions (and therefore data) of a similar type. Given the moratorium currently 
prevents almost all use of genetic data, I will then be able to suggest both areas in 
which the moratorium should be re-assessed to allow some use (data within a)) and 
those where the moratorium is likely correct (data within b)). This will allow me to 
provide meaningful conclusions re: the justifiability of the current moratorium 
position from a Rawlsian perspective. 
In order to do this, instead of focusing on membership of the least 
advantaged group, I am going to first ground my analysis in the first part of the 
second principle of justice, the idea of fair equality of opportunity, specifically in 
relation to employment. If an individual has this equality of opportunity 
compromised, they are entitled to action to remedy this inequality, as a denial of fair 
equality of opportunity leaves them unable to compete for and thus obtain income 
and wealth in the same way as an unaffected individual. I will also provide some 
thoughts on whether the development of their condition is likely to compromise their 
capability in a meaningful way, and therefore whether they may also be considered 
legitimately disadvantaged due to this. All of this will then allow me to assess 
whether they are disadvantaged in a way which is unjust, and therefore, whether use 
of their data should be allowed. I will then proceed to assess whether denying 
insurers the use of this information would lead to adverse selection, and an increase 
in premiums for all (including members of the least advantaged group). If significant 
adverse selection would occur, it is justifiable to allow use of their data to protect 
members of this group, and the difference principle demands this. However, if 
adverse selection would not occur in a specific case, it may be that the interests of 
justice require denying access to this data, in order to not further disadvantage an 
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individual already disadvantaged either in terms of equality of opportunity or 
capability. 
 
 However, before I am able to proceed to analyse this, I must first solve the 
other two problems with the account identified earlier, namely that not all genetic 
predispositions are identical in their potential effect, and that because of this income 
(and therefore wealth) may change dramatically over the course of a whole life. It is 
this which motivates the work in the next Chapter, and informs the development of 
the following typology.  
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Chapter Four 
Representative Conditions and Consequences of Use 
 
Mindful of the differing effects of genetic conditions (and therefore 
possession of genetic data), I will now establish a typology which allows me to 
assess the potential effects of the possession of different genetic markers on future 
disadvantage. Specifically, I will be assessing the potential of genetic data to affect 
either: 
 
a) Fair equality of opportunity, or 
b) Capability 
 
 Second, as it is clearly impractical to assess every possible genetic marker 
and subsequent condition, I will then identify representative conditions along the 
scale, and provide an evidence base for where these conditions fit along my 
typology. Within Chapter Five, I will then be able to analyse the effects of these 
conditions on these key areas, and reach conclusions generalisable to conditions of a 
similar type. Finally, I will then briefly outline the two major individual 
consequences that will result from the use of genetic test data by insurers, those 
being: 
 
 a change in  individual premium prices and,  
 the creation of a potential disincentive for that individual to obtain 
the results of genetic tests,  
 
both of which may disadvantage the individual whose data is to be used. This will 
again feed into the analysis within Chapter Five, where I will assess both whether an 
individual is significantly disadvantaged due to their possession of certain genetic 
makers (and the effect that this may have on their fair equality of opportunity and 
capability to convert their primary goods), and second, whether it is then legitimate 
to further disadvantage them through the use of their test data. This will then allow 
me to reach conditions on justifiability, and therefore within Chapter Six, assess 
whether the moratorium is justifiable. 
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4.1 – Typologies 
 
4.1.1 – Introduction 
 
 In order to assess the effect of genetic conditions on both fair equality of 
opportunity and capability, I have identified three characteristics of genetic test data 
and conditions which may be relevant. These closely mirror the criteria which were 
used by the GAIC in order to assess whether a genetic test should be approved for 
use.
1
 My characteristics are: 
 
 Severity of Disease or Disorder (If managed appropriately according to 
clinical guidelines) 
 Level of Penetrance (How likely it is that those with the gene will go on to 
manifest the disease or disorder) 
 Time of Onset (Pre or Post Retirement, with Age 65 as a proxy) 
 
The following section of the Chapter will provide explanation for each of these 
criteria, before I use them to identify the representative conditions which I will later 
analyse. 
 
4.1.2 – Severity 
 
 The first characteristic I am concerned with is severity, specifically, the 
severity of the condition which results (or may result) from the possession of certain 
genetic data. Within this, I am assessing severity as (assuming the individual 
receives appropriate medical treatment for their condition) either: 
 
a) how far the development of the condition negatively impacts upon their 
ability to compete for or maintain employment under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity, or  
                                                 
1
 Association of British Insurers, Concordat and Moratorium on Genetics and Insurance, March 
2005, op. cit. p. 3. 
 
58 
 
b) their capability to use their existing primary goods, namely wealth.  
 
If a condition is capable of infringing upon either of these significantly, it will be 
judged relatively severe in my taxonomy. It is important to note at this point that 
there is a spectrum of severity, along which I will be considering representative 
points. 
 
 As an example of the types of impact I am considering, let us consider the 
following. At one end of the severity spectrum, we may have a disease which is 
degenerative, terminal, and the effects of which cannot be substantially mitigated. 
Such a disease might significantly affect both an individual’s ability to compete 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity and their capability to convert their 
primary goods. First, equality of opportunity. Such an individual would be unable to 
compete for, obtain, or maintain employment in the same way as an unaffected 
individual, nor use their goods as effectively. It may therefore be unjustifiable to 
further disadvantage them through allowing use of their data. At the other end of the 
spectrum, we may have a condition which is transient, and easily managed through 
relatively minor medical intervention. This condition would not meaningfully 
compromise either an individual’s ability to compete for, obtain or maintain 
employment, nor their capability to use their existing primary goods. Such an 
individual is therefore not meaningfully disadvantaged by their condition, and as 
such, the use of their data may be justifiable in order to protect individuals who are 
more disadvantaged from the insurers’ response to adverse selection. I will later be 
assessing conditions at different points along this spectrum. 
 
4.1.3 – Penetrance 
 
 As highlighted briefly above, the penetrance of genetic data is the likelihood 
that the possession of that genetic data will result in the development of the 
condition in question. Data with a high degree of penetrance will be that which 
correlates with a high chance of developing the condition. Data with a low degree of 
penetrance the opposite. As an example, the genetic markers for Huntington’s would 
have a penetrance of close to 100%, as the vast majority of those who possess them 
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will go on to develop the condition. At the lower end of the penetrance scale falls 
genetic data which predisposes individuals to certain conditions, such as high blood 
pressure or atherosclerosis. 
 
 This matters because (assuming some degree of severity) penetrance will 
affect whether the condition does in fact develop, and therefore, whether the 
individual will suffer the effects associated with it.
2
 Individuals who carry genetic 
data with high penetrance are more likely to suffer from the condition in question 
over the course of their life, and therefore, more likely to suffer these effects both to 
their ability to compete, and their capability to convert existing primary goods. As 
penetrance decreases, the likelihood that the individual suffers these negative 
consequences at all also decreases. The potential of an individual to be relevantly 
disadvantaged therefore decreases as penetrance does. Penetrance therefore 
potentially affects whether the use of the data could be said to be justifiable and is 
important to consider when drawing my conclusions. How penetrant the condition is 
also affects the usefulness of the information to insurers, as it affects how predictive 
it is. The more predictive information is, the larger the potential increase in premium 
if insurers are able to use this data. Again, the conditions identified later will 
represent several different points along the penetrance spectrum. 
 
4.1.4 – Time of Onset 
 
 To explain this final criterion, let us return to the idea that employment is one 
of the major areas to which an important primary good is attached, and as such, an 
area which much be open to the requirements of equality of opportunity. It therefore 
becomes important to consider time of onset as there is a distinction to be made 
between conditions which onset pre-retirement, when an individual is still likely to 
be engaged in employment, and post-retirement when they are not.
3
 Assuming some 
degree of both severity and penetrance, individuals with conditions which are likely 
to onset pre-retirement age are more likely to suffer the loss of the ability to compete 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and the subsequent loss of primary 
                                                 
2
 Rawls, John, “Social Unity and Primary Goods,” in Utilitarianism and Beyond, Amartya Sen and 
Bernard Williams (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982) 
3
 With 65 as a proxy for retirement age. 
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goods such as income and wealth. This is true even if the individual is self-
employed, as the condition may inhibit their ability to work and therefore, their 
ability to earn income and wealth. In contrast, these effects are not nearly as 
pronounced (and in some cases, entirely absent) in individuals whose conditions 
onset post-retirement. As these individuals are no longer working, they suffer little 
meaningful loss of fair equality of opportunity in relation to competition for 
employment, as they are no longer competing. Equally, they suffer no loss of income 
and wealth, as they would not be earning a wage anyway. The only relevant effect 
may be a compromise of their capability to use primary goods already obtained, 
although this depends on the severity and penetrance of the genetic marker in 
question. It may therefore be justifiable to allow the use of certain test data for 
conditions which onset post-retirement age in a way that it would not be should the 
condition onset earlier.  
 
4.1.5 – Complete Typology 
 
  The previous analysis now provides me with a system for meaningfully 
classifying different types of genetic data. Both severity and penetrance exist on a 
spectrum, the extremes of which have been identified, with time of onset a binary 
between pre and post-retirement age. Tests and conditions which fall toward the top 
end of both spectra, and which onset pre-retirement will have a very serious effect 
upon an individual’s fair equality of opportunity and capability, and as such, 
potentially make it unjustifiable to allow the use of their test data. Equally, data 
falling toward the lower end of the spectra, or which onset post-retirement could 
perhaps justifiably be used, given that failing to allow use of this data may 
disadvantage members of the least advantaged group. This will be explored in detail 
within Chapter Five. 
 
 It is however impractical for me to consider every possible permutation of 
these criteria within the thesis. Therefore, I intend to limit my analysis to specific 
representative points along these spectra, points which will be illustrated through the 
use of specific genetic conditions. The use of specific representative conditions 
allows me to gather an evidence base relating to severity, penetrance and time of 
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onset, and provide meaningful conclusions about the use of test data for real world 
conditions. This will then also be generalisable to conditions of a similar type, where 
the data considered is representative of all alike data. The conditions which I am 
going to consider are: 
 
 Alzheimer’s Disease 
 Huntington’s Disease 
 BRCA1 and BRCA2 Mutations 
 Type 1 Haemochromatosis 
 Hypertension 
 
with their position within the typology explained and defended within the following 
section. 
 
4.2 – Representative Conditions 
 
 Before I am able to analyse whether the use of data relating to a specific 
condition is justifiable, I must first be able to accurately place each condition within 
my typology. To do this, I need to know the severity, penetrance and time of onset of 
each condition I am studying. The following sections provide this evidence base. 
 
4.2.1 – Alzheimer’s Disease 
 
Severity 
 
 Alzheimer’s disease is a progressive form of dementia, characterised by a 
gradual loss of memory at onset. Individuals may misplace items, become 
disorientated or begin to have problems with language. The condition can also lead 
to psychological issues such as depression or mood swings. After the initial stages, 
the individual continues to decline, and will begin to suffer a loss of sensory and 
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motor function towards the later stages of the disease.
4
 In the late stages, the disease 
can fairly be characterised as very severe, with the individual losing the ability to 
recognise even close family members, the ability to communicate, and eventually 
becoming bed-bound.
5
 The rate of progression is variable, but the average 
progression of symptoms spans a decade.
6
 
 
 The disease is eventually terminal, and there is currently no known cure. The 
average life expectancy for an Alzheimer’s patient after the onset of symptoms is 
between eight and ten years.
7
 As such, the treatment plan for the disease is based 
upon management of the condition, and seeks to “minimize behavioural 
disturbances, maximize functioning and independence, and foster a safe and secure 
environment.”8 The degenerative progression of the disease and the fact that 
symptoms cannot be prevented from developing both mean that the development of 
the condition has a significant effect on both fair equality of opportunity and an 
individual’s capability to convert their primary goods. Indeed, an individual 
suffering from Alzheimer’s would be entirely unable to compete for employment 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and less capable of using their 
existing primary goods. As such, the condition would be placed toward the top end 
of the severity spectrum. In approximately 90% of cases, the diagnosis can be made 
on the basis of a general medical and psychiatric evaluation, so genetic testing is not 
needed to perform a diagnosis.
9
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Small GW, et. al. Diagnosis and treatment of Alzheimer disease and related disorders. Consensus 
statement of the American Association for Geriatric Psychiatry, the Alzheimer's Association, and the 
American Geriatrics Society. JAMA. (1997) 278 (16) 1363–1371. 
5
 Alzheimer's Association. Alzheimer's disease facts and figures 2007: a statistical abstract of U.S. 
data on Alzheimer's disease. Accessible at: 
[http://alz.org/national/documents/Report_2007FactsAndFigures.pdf] Accessed 10-02-2012. 
6
 Small GW, et. al. Diagnosis and treatment of Alzheimer disease and related disorders. Consensus 
statement of the American Association for Geriatric Psychiatry, the Alzheimer's Association, and the 
American Geriatrics Society. op. cit. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Rasmusson, D. X. et al. Accuracy of clinical diagnosis of Alzheimer disease and clinical features of 
patients with non-Alzheimer neuropathology, Alzheimer Disease & Associated Disorders (1996) 10 
180-188. 
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Penetrance 
 
 The risk factors for the development of Alzheimer’s are multifactorial. 
Within this there exists a strong genetic component, although its penetrance is 
debateable. For example, the development of Late Onset (Post 60 Years) 
Alzheimer’s is strongly influenced by the allele Apolipoprotein Epsilon Four 
(APOE-4). The possession of certain APOE-4 statuses confers a dramatically 
increased risk of developing the disease, and at an earlier age.
10
 Indeed, studies 
demonstrate that an increasing number of APOE-4 alleles correlates with an 
increasing incidence of the disease, with homozygosity “virtually sufficient to cause 
AD by age 80”.11 
 
 Further, in a study of individuals over the age of seventy-five, we find that: 
 
“Family history of dementia was associated with an increased risk of dementia and AD in 
this very old population, but only among APOE epsilon4 carriers”12 
 
which suggests that an individual’s APOE-4 status may be an important indicator for 
assessing whether they will go on to develop Alzheimer’s disease. However, the 
same study also concluded that “other familial (genetic or environmental) risk factors 
for dementia and AD might be
 
active among APOE-4 carriers.”13 Indeed, work done 
by Ashford in 2004 suggests that APOE-4 contributes approximately 50% of the 
attributable risk for Alzheimer’s.14 Certain other studies implicate genetic 
contributions located on Chromosome Twelve
15
, which is supported by other 
sources.
16,17
 The genetic contribution towards Alzheimer’s is neatly summarised by 
Tanzi, who explains that: 
                                                 
10
 Roses, A.D. et. al., Influence of the susceptibility genes apolipoprotein E-epsilon 4 and 
apolipoprotein E-epsilon 2 on the rate of disease expressivity of late-onset Alzheimer’s disease, 
Arzneimittelforschung (1995) 45 (3A) 413-417. 
11
 Corder, E.H. et. al., Gene dose of apolipoprotein E type 4 allele and the risk of Alzheimer’s disease 
in late onset families, Science (1993) 13 (261) 921-923. 
12
 Huang,W. et. al., APOE genotype, family history of dementia, and Alzheimer disease risk: a 6 year 
follow-up study, Archives of Neurology (2004) 61 (12) 1930-1934. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ashford, J, APOE Genotype Effects on Alzheimer’s Disease Onset and Epidemiology, Journal of 
Molecular Neuroscience (2004) 23 (3) pp. 157-165. 
15
 Pericak-Vance, M.A. et. al., Complete genomic screen in late-onset familial Alzheimer disease. 
Evidence for a new locus on chromosome 12, JAMA (1997) 278 (15) 1237-41. 
16
 Schellenberg, G.D. et. al., The genetics of Alzheimer’s Disease, Current Psychiatry Reports (2000) 
2 (2) 158-164. 
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“While APP, the presenilins, and APOE represent the only firmly established AD genes to 
date, the other genes described in this review remain at best functional and/or positional 
candidates…[however] some of these loci exhibit genetic linkage and/or association with 
AD across independent datasets and are thus worthy of further investigation at both the 
genetics and functional levels.”
18
 
  
It is therefore clear that certain genetic markers predispose individuals 
towards the development of Alzheimer’s disease. However, we do not yet have a 
clear picture as to the exact contribution of this genetic status. For help, we can look 
to Skeehan’s summary of the contribution of APOE-4. He states: 
 
“Persons with APOE ε4/ ε4 have increased risk—more than sixteen-fold higher among 
Caucasian males at peak relative risk—and they have earlier age of onset than individuals 
with only one ε4 (three-fold higher risk in Caucasian males). Individuals with only one ε4 
have a higher risk and earlier onset, in turn, than those with no ε4 alleles.”19 
 
 We therefore know that APOE-4 (and possibly other markers) contributes 
significantly to the risk of developing Alzheimer’s disease, possibly in the region of 
50% attributable risk. The presence of these markers therefore provides a decent 
indication as to whether an individual will go on to develop the condition. The 
condition is therefore relatively penetrant, and would be relevant in an actuarial 
context. This relevance is strengthened by Skeehan’s second conclusion, that 
possession of certain combinations of APOE-4 also causes earlier onset of the 
condition. Given that this can range from before seventy to over ninety years of age, 
it is reasonable to suggest that this is also of actuarial relevance. If an individual has 
genetic markers which indicate an age of onset before or around seventy years of 
age, they will develop the condition over the course of an average lifespan. If the 
median age of onset suggested by their genetic markers is over ninety years of age, it 
is far less likely they will survive long enough to suffer from the condition. As such, 
it is less likely that a life insurer would view this genetic predisposition as relevant to 
their risk calculation, as the individual is likely to die from another cause first. 
 
 Given that genetic markers are thought to contribute approximately 50% of 
the attributable risk, it is fair to conclude that genetic markers (and thereby, genetic 
                                                                                                                                          
17
Yu, C.E. et. al., The apolipoprotein E/CI/CII gene cluster and late-onset Alzheimer disease, 
American Journal of Human Genetics (1994) 54 (4) 631-642. 
18
 Tanzi, R. and Bertram, L., Twenty Years of the Alzheimer’s Disease Amyloid Hypothesis: A Genetic 
Perspective, Cell (2005) 120 545-555. 
19
 Skeehan, K. et. al., Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing Practices on Access to Genetic Testing 
for Alzheimer’s Disease, Genetic Medicine (2010) 12 (4 Suppl.) S71-S82. 
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testing) can provide us a reasonable indication of an individual’s level of risk with 
regard to the development of Alzheimer’s disease, and it seems appropriate to place 
it towards the middle of the penetrance spectrum. 
 
Time of Onset 
 
 As Alzheimer’s disease is a form of degenerative dementia, it is primarily a 
disease of the old. We can already see from the studies cited earlier, that the majority 
of individuals within those studies were over the age of 60. Indeed, late-onset 
Alzheimer’s is defined as that which onsets post sixty years of age, and the majority 
of cases onset post retirement.
20
 
 
Location within typology 
 
 Alzheimer’s disease is therefore an example of a condition that is somewhat 
penetrant, and is capable of having severe effects on both fair equality of opportunity 
and an individuals’ capability to use their existing primary goods. The specific 
relevance of this condition is that it is the only one of my representative conditions 
which onsets post-retirement age. Further, with regard to severity, both the onset of 
the condition and its subsequent symptoms are similar to those caused by 
Huntington’s, one of my other representative conditions. Using this condition, I will 
therefore later be able to examine how far the fact that a condition onsets post-
retirement affects my conclusions regarding whether use of data is justifiable in the 
insurance context. This is the relevance of this specific condition, and the reason for 
its selection. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Alzheimer's Association. Alzheimer's disease facts and figures 2007: a statistical abstract of U.S. 
data on Alzheimer's disease. Accessible at: 
[http://alz.org/national/documents/Report_2007FactsAndFigures.pdf] 
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4.2.2 – Huntington’s disease 
 
Severity 
 
 Much like Alzheimer’s, Huntington’s disease is a degenerative, neurological 
disease characterised by an initial onset of clumsiness, small involuntary movements, 
unsteadiness and depression.
21
 As the disease progresses, chorea worsens, as does 
cognitive ability. Middle-disease symptoms include further motor degeneration 
which begins to interfere with daily life, such as trouble walking, psychological 
issues such as delusions and hallucinations, and a further decline in memory.
22
 Late-
stage Huntington’s is characterised by severe ataxia leading to severely impaired 
mobility, and a progressive worsening of both dysarthria (problems with speech and 
enunciation) and dysphagia (difficulty swallowing). This development of symptoms 
can lead to an individual being unable to communicate or feed themselves without 
assistance in the later stages of the disease.
23
 Severe neurological degeneration can 
also lead individuals to lose bowel and bladder control.
24
 Due to the severe nature of 
the condition, individuals with late-stage Huntington’s often require round-the-clock 
care as they are unable to support themselves. 
 
 In terms of progression, a study of 510 patients suggests that symptoms 
progressively worsen for between fifteen and twenty years.
25
 The most common 
cause of death is infection, at an average age of fifty-four.
26
 Kirkwood provides more 
detail, suggesting that middle stage symptoms tend to develop anywhere between 2 
to 10 years, progressing toward late stage symptoms at the end of that scale.
27
 Again, 
like Alzheimer’s, the condition is terminal, and there is no known cure. Further, 
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 Di Maio, L. et. al., Onset symptoms in 510 patients with Huntington’s Disease, Journal of Medical 
Genetics (1993) 30 (4) 289-292. 
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 Kirkwood S.C. et. al., Progression of symptoms in the early and middle stages of Huntington 
disease. Archives of Neurology (2001) 58 (2) 273-278. 
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 Sturrock, A. and Leavitt, B., The Clinical and Genetic features of Huntington’s Disease, Journal of 
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26
 Myers, R. et. al., Late onset of Huntington’s Disease, Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and 
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treatment is currently limited entirely to the management of symptoms, as “no drug 
therapy has yet been shown to modify the disease course.”28 Drugs and therapies are 
available to attempt to mitigate the effects of the disease, with varying effect, 
although the symptoms are still severe.
29
 The condition would therefore be placed at 
the extreme end of the severity continuum, as it severely affects both fair equality of 
opportunity and capability. 
 
Penetrance 
 
 Unlike severity, the penetrance of the genetic markers for Huntington’s 
disease is markedly different to those for Alzheimer’s. Huntington’s disease is a 
trinucleotide repeat disorder, characterised by excessive repeats of the cytosine-
adenine-guanine (CAG) group along chromosome four. A repeat count of below 35 
means that the individual will be unaffected whereas a repeat size of between 35 and 
39 indicates reduced penetrance. Adult onset of the disease is generally associated 
with repeat sized between 36 and 50. Certain excessively long repeat sizes (>60) are 
associated with the development of Huntington’s as a juvenile, but this is extremely 
rare. Within the thesis I am concerned with adult onset Huntington’s. Within the 
range for adult onset, “…there is a trend to increasing penetrance with increasing 
repeat length in the 36-41-repeat range: <90% for 39 CAG repeats and 99% for 41 
CAG repeats”30 
 
 As we can see, penetrance is extremely high, especially for individuals who 
possess a CAG repeat number over 40.  Further, our understanding of how 
penetrance and the development of the condition relates to an individual’s genetic 
status means that genetic markers (and therefore testing) can provide an extremely 
accurate assessment of individual risk. This is especially true as the condition is 
Mendelian Dominant, and monogenetic. Much like with severity, the condition can 
therefore be placed at the extreme end of the penetrance continuum, as possession of 
the genetic markers in question almost guarantees development of the condition. 
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 Sturrock, A. and Leavitt, B., The Clinical and Genetic features of Huntington’s Disease, Journal of 
Geriatric Psychiatry and Neurology (2010) 23 (4) p. 243-259. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Brinkman R.R, et. al., The likelihood of being affected with Huntington disease by a particular age, 
for a specific CAG size. American Journal of Human Genetics (1997) 60 1202-1210. 
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Time of Onset 
 
 Myers suggests that the onset of the disease usually begins in mid-life 
(between 21 and 50), with the mean age of onset being 41. The condition then 
follows the progression highlighted earlier, leading to death at an average of 54.
31
 
This study is supported by further empirical studies performed by Myers, Wendt, 
and Newcombe.
 32,33,34
 With a repeat number of 40, onset occurs at a median of 59, 
with 45 repeats a median of 37, and with 50 repeats, a median of 27.
35
 Studies of 
Huntington’s amongst the certain northern European populations suggest a mean 
onset age of the mid-40.
36
 The condition therefore onsets pre-retirement, when an 
individual is likely to still be engaged in employment. 
 
Location within typology 
 
 Much like Alzheimer’s, Huntington’s is a condition which falls at the highest 
end of the severity scale, with the symptoms both extremely likely to compromise 
fair equality of opportunity and capability to use primary goods, and unable to be 
significantly mitigated or treated. In addition, Huntington’s disease is an example of 
a condition which is extremely penetrant, and as such, carriers are very likely to 
suffer from the above effects. Taking this, and the fact that the condition onsets pre-
retirement, this condition is essentially a worst-case scenario, with an individual 
extremely likely to suffer extremely severe effects on their fair equality of 
opportunity at a time in their life when they are engaged in employment. If in my 
analysis I am able to justify the use of test data relating to this condition, it would 
seem unlikely that any test data could not be justifiably used. 
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4.2.3 – BRCA1 and BRCA2 Mutations. 
 
 Breast Cancer Susceptibility Gene 1 (BRCA1) and Breast Cancer 
Susceptibility Gene 2 (BRCA2) are both genes which encode for proteins 
responsible for the repair of DNA. If these genes are mutated, DNA repair is 
compromised, increasing the risk of developing breast and other cancers. 
Specifically, mutations of these genes significantly increase the risk of both breast 
and ovarian cancer. It is these conditions which I will be considering. 
 
Severity 
 
 The severity of cancers is assessed through reference to five year survival 
statistics, that is, the number of patients alive five years after the identification of the 
disease. These statistics are separated according to the stage of development of the 
cancer in question. 
 
For breast cancer, the five year survival statistics are as follows: 
 
 Localised – 98% 
 Regional – 81% 
 Distant – 26% 
 All stages (average) – 88%.37 
 
Further statistics indicate a total risk of recurrence of 11% for five years after 
completion of treatment, and 20% for 10 years. Divided by stage, recurrence rates 
are 7%, 11% and 13% for stage i. ii. and iii. cancers respectively.
38
 
 
 Five year survival for Ovarian cancer is much lower, sitting at 35%, although 
this is because the majority of suffers present with advanced forms. Earlier stages 
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have much higher five year survival rates.
39
 Amongst this late-stage majority, 50%-
75% of these cases will relapse within 18 months and require further treatment.
40
 10 
year survival rates for ovarian cancer are high (80%-95%) for early stage cancers, 
but long term survival for advanced cancer is only 10%-30%.
41
 For this reason, 
preventative oophorectomy is advised for high risk patients carrying BRCA 
mutations. 
42
 If diagnosed early, it is therefore likely that these conditions can be 
treated, and unlikely that the condition will recur. Whilst the condition is likely to in 
some way affect either fair equality of opportunity or the capability of an individual 
to use their primary goods, an early diagnosis means that the condition is not 
terminal, and that these effects will be relatively short-term. I explicitly concern 
myself with early-stage cancers as the only relevant individuals in this case are those 
who possess information about their BRCA status, as it is only those individuals who 
could have their data used by insurers. If an individual does not possess this data, an 
insurer cannot obtain it. These individuals who do possess this genetic information 
are placed in high-risk groups and monitored, receiving more frequent 
mammograms, and in some cases, preventative mastectomy or oophorectomy. Due 
to this, it is likely that these individuals would receive diagnosis of any subsequent 
breast or ovarian cancer at an early stage, and that they are less likely to suffer 
cancer at all (in cases of preventative mastectomy or oophorectomy). Given my 
focus on early-stage cancers, it would seem appropriate to locate this condition 
toward the lower end of the severity continuum. Whilst it is capable of having some 
relevant effect, these effects are short-term, and the individual is likely to recover 
their prior function. 
 
 If however, I find that allowing the use of this data by insurers disincentivises 
these individuals from obtaining information relating to their BRCA status, the 
position changes. These individuals are now no longer likely to receive an early 
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diagnosis of their condition, and as such, more likely to suffer the more severe 
effects associated with later stage cancers. This means that the condition would 
become one more appropriately placed toward the severe end of the continuum. This 
will again be explored in further detail within Chapter Five. 
 
Penetrance 
 
BRCA mutations are by no means the only contributors to the development 
of cancer. Indeed, they account for a relatively small amount by percentage.
43
 Recent 
studies demonstrate that BRCA mutations account for approximately 11% and 4.9% 
(BRCA1 and 2 respectively) of breast cancer amongst populations.
44
 These figures 
are lower in Britain, possibly due to population differences in mutation frequency.
45
 
Indeed, BRCA mutations do not even account for all hereditary breast cancer, other 
genetic factors may be at play.
46
 There are many other suggested loci for cancer risk 
genes, including p53 mutations,
47
 hCHK2,
48
 CDKN2A,
49,50
, 13q21,
51
 and 6q22.33
52
 
The exact risk which each of these contributes is unclear. A recent twin study 
suggests that taking all suspected genetic risk factors together, 27% of breast cancer 
may be genetic (also 42% of prostate, and 35% of colorectal.)
53
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Returning to BRCA, we can show that the lifetime penetrance of breast 
cancer amongst people with BRCA1 mutations is between 45% and 74%, depending 
on the study.
54,55
 It has been suggested by a more recent population study that the 
lifetime penetrance for breast cancer amongst those with BRCA mutations is 
approximately 68%
56
 The same study suggests the penetrance of ovarian cancer 
amongst those with BRCA mutations to be approximately 36%.
57
 When taken 
together, this means that “…the estimated penetrance by age 80 years, of cancer of 
any type among female carriers of BRCA1 mutations, is thus nearly 100%.”58 When 
we compare this to the non-mutated population, we find a significant decrease. The 
general population risk for the development of breast cancer is 4.81%, and for 
ovarian cancer, 0.7%.
59
 We therefore see that being a carrier of a BRCA mutation 
leaves an individual 63% more likely to develop breast cancer, and 35% more likely 
to develop ovarian cancers. Penetrance is therefore significant, and genetic test data 
could therefore be useful in actuarially identifying high risk individuals. 
 
 Indeed, testing for BRCA mutations has proved to be useful diagnostically, 
even above and beyond family history. Studies show that: 
 
“…ovarian cancers occurring among carriers of BRCA1 mutations were diagnosed, on 
average, ∼4–5 years earlier than those among women not found to have mutations and ∼7 
years earlier than sporadic invasive ovarian cancer.”60 
 
Further, excluding patients from screening who did not have a first degree relative 
affected with cancer would have missed over 50% of the mutations.
61
 It is therefore 
important that these individuals are not disincentivsed from obtaining their BRCA 
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status, as otherwise they may not be aware of their increased risk. Given this, the 
condition can be located towards the more penetrant end of the spectrum, somewhere 
between Alzheimer’s and Huntington’s. Whilst clearly less penetrant than 
Huntington’s, possession of certain genetic markers leaves an individual 63% more 
likely to develop breast cancer, 35% more likely to develop ovarian cancer, and 
almost 100% likely to develop cancer of any type by age 80. The likelihood of the 
individual developing a condition which may potentially infringe upon either their 
fair equality of opportunity or their capability is therefore high, and the level of this 
infringement depends on whether an individual is disincentivised from obtaining a 
test. 
 
Time of Onset 
 
 Looking again at the data, we find that amongst those diagnosed with cancer, 
the highest frequency of mutations were found in those aged between 40 and 50, 
suggesting that the time of onset is between these ages.
62
 Another study suggests that 
BRCA mutations lower the mean age of onset for cancer by several years, depending 
on the mutation.
63
 Again, the population study by Risch suggests that, “BRCA1-
associated cases typically occur during a patient's 40s and 50s, with <10% being 
diagnosed at age <40 years.”64 Some cancers which occur pre-forty have also been 
linked to BRCA mutations. BRCA mutations can therefore be linked to onset of 
cancer in middle age. This makes the condition one which clearly onsets pre-
retirement. 
 
Location within typology 
 
 As I explained earlier, it may be the case that for some conditions, a genetic 
test is extremely helpful in obtaining an early diagnosis, and further, that an early 
diagnosis is relevant to an individual’s prognosis. This is broadly the purpose of this 
representative condition. As we see above, both breast and ovarian cancers have high 
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survival rates if diagnosed and appropriately treated at an early stage, falling rapidly 
the later the condition is identified. If the use of test data by insurers is shown to 
disincentivise individuals from taking genetic tests, it is likely that these individuals 
would receive tests (and therefore diagnoses) later than they otherwise would, and 
that therefore, their condition would be more severe. This case study will serve to 
illustrate the potential effect of disincentivisation on the justifiability of the use of 
data. 
  
4.2.4 – Haemochromatosis 
 
 Haemochromatosis is an autosomal recessive condition which manifests as 
an excess of iron in the bloodstream. There are several forms of the condition, and 
they can be divided into Adult Onset (HFE, or Classic) Haemochromatosis, also 
termed Type 1 and Juvenile Haemochromatosis, also termed Type 2. Similarly to 
Huntington’s, I will only be considering the adult onset form of the condition, as 
juvenile onset conditions are irrelevant to the purchase of life insurance, as 
individuals will likely already be symptomatic by the time they come to purchase. 
 
Severity 
 
 Within adults, the onset of symptoms is usually non-specific, and patients 
often present with complaints of fatigue, or joint pain. Untreated, this can develop 
into liver disease (including cirrhosis) endocrine disorders such as diabetes, cardiac 
problems (including heart failure) and joint diseases.
65
 Many of these later 
complications could prove fatal.  Actual patient prognosis varies, and depends on the 
degree of development of complications. If treatment is started before the 
development of severe secondary complications, the survival chances of a patient are 
very good. These rapidly deteriorate as secondary complications develop.
66,67,68
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Obtaining an early diagnosis is therefore important to prognosis.
69
 If early diagnosis 
is obtained, and treatment begins long before secondary complications develop, 
survival rates are comparable to the general population.
70
 In terms of absolute risk, 
the chance of severe liver damage is approximately 5% in men, and 1% in women, 
so morbidity is also generally low.
71
 
 
 If started before secondary complications develop, treatment is relatively 
simple. Regular phlebotomy can keep iron loads under control, and prevent the 
development of secondary complications.
72
 The condition therefore falls at the 
bottom end of the severity spectrum, with appropriate treatment all but preventing 
any meaningful symptoms from developing. Much like with breast and ovarian 
cancer, evidence of significant disincentivisation may increase the severity, as the 
condition is difficult to diagnose otherwise. 
 
Penetrance 
 
 Originally, Haemochromatosis was thought to stem entirely from a mutation 
of the HFE gene.
73
 There are now however several different types of 
Haemochromatosis, and at least four genes are implicated, of which, HFE-linked 
Haemochromatosis is the most common form.
 74
 The exact penetrance of this 
mutation is however unclear. In a population study of 16 homozygous individuals, 8 
of them were found to have clinical presentation of Haemochromatosis, a penetrance 
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of 50%
75
 However, another wider population study of 410 homozygotes found that 
110 presented with no clinical symptoms, whereas 300 did. Further, it suggested that 
some of these 110 individuals could simply be presymptomatic.
76
 This study 
therefore suggests a penetrance of at least 73%, possibly higher. The penetrance of 
the condition is therefore likely to reside between 50% and 75%. I am inclined to 
suggest it resides toward the higher end of the scale, as the second study has a far 
higher sample size than the first, and will therefore be more representative. HFE-
related Haemochromatosis is therefore relatively penetrant and genetic test data a 
reasonable indicator of risk, although it is difficult to suggest exactly if or when the 
mutation will be expressed.
77
 
 
 Genetic testing is however often helpful in effectively diagnosing the 
condition. This is especially true as non-genetic diagnosis of haemochromatosis is 
not easy. Patients often present with nonspecific complaints or symptoms, and the 
biological indicators can be linked with other diseases. This is why The British 
Society for Haematology suggest in their standard setting document that “a genetic 
test offers the best approach to early detection.”78 This need to test is something also 
highlighted by Adams, who claims that genetic screening is important as symptoms 
may go unrecognised and lead to the development of life threatening 
complications.
79
 The condition would appear to fall toward the top end of the 
penetrance spectrum, with individuals approaching a 75% likelihood of developing 
the condition. 
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Time of Onset 
 
 Empirical studies suggest that HFE-related Haemochromatosis tends to onset 
in middle-age.
80
 It therefore falls on the pre-retirement side of my binary. 
 
Location within typology 
 
 The purpose of Haemochromatosis is to provide an example of a strongly 
penetrant genetic condition which can be effectively treated, and therefore 
potentially has low severity. This will allow me to briefly explore the duties that the 
state owes to these individuals with regard the provision of healthcare, and how this 
affects the justifiability of the use of their data. 
 
4.2.5 – Hypertension 
 
 Unlike the other conditions I have selected, hypertension is often used to 
describe several different clinical conditions. Within the thesis, I am specifically 
referring to a generalised state of elevated blood pressure. 
 
Severity 
 
 Unmanaged hypertension can lead to various secondary complications. At the 
less significant end of the scale, individuals with high blood pressure may be unable 
to complete strenuous exercise, or suffer from shortness of breath, or transient 
dizziness. More severe complications can include a substantially increased risk of 
cardio-vascular diseases, and a higher risk of cardiac events such as myocardial 
infarction.
81,82
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 There are however many effective management strategies. The NICE 
management pathway indicates lifestyle changes should be suggested first, and that 
this can often substantially reduce hypertension and associated morbidity and 
mortality.
83
 Should lifestyle changes not reduce hypertension, or the individual fail 
to actually carry them out, several pharmaceutical options are also available. Beta-
Blockers, Thiazides, ACE inhibitors and ARB’s can all prescribed to the patient and 
are effective at managing symptoms, controlling risk and reducing severity of 
outcome.
84,85,86,87
 
 
 The condition would therefore seem to be appropriately placed somewhere 
between Breast Cancer and Haemochromatosis, on the lower end of the severity 
spectrum. Whilst it is capable of having meaningful effects on both fair equality of 
opportunity and capability, there are several treatment options available which have 
proved effective at managing the condition, and reducing both morbidity and 
mortality. 
 
Penetrance 
 
 The causes of hypertension are multifactorial. Genetic, lifestyle and 
environmental factors all affect an individual’s risk of developing the condition. To 
provide a very brief and non-exhaustive list, hypertension has been found to be 
significantly affected by age, gender, smoking status, and body mass index,
88
 as well 
as salt consumption, and other dietary effects.
89
 Indeed, demographic factors and 
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lifestyle choices are the main determinants of whether an individual develops 
hypertension. 
 
 There is however evidence that a variety of genes contribute significantly. 
Several genes have been hypothesised to have the ability to exert modest effects 
upon blood pressure, and many of these have been positively identified to 
date.
90,91,92,93,94
 Taken together, what is the extent of this effect? Although the exact 
contribution is still unclear, a study of almost 24,000 women found that: 
 
“…an increase of one standard deviation in the genetic risk score was associated with a 23% 
increase in the odds of hypertension. Among individuals in the top decile of the risk score, 
the prevalence of hypertension was 29% compared with 16% in the bottom decile.”
95
 
 
It is therefore possible to conclude that although genetic factors may not be the major 
influence on whether an individual develops hypertension, higher risk individuals 
can be identified using genetic markers. In terms of actual use, an individual who 
knows they are in the top decile for risk may be more likely to undertake risk 
reducing lifestyle changes than an individual in the bottom decile. This is especially 
true given the material on perceptions presented within Chapter One, as the 
individual is likely to treat a genetic indication that they are at risk of hypertension 
more seriously than lifestyle or demographic data due to its perceived importance. 
Getting this information to individuals may therefore be important in reducing 
severity of outcome. The condition is therefore appropriately located toward the 
lowest end of the penetrance spectrum. Whilst genetic factors contribute to the 
development of the condition, they are by no means the most significant contributor. 
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Time of Onset  
 
 Hypertension related complications usually onset in late middle age, 
progressing into old age. Studies suggest the development ranges between ages 45 
and 75 depending on the exact combination of risk factors an individual possesses. 
The majority of individuals will therefore develop this condition pre-retirement, 
although some may certainly only become symptomatic post age 65. As the majority 
will develop the condition pre-65, it is appropriately located on the pre-retirement 
side of my binary. 
 
Location within typology 
 
 Finally, Hypertension is, within my typology, an example of a condition 
where the penetrance of the genes in question is doubtful. The condition is certainly 
multifactorial, and within that strong environmental and lifestyle factors are 
implicated. This condition will illustrate the duties that the state owes to individuals 
who may have made their condition worse through their own actions, and more 
widely, the justifiability of using data whose penetrance is questionable. 
 
4.2.6 – Representative Conditions Summarised 
 
 Below is a table summarising the evidence base above for analysis within 
Chapter Five. The conclusions offered later for these conditions should be 
generalisable to all similar conditions, that is to say, those conditions which share a 
similar position in this table. 
 
Condition Severity Penetrance Time of Onset 
Alzheimer’s Disease High Mid Post Retirement 
Huntington’s Disease High High Pre Retirement 
Breast and Ovarian 
Cancers 
Mid to Low – Early  
High – Late 
Mid to High Pre Retirement 
Haemochromatosis Low High Pre Retirement 
Hypertension Low Low Pre Retirement 
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Having established this evidence base, I must now briefly assess the potential 
individual consequences of allowing the use of genetic test data by insurers, namely: 
 
a) An increase in premium price as a result of increased risk, and 
b) The potential to disincentivise individuals from obtaining genetic test 
results. 
 
 Later, within Chapter Five, I will then be able to assess whether it is 
justifiable to allow these to occur based whether an individual has either their fair 
equality of opportunity or capability compromised. 
 
4.3 – Consequences of Use 
 
4.3.1 – Policy pricing 
 
 The first important consequence of allowing the use of genetic test data is a 
change in policy pricing. As I have already highlighted, the UK insurance industry 
operates on principles of mutuality and actuarial fairness. An individual is therefore 
charged a premium representative of the risk they bring to the insured pool, with 
higher risk individuals attracting higher premiums. If an individual possesses genetic 
markers which indicate they are likely to suffer from a serious disease, they present a 
higher risk for both health and life insurance, as they are more likely to become ill, 
or in some cases to die. An insurer being able to access this data means that the 
insurer will likely consider these individuals a higher risk than would be the case 
could they not access the data in question, although this will obviously depend upon 
both the result of the test and the type of genetic data. However, there certainly exists 
the potential for these individuals to receive higher premiums than would be the case 
were the use of their data by insurers prohibited. 
 
 But what about those who do not possess genetic markers for certain 
conditions, and are able to present an insurer a relatively clear genetic test record? 
There is a case to be made that these individuals would benefit from a situation 
where insurers were allowed to use their test data, as they could be classified as 
82 
 
lower risk customers and receive lower premiums as a result. It is however doubtful 
as to how much this would occur. First, it seems plausible to suggest that as 
companies with profit motives, there exists a reason for insurers to charge the highest 
premiums they possibly can, and less incentive to allow discounts. This is not 
persuasive on its own, as one insurer offering lowered premiums for those with 
lower risk genetic data would mean that they would be more attractive to those 
individuals, and potentially obtain a greater market share as a result. However, if we 
look to the ABI Code of Practice on Genetic Tests, within the code, we see that 
insurers: 
 
“…must not offer individuals lower than standard premiums on the basis of their predictive 
genetic test results: that is, genetic test results cannot be used as a trigger for allowing 
preferred life underwriting terms.”96 
 
 Given this code is agreed by the ABI, which represents the British Insurance 
Industry, it would seem that there currently exists an agreement not to use genetic 
test data to offer premiums and policies more favourable than the standard. The 
justifiability of using genetic data in this way will also be discussed within Chapter 
Five. Although only the current Code of Practice, and therefore subject to change, 
this provides us a useful insight into the current thinking of the insurance industry, 
and their potential position moving forward. There does however exist another way 
in which allowing the use of genetic test data might provide an advantage to some 
individuals. Indeed, in the same Code, we find that: 
 
“Insurers may use a normal (negative) predictive genetic test result to reduce the impact of 
loading which would otherwise have applied due to the applicant’s known medical or family 
history.”97  
 
 As an example, if an individual’s family history suggests that one of their 
parents possesses a dominant gene mutation for a condition, it is likely that the 
individual in question will be assessed as having a 50% chance of developing the 
condition in question (through basic Mendelian Genetics). If an individual can 
provide the insurer a genetic test demonstrating that they have not inherited this 
condition their premium is not loaded in the same way. 
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 Within my analysis, I must therefore consider two different effects on 
premium pricing. First, it may be that upon production of a genetic test which 
indicates an increased risk, an individual may see their premium rise. Second, 
possession of a negative test may result in a fall in premium for the individual 
concerned. This reduction in premium may also have important effects on other 
individuals within the insurance pool. Most obviously, a widespread use of negative 
genetic test results would allow for identification by exclusion. If an insurer makes it 
clear that a negative test for a condition (for example, Huntington’s) will attract a 
reduced premium, then consumers who have such a test would be motivated to 
provide it. The insurer may then assume that anyone who refuses to provide such a 
negative result must therefore have something to hide, and act to load premiums 
accordingly. Allowing widespread use of negative tests in this way could operate to 
harm individuals with Huntington’s in the same way as mandating them to disclose 
their own data would. 
 
 Even if the insurer does not conclude that everyone who does not provide this 
data is, de facto, a carrier of a condition which increases their risk profile, these 
individuals are still likely to see their premiums rise. By providing negative test 
results, less risky individuals remove themselves from the aggregate pool and create 
their own ‘low risk’ pool of insured individuals. The aggregate risk of the remaining 
pool therefore increases because low-risk individuals have been withdrawn from it, 
and premiums rise for those who remain within it. Within my analysis, I will 
therefore have to consider not only the effect positive test results may have on those 
who hold them, but how far insurers should be allowed to take account of the 
negative tests, as this may also operate to disadvantage others. 
 
 In summary, allowing insurers to use the genetic test data of individuals 
therefore affects the setting of policy prices. For some individuals, this may result in 
increased premiums due to them being assessed as more risky than they otherwise 
would be. For others, and even in the absence of explicitly lower premiums offered 
for favourable genetic status, allowing the use of test data may help remove loading 
from their premium by allowing them to demonstrate that they possess a lower risk 
than had previously been assumed. This will be explored further within the analysis 
in Chapter Five. 
84 
 
4.3.2 – Disincentivisation 
 
 In order to assess whether allowing insurers to use genetic test data may 
disincentivise individuals from taking genetic tests, we must first answer a few 
preliminary questions. Given insurance is, in general, a policy taken out to guard 
against risk, we must explore how individuals make decisions about risk, and how 
and why they choose to take genetic tests. A summary of the literature in this area 
follows, and will help determine whether allowing the use of this data by insurers 
does carry a risk of disincentivisation. 
 
4.3.3 – How do people make decisions about risk? 
 
 Possibly the pre-eminent theory of individual decisions about risk originates 
in the late 1970’s, with Kahneman and Tversky.98 In their account of what they term 
Prospect Theory, they provide a model of decision making which has several 
important aspects. The first, and perhaps most important of these is that individuals 
weight probabilities in a non-linear way.
 99
 Take for example a bet where you have a 
50% chance of losing £10, and a 50% chance of gaining £20. Previous theories 
would suggest that an individual would (and should) always take the gamble, as the 
potential payoff would result in an increase in utility. However, Prospect Theory 
introduces another element. It suggests that an individual is much less likely to take 
the gamble if, for example, they are down to their last £10. A reduction in your 
amount of money from £10 to £0 is more significant to you than a reduction from 
£100 to £90. Individuals therefore weight the exact same probability of occurrence 
higher, dependant on their circumstances. Indeed:  
 
“…people look not at the levels of final wealth they can attain but at gains and losses relative 
to some reference point, which may vary from situation to situation…”100 
 
 Because of this, Prospect Theory provides an account of individuals as loss-
averse. As Plous describes: 
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“Moreover, the value function for losses is different than the value function for gains. [...] the 
value function for losses (the curve lying below the horizontal axis) is convex and relatively 
steep. In contrast, the value function for gains (above the horizontal axis) is concave and not 
quite so steep. These differences lead to several noteworthy results. Because the value 
function for losses is steeper than that for gains, losses “loom larger” than gains. For 
instance, a loss of $500 is felt more than a gain of $500.”101 
 
Prospect Theory therefore provides us with two important characteristics of 
individual decision making. First, it suggests that individuals weight probability non-
linearly, and that the same probability is capable of having different importance 
dependant on relative circumstances. Circumstances such as a significant loss of 
health or risk of death are therefore likely to be considered more weighty than a 
simple financial loss. Second, it provides an account of individuals as loss-averse, in 
that they are less willing to gamble on losing something than they are to gamble for a 
gain. 
 
 This position is also supported by several empirical studies. First we have 
some simple studies of individual risk aversion. Although both studies found 
substantial heterogeneity, they both conclude that risk aversion is the most frequent 
situation.
102
 Indeed, the study by Barksy et. al. suggests that “…low risk tolerance 
characterises most of the population.”103 Because individuals are loss-averse, it 
would therefore appear they are also risk-averse, in that they avoid taking risks due 
to the possibility of loss. Again, individuals possess differing levels of risk aversion, 
and some are certainly risk-seeking, but as a population trend (amongst adult 
Americans), individuals would appear to be averse to risk. This also would not 
appear to be hugely affected by culture. In a study of Rural India, Binswanger found 
that individuals were again generally risk averse, with wealthier individuals 
demonstrating slightly lower risk aversion than poorer ones.
104
 I am unaware of a 
significant study having been performed on the UK population, but this is not 
problematic. First, I would suggest that UK culture is similar enough to that within 
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the USA that the results of the first study would likely replicate. Second, as we know 
from the Binswanger study, this effect is largely cross-cultural anyway. 
 
 We can also see that individuals are risk-averse from other larger empirical 
studies. A study of contestants on the gameshow ‘Deal or No Deal’ found that whilst 
some individuals exhibited risk seeking behaviour (possibly due to chasing a loss, or 
the perception that they were not playing with their own money); most contestants 
were still moderately risk averse.
105
 Indeed, this modification of behaviour with 
regard to the chasing of losses also demonstrates that decisions about risk are 
influenced by previous circumstances, and probability is not always assessed in a 
linear way. A further study of the same gameshow in Italy found that whilst 
individuals were what they termed risk-neutral at smaller stakes, higher stakes lead 
to the individuals again demonstrating risk-aversion.
106
 
 
 Studies also suggest that an individual’s level of risk aversion is affected by 
their wealth, possibly because an individual’s attitude to risk determines their 
earning potential. For example, those who are risk averse are less likely to invest in 
risky investments which may have large payoffs. Indeed, we find that risk aversion is 
highest amongst the poorest in society
107
 and decreases with increases in wealth.
108
 
There is however limited evidence to suggest that the very poorest are actually less 
risk averse than those on average incomes, possibly because at that level one has to 
take some risks in order to survive.
109
 
 
 As a general trend, we therefore know two things of relevance. Individuals 
are generally both loss and risk averse, in that they fear losses more than they 
anticipate gains, and as such, are often reluctant to take risks. Further, risk aversion 
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shows a negative correlation with individual wealth and a positive one with the 
stakes at play. We do not however yet know how this can be applied to genetic 
testing. In order to be able to answer this question, first we must look at why 
individuals choose to take genetic tests. 
 
4.3.4 – Why do people take genetic tests? 
 
 In order to be able to conclude whether the above analysis on risk applies, we 
must now discover why these individuals might take these tests in the first place and 
whether a disincentivisation effect will exist. First, we know that whether an 
individual obtains a genetic test is affected by their risk of developing a genetic 
condition, with those who perceive themselves to be higher risk more likely to obtain 
tests.
110,111 
Possibly the biggest reason for this is that those thought to be at high risk 
of developing genetic conditions will often be offered genetic tests within the 
healthcare context as a useful diagnostic tool. This could also be due to the 
prevailing perception of genetic information as a panacea which provides unique 
insight into future health status.
112
 Further, we see that a willingness to take a genetic 
test increases with the medical usefulness of the test. For a condition such as 
Huntington’s, where a cure is not available, and development of the condition cannot 
be slowed, test uptake is approximately 20%.
113,114 
Uptake for genetic tests is much 
higher for conditions such as breast cancer, where early diagnosis is far more 
useful.
115
 In brief, individuals are more likely to take tests when they a) perceive 
themselves to be at high risk of suffering from a condition, and b) feel that the test 
result would be useful in obtaining early diagnosis or appropriate treatment. These 
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factors are independent, and an increase in either leads to an individual being more 
likely to take a test.
116
 
 
4.3.5 – How does this all relate to my question? 
 
 Given what we know so far, how does individual risk-aversion play out 
within the insurance context, and how is this relevant to genetic testing? First, 
insurance provides an excellent example of how individuals are actually generally 
risk averse. Despite the statistically small chance of making a significant claim, 
many individuals choose to take out insurance against a particular event because they 
are risk averse to it. Indeed, the insurance industry depends on an individual’s risk-
averse nature. As Crocker explains, the industry relies upon a “continuum of risk-
averse consumers”117 This is explained by Prospect Theory. Although we stand a 
statistically low chance of losing our house in a fire, we value not losing our house to 
the point where we are in most cases willing to pay for home insurance. In this way 
“…prospect theory…predicts prevailing risk aversion in insurance, which mostly 
concerns small-probability losses…”118 
 
 Insurance also appeals to an individual’s risk-averse nature. Through the 
presentation of insurance as a gain, and the comparison with the loss of something 
important to you such as your health, or a house, uptake of insurance is high. As 
Hershey found: 
 
“…individuals focus on protective aspects when the situation is presented in an insurance 
context so that this is perceived as a gain.”119 
  
 In addition to the theory, we can also see empirically that individuals weight 
probabilities non-linearly in automobile, home and health insurance.
120,121 
Further, 
                                                 
116
 Marteau, T and Croyle, R, The New Genetics: Psychological Responses to Genetic Testing, British 
Medical Journal (1998) 316 (7132) 693-696. 
117
 Crocker, K. and Snow, A. The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance 
Industry, Journal of Political Economy (1986) 94 (2) p. 323.  
118
 Wakker, P. et. al. The Effects of Statistical Information on Risk and Ambiguity Attitudes, and on 
Rational Insurance Decisions, Journal of Management Science (2007) 53 (11) 1170-1784. 
119
 Hershey, J. et. al. Sources of Bias in Assessment Procedures for Utility Functions, Management 
Science (1982) 28 (8) 936-954. 
120
 Barseghyan, Levon, et. al. The Nature of Risk Preferences: Evidence from Insurance Choices 
(June 30, 2011) Accessible at SSRN: [http://ssrn.com/abstract=1646520] Accessed 22-02-2012. 
89 
 
when considering insurance purchasing decisions, an individual tends to either be 
completely dismissive of the risk, or to be risk averse and over-insure, with a 
tendency toward the latter.
122
 We also see loss aversion happening within the 
insurance context. In a study comparing the effect of price rises and price reductions, 
it was found that a price increase lead to far more defection to other companies than 
did other companies reducing their prices. This defection was attributed to the price 
increase being perceived as a loss as compared to a gain.
123
 This is the risk that we 
are concerned about here. The above study by Dawes suggests that individuals 
perceive a price increase as a loss. If individuals are loss-averse, they may therefore 
be averse to taking a genetic test through fear of their premium increasing. However, 
they may also be averse to the adverse health effects that may result from not 
obtaining a genetic test. This is something which will be discussed within Chapter 
Five. 
 
So far we are able to suggest that due to the generally risk-averse nature of 
individuals, insurance is an important commodity, and one that many individuals 
would like to possess. But why is this relevant to the use of genetic tests? If insurers 
are able to use this data, premium prices could increase as I have previously 
demonstrated. Doherty and Thistle suggest that because individuals currently exist in 
a situation where their exact risk status is uncertain, a situation whereby insurers are 
able to mandate the disclosure of genetic data creates a disincentive effect because: 
 
“…when insurers can access this data…the value of information to the uninformed is 
negative and they would never choose to become informed.”124 
 
 In essence, an individual who does not possess a genetic test will, according 
to Doherty and Thistle, lack any incentive to obtain a genetic test. Through obtaining 
a genetic test, the consumer essentially enters into a lottery, where they either do not 
possess a relevant genetic condition and therefore become low risk and receive lower 
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premiums, or they become high risk, and receive higher premiums. This is as 
compared to the mid-level premium that they likely currently receive in a state of 
uncertainty. Due to this: 
 
“…risk averse consumers prefer the 'uninformed' policy with certainty. Rational 
policyholders fail to invest in information…”125 
 
 As individuals are both loss and risk averse, they tend to prefer paying the 
mid-level premium over risking the possibility of a large loss through receiving a 
rise in premium price upon disclosure of a genetic test. Even Hoel et. al. who put 
forward an argument for allowing genetic test data to be used concede that risk 
aversion to economic consequences means that some individuals will not take 
tests.
126
 This conclusion is consistent with Hoy’s assessment of the situation, which 
is that individuals would prefer uncertain categorisation to the possibility of being 
classified in a higher risk category.
127
 This is what Tabarrok terms premium risk. 
Given that people are both risk and loss averse, and the possibility of being classified 
at higher risk presents the chance of a relatively large financial loss for relatively 
little financial gain, moving from a situation of uncertain information to a certain one 
has negative utility, and a rational individual would never choose to do it.
128
 
 
 This is only the economic case however. An individual may be incentivised 
to take a test for other reasons, such as to achieve a better or earlier diagnosis, or to 
allow more effective treatment of their condition. The exact balance between 
incentives and disincentives will depend on the type of genetic data in question, and 
the condition or conditions to which it relates, something which will again be 
discussed within Chapter Five.  Having established my typology, the evidence base 
for analysis, and the potential consequences of allowing use of genetic data by 
insurers, I can now proceed to analysis. 
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Chapter Five 
Can the use of genetic data be justified? 
 
 Within this Chapter, I will now proceed to analyse whether use of data 
relating to these conditions is justifiable. Below is a reminder of the conditions and 
their place within my typology, re-ordered to reflect their order of consideration 
within this Chapter. 
 
Condition Severity Penetrance Time of Onset 
Alzheimer’s Disease High Mid Post Retirement 
Huntington’s Disease High High Pre Retirement 
Haemochromatosis Low High Pre Retirement 
Breast and Ovarian 
Cancers 
Mid to Low – Early  
High – Late 
Mid to High Pre Retirement 
Hypertension Low Low Pre Retirement 
 
First, I will assess whether the use of this information by insurers is likely to 
cause a disincentive effect, as it may be the case that a significant disincentive effect 
affects the development of the condition, for example, through the individual no 
longer being able to access the same treatment options. This may in turn affect the 
severity of the condition, and therefore the effect it is able to have on either fair 
equality of opportunity with regard to accessing employment, or an individual’s 
capability to convert their existing primary goods. I will then proceed to analyse 
whether the development of the subsequent condition will disadvantage the 
individual, either with regard to their fair equality of opportunity, or their capability 
to convert their existing goods. This will then allow me to determine whether it is 
unjustifiable to further disadvantage these individuals through allowing use of their 
data. 
 
Finally, I will assess the potential for adverse selection in each case. This is 
relevant, as if there is no potential for adverse selection, denying insurers’ use of this 
specific information no longer results in premium price increases across the board. It 
may therefore be justifiable to deny access to this information due to concerns about 
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fair equality of opportunity or an individual’s capability, even if this individual is not 
a member of the least advantaged group. However, if significant adverse selection is 
likely to occur, it becomes harder to justify keeping this information from insurers. 
This is something which will vary based upon the condition being examined. 
 
In terms of Chapter structure, I will first examine Alzheimer’s, as it is my 
only example of a condition which onsets post-retirement. This will be followed by 
Huntington’s and Haemochromatosis, as both of these conditions are important due 
to their place on the severity spectrum, of which they occupy opposite ends. 
Fourthly, I will then assess BRCA as an example of a condition to which 
disincentivisation may be extremely significant, before finally assessing 
Hypertension, and the issues that this condition raises with regard to penetrance. 
 
5.1 – Alzheimer’s Disease 
 
 As we know from the evidence base presented earlier, Alzheimer’s is a 
condition of high severity and mid-level penetrance which onsets on the post-
retirement side of my binary. So, is the use of this data by insurers justifiable in this 
case?  
 
5.1.1 – Does a disincentive effect matter here? 
 
 The disincentivisation effect is likely to be particularly strong in this case, as 
the individual does not obtain any diagnostic nor medical benefit from this test. 
Faced with a situation where obtaining a test means an individual will suffer a 
financial loss for no medical or health benefit, it would seem unlikely that an 
individual would choose to obtain a genetic test due to the reasoning provided within 
Chapter Four. This is especially true given uptake of tests for degenerative, terminal 
conditions is low anyway. However, although a disincentive effect exists, it is 
unlikely to matter. As the test is not medically useful and progression of the 
condition cannot be slowed, an individual will suffer similar effects on both their fair 
equality of opportunity and capability regardless of when (or indeed, whether) they 
become aware that they possess the condition prior to developing it. Whether an 
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individual is disincentivised from obtaining a test is therefore, in this case irrelevant 
as there are no treatment options an individual is able to access with this genetic 
information that they would not otherwise be able to. The treatment offered and 
progression of the condition remains the same, and therefore, all relevant effects on 
both fair equality of opportunity and capability also remain the same. 
 
5.1.2 – Is fair equality of opportunity compromised? 
 
 So, does the development of Alzheimer’s disease meaningfully inhibit an 
individual’s fair equality of opportunity?  Specifically, given what was said earlier 
about the attachment of income and wealth to positions of employment, the 
appropriate question is whether the development of the condition limits an 
individual’s ability to obtain or maintain employment under these conditions. 
 
 Given the condition is one of high severity; development of symptoms 
therefore significantly limits an individual’s ability to compete under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity. We also know that the condition is one of middle or 
moderate penetrance, and as such, it is likely that an individual will develop the 
condition over the course of a whole life. Indeed, in Chapter Four, we find that for 
certain combinations of APOE-4, median onset occurs before seventy years of age, 
which means that an individual is likely to develop the condition over the course of 
an average lifespan.1  Possession of these specific allele combinations therefore 
means that the individual is likely to suffer the severe effects associated with the 
symptoms of the condition. We also know that the progression of the condition 
cannot be slowed, and there is no known cure. As such, the provision of health care 
does little to mitigate the effects of this condition, and the condition remains severe. 
However, when we come to consider time of onset, the usefulness of this particular 
representative condition becomes apparent. As we know from earlier, the condition 
is one which occurs on the post-retirement side of my binary distinction. Even those 
conditions which onset at age 60 will not progress to the more severe late-stage until 
after age 65. 
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Although an individual does undoubtedly depart from normal functioning 
here, this does not occur until after retirement.
 2
 As such, the development of this 
condition will not significantly affect an individual’s fair equality of opportunity. By 
the time symptoms progress to the point where they will compromise an individual’s 
ability to access or maintain employment, it is likely that the individual will have 
retired. They will therefore have been able to compete for a whole working life in the 
same way as someone who does not develop this condition. This means that the 
share of wealth they are able to obtain from employment will be the same as an 
identical individual who does not develop Alzheimer’s. The fact that they are no 
longer able to compete therefore does not matter in this sense. 
 
5.1.3 – Is capability compromised? 
 
 Although an individual does not have their fair equality of opportunity 
compromised, and so can access similar primary goods as an unaffected individual, 
their capability to convert their primary goods into ends might still be compromised. 
According to the approach outlined within Chapter Two, we know that there can 
exist variability in an individual’s capability to convert primary goods into ends. If 
they are unable to convert these goods as effectively as others through no fault of 
their own, they are meaningfully disadvantaged. The idea of capability as the 
morally relevant factor is the capabilities approach as described by Sen.
3
 We also 
know from Chapter Two that we have a moral duty to provide healthcare services to 
attempt to mitigate this, and indeed, both health and social services are provided free 
at the point of service under the status quo.
4
  
 
However, earlier within Chapter Four, we learn that this is condition for 
which there is no available cure, and the progression of which cannot be significantly 
slowed. As such, the provision of these services is not radically helpful, although it 
may mitigate this disadvantage in two ways. First, because an individual in the late 
stages of the condition (and who may be bed-bound) might otherwise have to use 
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some of their wealth in order to purchase necessary healthcare and social support, 
assuming they lack a supportive family. The presence of the care system within the 
status quo at the very least prevents these individuals from losing primary goods 
through the costs associated with managing their condition. Secondly, the care 
provided seeks to “maximise functioning and independence”, and as such, helps 
these individuals retain capability that they may not possess was this care not 
provided.
5
 The situation could certainly be worse. 
 
However, as compared to the individual who does not develop Alzheimer’s, 
it would seem difficult to argue that the individual with the condition does not have 
their capability compromised. An individual who has severe problems with their 
memory (to the point of being unable to recognise close family) and who will 
eventually be bed-bound, is unable to actualise their interests and goals in the same 
way as an individual who does not suffer from these symptoms. 
 
 As the entire purpose of the theory is to “attempt to mitigate the arbitrariness 
of natural contingency and superficial fortune” it would seem we must be concerned 
here.
6
 However, the relevance of this loss of capability is somewhat mitigated by the 
time of onset of the condition. As the condition does not develop until post-
retirement, and the most severe symptoms between eight and ten years later, our 
comparative is that of an individual aged between 70 and 80 who does not suffer 
from Alzheimer’s. It is likely that, by this age, the majority of individuals will have 
developed some form of illness or disability which interferes with their ability to 
convert their primary goods into ends. As such, whilst the individual with 
Alzheimer’s is certainly disadvantaged, it would appear that they are disadvantaged 
less than they would be if their condition developed earlier. 
 
 We also know from Chapter Four that allowing the use of this test data 
would disadvantage these individuals with regard to primary goods. If an individual 
must disclose possession of these genetic markers to insurers, their premiums will 
rise, consistent with the principles of mutuality and actuarial fairness. Immediately, 
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they suffer a loss of wealth as compared to an individual who does not have to 
disclose such data. Whilst in many cases this premium increase is likely to be 
relatively small (due to family history data already increasing their premium) those 
without family histories of Alzheimer’s are likely to see their premiums rise 
significantly. Allowing insurers to use this data would therefore disadvantage these 
individuals with regard to possession of the primary good of wealth. Equally, it 
would seem that allowing insurers to take account of negative test results would also 
harm those individuals who possess positive ones, either through identification via 
exclusion, or through increasing the aggregate risk of the pool which they occupy. 
 
However, whether it is justifiable to disadvantage these individuals in this 
way not only depends on whether their fair equality of opportunity is compromised, 
or whether their capability is, but the effect that the denial of this information may 
have on other policy holders. In order to assess whether allowing use of this data is 
justifiable, I must first determine the effect that the prohibition on use of this data 
may have on others. This is where the material on adverse selection becomes 
important. 
 
5.1.4 – What level of adverse selection is likely? 
 
Assuming individuals possess tests for the condition, there are two elements 
relevant to the risk of adverse selection, the prevalence of the mutation within the 
population, and the degree to which the genetic marker modifies an individual’s risk 
status. If a mutation is more prevalent, more individuals will possess said mutation, 
and will therefore have their risk mis-assessed. The more individuals who have their 
risk underestimated, the stronger the adverse selection effect becomes, as the 
difference between the actual risk the pool presents, and the risk that the insurer 
think that the pool presents grows. The degree to which an individual’s risk is 
underestimated is also important. If the mutation does not place the individual at a 
significantly higher risk than other data (such as family history) would indicate, the 
adverse selection risk is somewhat minimised, as an insurer is already able to access 
that data, and use it within actuarial calculations. However, if it does, adverse 
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selection is much stronger, as insurers assess individuals as much less risky than they 
actually are. 
 
 Using these criteria, adverse selection is likely to be moderate here. Although 
the possession of certain genetic markers (such as APOE-4 mutations) increases an 
individual’s risk of developing Alzheimer’s, the disease is multifactorial. Indeed, as 
we know from above, genetic markers contribute approximately 50% of the 
attributable risk.
7
 Within this genetic component of risk, an insurer will therefore 
likely not hugely underestimate the risk an individual presents. Certain individuals 
may possess family history data which suggests they are at high risk for developing 
the disease, something which would already be incorporated into their risk profile. 
As such these individuals would not significantly contribute towards adverse 
selection. 
 
 However, the analysis so far assumes that all individuals possess information 
about their condition at the point they purchase insurance. For adverse selection to 
operate, these individuals need to know that they are at higher risk at the point they 
purchase insurance. As there is a disincentive to test here, it is unlikely that a large 
number of individuals possess data relating to their genetic status, as there is no 
medical incentive to obtain a test, and tests are not routinely offered in the medical 
context (consistent with Chapter Four). As such, adverse selection is likely to be 
small and controllable, and the insurer likely to adapt without increases in premiums 
across the board. 
 
5.1.5 – Conclusions 
 
 In conclusion, I find the following. First, it is unlikely that fair equality of 
opportunity will be significantly compromised. Although the condition is certainly 
severe enough to substantially interfere with employment prospects, and certain 
combinations of genetic markers are significantly penetrant, it is not likely to onset 
until post-retirement, and as such, an individual’s employment prospects would not 
be affected. An individual who develops Alzheimer’s will therefore, over the course 
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of a whole life, earn similar wealth to an identical individual who does not develop 
the condition. 
 
Second, whilst the affected individual’s ability to convert their primary goods 
is certainly compromised, this is significantly mitigated in several ways. First, social 
and health care is focused on maintaining independence and function, and will in 
part mitigate this loss of capability. Secondly, the majority of individuals of this age 
are likely to have their capability compromised. As such, capability is not hugely 
compromised as compared to an identical individual without genetic markers for 
Alzheimer’s disease. 
 
 The potential for adverse selection in this case is, whilst present, also small. 
Few individuals will hold data relating to their Alzheimer’s risk status, as it is not 
diagnostically nor medically useful, and therefore would not be offered as a matter of 
medical course. Individuals are unlikely to seek out their genetic status from private 
providers, as it would not be useful to them, and they have little incentive to do so. 
Further, many individuals will already possess family history suggesting a risk of 
developing the disease, and their premiums will already be appropriately loaded. 
Information asymmetry between insurers and the insured is therefore small, and the 
risk of significant adverse selection is low. As such, the insurer is able to cope 
without raising premiums. 
 
 Given the above, it is justifiable to prevent the use of data relating to this 
condition. Without a risk of adverse selection, there no longer exists a risk that 
preventing the use of this data would act to harm members of the least advantaged 
group through a rise in premiums across the board. Without this harm, we are left 
purely considering those individuals who do go on to develop Alzheimer’s. 
Although their fair equality of opportunity is not compromised, their capability to 
use their existing primary goods is somewhat compromised as compared to an 
identical individual (even accounting for age), and as such, it would be justifiable to 
prevent the use of their data for this reason. Equally, it would be justifiable to 
prevent the use of negative test results, as this would also operate to harm the 
individuals who will go on to develop the condition either through identification by 
exclusion, or through changing the composition of the risk pool. 
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 This conclusion is strengthened by other concerns relating to the use of 
genetic information. Given the sensitivity of this data and the fact that individuals 
view it as especially meaningful or important, there may be significant privacy 
concerns when we begin to talk about disclosure. There is no room within this thesis 
to provide a detailed account of the material relating to genetic privacy, but good 
starting points can be found here.
8,9
 For a specific discussion on the tension between 
insurance and medical research using genetic data (although health, rather than life), 
see Townend.
10
 Given the fact that denying the use of this data raises no issue of 
adverse selection, and therefore means that denial of this information cannot 
negatively impact those who are members of the least advantaged group, it is 
legitimate to prevent use of this data out of concern both for the reduced capability 
of these individuals, and wider privacy and accuracy concerns. As I established 
within Chapter One, our understanding of genetic information is still at a formative 
stage, and absent significant harm, it is sensible to pursue a precautionary approach. 
 
5.2 – Huntington’s disease. 
 
 Second, let us consider another severe condition, Huntington’s. Again, as we 
know from Chapter Four, Huntington’s is a condition which can be characterised as 
extremely severe, extremely penetrant, and which onsets pre-retirement in middle-
age. 
 
5.2.1 – Does a disincentive effect matter here? 
 
 Much as with Alzheimer’s, the disincentive effect would appear to be strong 
in this case, as the test is not medically nor diagnostically useful, and premiums 
would rise. Indeed, studies suggest that uptake of genetic tests for Huntington’s is 
only around 20% even in a situation where use is prohibited.
11
 It is therefore unlikely 
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that many individuals will possess information about their genetic status.  However, 
again as above, it is unlikely that this matters. Given that the disease is terminal and 
progression cannot be slowed, knowledge of whether the individual is or is not a 
sufferer of this condition is not useful with regard to mitigating the effects. Again, an 
individual will suffer the same severity of condition, and thus, the same effects on 
both their fair equality of opportunity and capability, regardless of whether they 
obtain a test result. The condition and symptoms progress the same in either case. As 
such, the fact that an individual may be disincentivised from taking a test (and 
therefore prevented from knowing their genetic status) does not have any meaningful 
effects either on their fair equality of opportunity, nor their capability to convert their 
primary goods. In either case, the appropriate condition to consider remains one of 
extreme severity. 
 
5.2.2 – Is fair equality of opportunity compromised? 
 
 We know from above that the condition is essentially a worst-case scenario, 
being both extremely severe and extremely penetrant, and occurring in middle-age. 
When compared with an individual who does not possess this genetic marker, we see 
a clear difference. After the onset of the condition, the individual with Huntington’s 
will be unable to fairly compete for employment, as they will begin to suffer from 
the physical and mental decline characteristic of the disease. Progression of the 
disease further compromises this ability to compete. Dysphagia and dysarthria, 
combined with the development of the chorea from which the condition draws its 
name mean that the individual is unlikely to be able to maintain employment at all. 
They certainly are unable to compete fairly for employment when compared to an 
individual who does not suffer from Huntington’s. This is a meaningful inhibition as 
(unlike Alzheimer’s), it manifests in middle age, a time of life when an individual is 
likely to still be in employment. It can certainly be said that possession of this 
mutation leads to a situation whereby an individual’s inability to compete means that 
their “….shares [shrink] below what is fair” as they become unable to compete 
through no fault of their own.
12
 As compared to an individual who does not develop 
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Huntington’s, the individual who does is substantially less able to obtain or maintain 
employment, and as such, has a lower expectation of lifetime wealth.  
 
5.2.3 – Is capability compromised? 
 
 In addition to the inability to obtain wealth through employment under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity, the individual with Huntington’s may also 
have their capability to convert their primary goods compromised through the 
development of their condition. Similar to the analysis within 5.1.3, we find that 
although we have a moral duty to provide healthcare services, they are not helpful in 
this case.
13
 The condition is again one which is progressive and terminal, and for 
which there is no effective treatment. Social care does in some cases mitigate this, 
for example, the individual with late-stage Huntington’s who is bed-bound would 
receive social care funded by the state. This prevents them from losing wealth 
through having to find and fund care from other sources. There is however little that 
can currently be done to restore or retain capability. 
 
 As compared to the individual who does not develop Huntington’s, this 
individual’s capability is clearly compromised. Toward the middle stages of the 
disease (likely between ages 40 and 50) the individual with Huntington’s is 
beginning to suffer symptoms such as difficulty walking, hallucinations, and 
worsening chorea. This development of symptoms will substantially inhibit their 
ability to convert their primary goods. This capability is only further infringed by the 
development of late stage symptoms, especially as the individual often becomes bed-
bound and requires round-the-clock care. There is little we can do to mitigate this, 
and as such, we must consider this individual relevantly disadvantaged. Unlike 
Alzheimer’s, this lack of capability also develops in middle-age, when our 
comparative individual is likely to still be fully functional. The individual with 
Huntington’s is therefore even further disadvantaged. 
 
The individual who possesses the mutation linked to Huntington’s will again 
present a higher risk to the insured pool than the individual who does not. As such, 
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their premiums will rise if insurers are allowed to use their data. Even if they possess 
family history suggesting that they have the allele for Huntington’s, a genetic test 
both confirms this diagnosis, and allows the insurer to obtain further data such as 
CAG repeat numbers, useful in assessing time of onset. This rise in premium price 
means disadvantages them with regard to possession of an important primary good, 
wealth. However, consistent with my earlier analysis, this increase in premiums is 
likely to be relatively small, as in the majority of cases; it is likely that family history 
information would mean that these individuals’ premiums would already be loaded 
to account for the risk of them developing the condition. However, for those 
individuals who do not possess prior family history data, premium rises are likely to 
be very large, as their risk of death will substantially increase. It would therefore 
seem difficult to justify allowing the use of genetic data relating to the development 
of Huntington’s. Similar analysis also applies with regard to negative test results, 
again, either through allowing identification by exclusion, or increasing aggregate 
risk. However, before I am able to conclude, I must again assess the potential for 
adverse selection in this case, and therefore, the effect that prohibition may have on 
other policy holders. 
 
5.2.4 – What level of adverse selection is likely? 
 
 Again, we are first considering two things here. First, the prevalence of the 
genetic status within the population, and the degree to which it modifies an 
individual’s risk. With regard to the first consideration, it is important to note that 
Huntington’s is a rare condition, with a prevalence of between five and seven people 
per 100,000 affected in Western Countries.
14
 There is however some suggestion that 
this represents a significant underassessment with regard to the U.K. As of June 
2010, the Huntington’s disease Association had 6376 symptomatic individuals on its 
books, a prevalence of 12.4 per 100,000.
15
 An All-Party Parliamentary group has 
been set up to investigate prevalence, however, even if the true figure rests 
somewhere closer to 12.4 per 100,000, the condition is still rare. Indeed, within the 
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European Union, a rare disease is defined as one which affects fewer than five 
people per 10,000, or fifty per 100,000.
16
 The prevalence of Huntington’s falls 
within these boundaries. As such, the effect of adverse selection is small, as few 
individuals will have their risk mis-assessed in this case. Actuarial work by 
MacDonald indicates that the insurance industry would be able to cope with the risk 
of adverse selection presented here, suggesting: 
 
“The former [Monofactoral Conditions] are rare enough that solutions outside of the free 
market should be sought…”17 
 
According to MacDonald, the rarity of the condition means that the industry is likely 
to respond in a way other than with an increase of premium. As the adverse selection 
risk is small, the industry would not suffer a substantial hit to profit, and could adapt. 
 
 Further, Huntington’s disease is an autosomally dominant condition, and as 
such, any carrier of the mutation is guaranteed to develop the condition. As such, 
there exists strong family history data here, as for an individual to possess such a 
mutation, one of their biological parents must have possessed it, and therefore must 
have suffered from the condition. Whilst there will exist situations where an 
individual’s family history cannot be adequately traced, or an individual’s parents 
have died before they could develop symptoms, in most cases family history will be 
present. As such, risk will not be hugely miss-assessed, as premiums will already be 
loaded based on the risk of inheritance of the mutation. This means that the risk of 
the insured pool is not hugely distorted and further reduces the risk of adverse 
selection, making it more likely that solutions other than premium increases will be 
found by insurers. 
 
Finally, much like Alzheimer’s, few individuals will possess information on 
their risk status in this case, as individuals are unlikely to obtain a genetic test. 
Therefore, the chance of significant information asymmetry is negligible, and as 
such adverse selection is unlikely to occur. Given all of this, the effect of adverse 
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selection in this case is minimal, and actuarial work suggests that there would be no 
premium increase were this information to be withheld from insurers. 
 
5.2.5 – Conclusions 
 
In this case, I find first that fair equality of opportunity is meaningfully 
compromised. The condition is both extremely severe and extremely penetrant, and 
as such, the individual is likely to suffer from the effects of the condition over the 
course of their life, specifically, in middle-age. The condition is therefore one which 
meaningfully interferes with an individual’s ability to compete for employment, and 
therefore, to compete for the primary good of wealth. Over their life, the individual 
with Huntington’s will be able to compete for and earn substantially less wealth than 
an identical individual without the condition, not only because their equality of 
opportunity is inhibited, but also because they will die much earlier. 
 
In addition, the individual also has their capability to use their primary goods 
significantly compromised. Although social care is provided, and will act to prevent 
the condition imposing financial costs upon the individual, the development of 
symptoms would, in this case, act to substantially inhibit the individual’s ability to 
convert their wealth into ends. Again, as compared to the individual without the 
condition, they spend a significant portion of their life being unable to effectively 
convert the wealth that they do obtain. The individual therefore not only possesses 
less wealth, but is less able to use it than an individual who does not develop 
Huntington’s. 
 
 The potential for adverse selection in this case is, whilst present, also very 
small. It is unlikely that many individuals will hold genetic information relating to 
their risk status (as the test is not medically useful) and as such, the effect of 
information asymmetry will be limited. This means that the insured pool does not 
become significantly distorted. Further, premiums will already be loaded with family 
history data which is likely to be present in this case, which means that premium 
rises would be small anyway. Finally, the condition is also rare enough that insurers 
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are unlikely to raise premiums overall, and instead look for solutions outside the free 
market anyway. 
 
 Assuming the above, the conclusion is relatively simple. In this case study, 
we have on one side an individual who is severely disadvantaged both in terms of 
fair equality of opportunity and capability through no fault of their own. Allowing 
access to their data would act to further disadvantage them through a likely rise in 
their life insurance premium. These individuals are also amongst those who are most 
likely to need life insurance, as they are guaranteed to die at an early age, and 
therefore more likely to need to support any dependents they leave behind through 
the mechanism of insurance. On the other hand, preventing the use of this data 
carries no third party harms, and would not see premiums rise for members of the 
least advantaged group. Therefore, the just approach would be to prevent use of this 
data by insurance companies in setting premiums. 
 
5.3 – Haemochromatosis 
 
 At the other end of the severity spectrum is Haemochromatosis. Whilst the 
development of complications can prove fatal if untreated, effective management of 
the condition through regular phlebotomy can prevent secondary complications.
18
 
The condition is therefore one of low severity, relatively high penetrance and onsets 
on the pre-retirement side of the binary. Again, before I can assess justifiability I 
must briefly discuss disincentivisation. This is relevant because in this case, a genetic 
test is incredibly useful in diagnosing the condition. An individual who is 
disincentivised from obtaining one may then not know that they have the condition. 
This in turn means that they would not receive regular phlebotomies, and severe 
complications could develop. The severity of the condition therefore depends on how 
effectively it is able to be diagnosed, and whether individuals are likely to obtain a 
genetic test result is part of that. 
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5.3.1 – Is there likely to be a disincentive to obtain a test? 
 
 Unlike both Alzheimer’s and Huntington’s, there is a large incentive to test 
for this condition. Without a genetic test, an individual is unlikely to discover they 
suffer from the condition at an early stage, as the onset of symptoms is extremely 
non-specific, often manifesting in general complaints such as joint pain or fatigue. 
By the time more specific symptoms develop, the patient will already be suffering 
from the effects of secondary complications. Further, there is a very effective and 
relatively non-invasive treatment option available which can prevent the 
development of complications. We know from within Chapter Four that individuals 
become more likely to obtain genetic tests both when they feel at risk, and when they 
feel that something is able to be done. Given the penetrance of the condition, it might 
be that an individual possesses a family history of Haemochromatosis, meaning they 
feel at risk and are likely to take a test. Even in the absence of this, the fact that the 
test is extremely useful in effectively diagnosing the condition early means that 
individuals are likely to obtain it, especially as it is offered in a medical context. 
Consistent with earlier analysis within Chapter Four, it is therefore likely that 
individuals choose to undergo genetic testing within the medical context, as they 
know it will be medically beneficial for them. 
 
 It is unlikely that allowing the use of test data by insurers does anything to 
change the likelihood an individual will obtain a test. On one side of the calculation, 
obtaining a test is beneficial to the individual, as it allows them to receive an early 
diagnosis of the condition. This in turn means that the condition can be properly 
managed through regular phlebotomy, and the complications associated with the 
condition prevented. On the other side, the increase in premium pricing is likely to 
be extremely small for these individuals, as properly treated; the condition does not 
substantially increase the risk of mortality relative to the general population. As 
such, there exists on one side a small disincentive effect created by a small increase 
in premium prices. On the other, there exists a large incentive to test as an early 
diagnosis hugely affects eventual prognosis and the development of complications.  
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 The risk of loss from not undertaking a test is therefore much higher than the 
risk from undertaking one, as the comparison is of a very small financial loss set 
against the potential to suffer life-threatening complications as a result of being 
unable to receive early diagnosis and thus early treatment. As individuals are both 
loss and risk averse, it seems likely that they would therefore act to prevent the large 
potential loss by obtaining a test. This is again consistent with the analysis presented 
within Chapter Four. It would therefore seem that there exists no relevant 
disincentive to test here, and the appropriate level of severity to consider is that of 
the condition if diagnosed early and properly treated. The condition therefore 
remains one of low severity. 
 
5.3.2 – Is fair equality of opportunity compromised? 
 
Again, as elsewhere in the Chapter, the appropriate question here is whether 
an individual’s ability to compete fairly for employment is compromised, as this is 
one of the positions to which an individual’s ability to obtain wealth is most 
commonly attached. 
 
 Given what was said above about disincentivisation, it is likely that the 
individual will obtain a diagnosis and therefore receive appropriate treatment. The 
relevant severity is therefore low. With appropriate treatment, the individual is 
therefore unlikely to suffer from any complications that would inhibit their ability to 
compete for, obtain or maintain employment in any way. Further, the treatment for 
the condition is relatively simple, and the need to undergo phlebotomies will not 
affect the ability to compete. The fact that the condition is of high penetrance does 
not matter in this case, as the severity is so low. Even though the individual in 
question is extremely likely to develop the condition, the condition does not infringe 
upon their fair equality of opportunity. The same is true of time of onset. Although 
the condition onsets pre-retirement, and therefore would in theory be capable of 
affecting employment, the fact that severity is so low means that this is also 
irrelevant. As compared to an identical individual without Haemochromatosis, the 
individual who does develop this condition has the same lifetime expectations with 
regard to competition for employment, and thus, all else being equal, the same 
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lifetime expectation of wealth.  As such, the individual does not appear to be 
meaningfully disadvantaged. This condition is useful in illustrating the importance of 
severity to the overall analysis. If severity is sufficiently low, neither time of onset 
nor penetrance matter, as the development of the condition does not meaningfully 
infringe fair equality of opportunity. 
 
5.3.3 – Is capability compromised? 
 
 Unlike both previous conditions, this individual does not suffer a significant 
loss to their capability to convert their primary goods either. The individual who 
suffers from Haemochromatosis is entitled to medical services (such as their regular 
phlebotomies) which the state is duty bound to provide. This is not an issue within 
the UK context, as the NHS does currently exist, and does currently provide this 
service. Was the thesis to be set within the US context, an interesting debate could be 
had here about provision of healthcare, and access to health insurance.
19
 However, 
currently under the status quo, this healthcare is already provided. 
 
 Given that the individual is able to access adequate and effective healthcare 
free at the point of service, they first do not have wealth costs imposed upon them 
through having to purchase healthcare. Further, the provision of treatment in this 
case means that they do not then go on to develop complications, and their prognosis 
and life-expectancy is similar to an individual who does not develop 
Haemochromatosis. For this reason, the individual does not have their capability 
affected. When compared to an individual without Haemochromatosis, both 
individuals (again, all else being identical) will have the same capability to convert 
any primary goods they possess, as any symptoms which could infringe upon 
capability are prevented by regular phlebotomy. The fact that this individual happens 
to have Haemochromatosis therefore has no significant effect on capability. 
 
 Further, as regards premium pricing, we have already established that these 
increases are likely to be small. Appropriately treated, these individuals do not 
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present a significantly increased risk to the insured pool, as they have life expectancy 
similar to the general population. As we are talking about life insurance, the relevant 
risk calculation is how likely the individual is to die from their condition and these 
individuals have, at worst, a very small increased chance of death. They therefore, 
they only suffer a mild financial disadvantage. Given these individuals suffer neither 
a loss to their fair equality of opportunity, nor to their capability to convert their 
primary goods, it would it seem initially that the use of data relating to this condition 
is able to be justified. Before I am able to conclude however, I must again briefly 
examine the potential for adverse selection in this case in order to assess the effect of 
prohibiting the use of this data. 
 
5.3.4 – What level of adverse selection is likely? 
 
 Given the large incentive to test, and the fact that the condition is relatively 
common (approximately 1:200), one might expect the risk of adverse selection to be 
high, as many individuals possessing information about their genetic status leads to 
large information asymmetry.
20
 However, adverse selection is actually minimal here. 
Although information asymmetry is certainly high, this asymmetry does not lead to 
substantial adverse selection. The possession of a genetic test result which is positive 
for HFE related Haemochromatosis operates to reduce the risk an individual presents 
rather than to increase it. An individual who receives an early diagnosis can undergo 
treatment for the condition, and therefore, not go on to develop complications which 
may make them more likely to die. Therefore, an individual who possesses a genetic 
test for this condition presents little more risk to the insured pool than an individual 
who does not have Haemochromatosis, as they have a similar life expectancy to the 
general population.  
 
As such, even though there is likely to be large information asymmetry here, 
there exists little risk of adverse selection, as the insurer will not significantly 
underestimate the risk of the insured pool. Further, individuals are unlikely to feel 
that they are at high risk, and therefore engage in the purchasing behaviour necessary 
to cause adverse selection (purchasing more insurance). Even if the insurer were to 
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be aware of the individual’s genetic status, the increase in premium price would be 
extremely modest. This in turn means that adverse selection will be manageable in 
this case, and therefore, a rise in premium prices across the board will not occur. As 
such, there is no harm to the least advantaged group through prohibiting the use of 
this data. 
 
5.3.5 – Conclusions 
 
 In conclusion, it is unlikely that an individual will be significantly 
disincentivised from obtaining a genetic test. If insurers are able to use this data and 
an individual obtains a test, the worst-case scenario is that they receive a small 
increase in the cost of their life insurance premium. In contrast, if an individual does 
not obtain a test, their condition is significantly harder to diagnose, and therefore 
there is a risk that they are unable to obtain adequate treatment at an early stage. This 
could then lead to the development of significant complications, including life-
threatening ones. As individuals are both risk and loss-averse they would likely act 
to avoid the large risk of life-threatening symptoms developing and instead obtain a 
test and accept the small premium increase. The appropriate severity to consider is 
therefore extremely low. 
 
 If complications are prevented, this individual does not have their fair 
equality of opportunity compromised; as they are no less able to compete for 
employment than they would be did they not have Haemochromatosis. The treatment 
required is relatively non-invasive, and is will not interfere with the ability of the 
individual to obtain nor maintain employment. As such, they are able to access the 
same amount of wealth as an identical individual who did not possess the condition 
over a whole life.  Second, their capability to convert their existing primary goods is 
not compromised. Treatment is free at the point of access and as such, accessible to 
all. An individual who receives appropriate treatment will not suffer a loss of 
capability when compared to an individual without the condition. They are therefore 
not disadvantaged in this way either. 
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The individual is therefore not meaningfully disadvantaged either in terms of 
fair equality of opportunity, nor capability, meaning that it is not unjustifiable to use 
their data. The individual with Haemochromatosis would only receive a small 
increase in premium price upon disclosure of this data, if indeed they received one at 
all. Indeed, the fact that possession of a genetic test makes diagnosis and subsequent 
treatment easier, and the incredibly good prognosis one is able to obtain with this 
early treatment means that the individual who possesses and discloses this data 
might actually be viewed as a lower risk, and receive a premium reduction. Equally, 
there is no reason to necessitate disclosure of this data, as the risk of adverse 
selection being significant enough to lead to premium price increases appears 
incredibly small. This means that prohibiting the use of this data is incapable of 
harming members of the least advantaged group through premium rises across the 
board. The position on use of this specific data is irrelevant from the view of the 
principles of justice. 
 
 Much as with Alzheimer’s, absent compelling reasons to allow use of data, I 
would suggest a precautionary approach. Given our compromised understanding of 
genetic data, the public perception of it as especially meaningful, personal and 
important, and the privacy concerns that this generates, I would suggest that use 
continue to be prohibited until compelling reason to allow use arises. 
 
5.4 – Breast and Ovarian Cancer 
 
 Within the analysis on Haemochromatosis, we begin to see the possible effect 
of disincentivisation on the severity of the resulting condition. The creation of a 
disincentive to test through allowing insurers use of genetic data is particularly 
relevant when we come to consider BRCA mutations and their relation to breast and 
ovarian cancer. First, let us again establish the background of the conditions in 
question. The conditions in question are of variable severity, mid-level penetrance, 
and onset on the pre-retirement side of my binary. 
 
 Whether an individual receives an early diagnosis, and therefore, the severity 
of the cancer an individual suffers, is significantly linked to whether they obtain a 
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genetic test result indicating their BRCA status. If individuals are disincentivised 
from obtaining these tests through fear that they will be used prejudicially by 
insurers, it is significantly more likely that they are then diagnosed at a later stage. 
As I highlighted within Chapter Four, the severity of the condition to be studied 
therefore depends on whether this disincentive effect exists. This is what I will now 
explore. 
 
5.4.1 – Is there likely to be a disincentive to obtain a test? 
 
 Taking into account the analysis earlier, I am now able to determine whether 
the use of this specific data by insurers is likely to have a disincentive effect. First, 
we know from Chapter Four that this test is diagnostically useful, even above and 
beyond family history data. For example, use of genetic tests meant that ovarian 
cancers were diagnosed at least half a decade earlier.
21
 Genetic testing is therefore 
important, as earlier diagnosis of these cancers means that individuals can receive 
treatment at an earlier stage. Not only is treatment of early stage cancers usually less 
invasive, but as we already know, it has far higher five and ten year survival rates, 
and is far less severe in its effects on both fair equality of opportunity and capability.  
 
 Testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2 in the medical context therefore has high 
diagnostic value with regard to treating conditions which develop. If we look back at 
section 4.3.4 we can see that the likelihood that an individual will take a diagnostic 
test rises sharply with the diagnostic usefulness of the test, possibly because more 
useful tests are more likely to be suggested by medical professionals, and provided 
as a matter of medical course.
22
 In addition to this, and because of the penetrance of 
the mutation, a significant number of these individuals will have previous family 
history of breast cancer, increasing their risk. Again, as we know from earlier, 
individuals who perceive themselves to be at higher risk of developing conditions are 
also more likely to obtain a genetic test.
 23,24 
As a starting point, these individuals 
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could therefore be said to be highly likely to obtain genetic testing for BRCA 
mutations. 
 
 So how might the use of this test by insurers change the situation? Given 
individuals are both risk and loss averse, and disclosure of data which indicates 
possession of these mutations will raise premium prices, it is possible that some 
individuals will be disincentivised from taking these tests. However, I would suggest 
that it is unlikely. First, it is again important to mention family history. As many of 
these individuals will have previous family history of breast cancer, their premiums 
will already likely be loaded as they will be assessed as at risk of possessing BRCA 
mutations. Confirming this perception would lead to an increase in premium price, 
but it is likely to be small. On the other hand, a failure to obtain a test may lead to 
their cancer not being effectively diagnosed, and them therefore suffering from late-
stage cancer rather than early stage cancer. This means that they are significantly 
more likely to die. Therefore, similar to the Haemochromatosis example, we have a 
comparison between a relatively small increase in premium, versus a large increased 
risk of serious illness or death. The loss averse individual would therefore likely 
choose to be tested to guard against the large risk, consistent with Chapter Four. 
 
 It would therefore seem unlikely that allowing insurers to use genetic test 
data relating to BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations would significantly disincentivise 
individuals from taking tests within the medical, diagnostic context, as loss averse 
individuals would likely guard against the large increased risk of death or serious 
illness, and be willing to accept a small rise in premium. The appropriate severity to 
consider is therefore that of early-stage cancer, as early diagnosis is likely to occur 
with individuals obtaining tests. The conditions are therefore of mid to low severity. 
 
5.4.2 – Is fair equality of opportunity compromised? 
 
 So, does the possession of BRCA mutations suggest that an individual will 
have their fair equality of opportunity compromised? From the analysis above, we 
know the disease is appropriately categorised as one of mid to low severity, as a lack 
                                                                                                                                          
24
 Witt, J. The Effect of Information in the Utilization of Preventive Health Care Strategies: An 
Application to Breast Cancer, op. cit. 
114 
 
of significant disincentive effect means that high-risk individuals are likely to be 
screened, receive earlier diagnostic intervention, and therefore receive treatment 
when their cancer is at an early stage. We know from Chapter Four that early stage 
cancer is treatable, and has very high survival statistics and low rates of recurrence. 
Therefore, it is likely that, even if the condition compromises fair equality of 
opportunity, this will only be short term.  
 
 In addition to the use of this genetic marker as an example of why the 
disincentive effect may matter (although, as outlined above, there is likely no 
disincentive here), these representative conditions are also useful as conditions of 
mid to low severity. Although unlike both Alzheimer’s and Huntington’s, the 
conditions are short-term, the individual is likely to suffer some compromise to their 
fair equality of opportunity. Patients are likely to receive surgical intervention (either 
mastectomy or oophorectomy) followed by adjuvant therapies such as chemotherapy 
or radiotherapy.
25
 The surgery, radiotherapy and chemotherapy associated with the 
treatment of cancer may mean that, while they are receiving treatment, they are 
unable to compete equally with an identical individual who is not receiving this 
treatment. The individual with the condition will be required to attend hospital on a 
regular basis, at least in the early stages. This may infringe upon their ability to 
maintain employment, although the existence of both statutory and occupational sick 
pay schemes mean that this effect will be limited.
26
 Indeed, the individual is likely to 
only be absent from work for a short period during and immediately after surgery, 
something which would be covered by these existing provisions. Secondly, the 
individual may suffer side effects including fatigue and nausea associated with their 
chemotherapy, and this may again mean that they require time away from work.
27
 
However, these side effects are again short term and likely to be covered by existing 
provision. 
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 Whilst these are by no means small interventions, it is unlikely that they 
would significantly affect an individual’s ability to obtain or maintain employment. 
An individual would be absent from work for a brief period during and immediately 
after surgery (and possibly for chemotherapy) something which could be covered by 
existing state and contractual provision for absence from work due to illness. 
Ongoing adjuvant therapies can then be arranged around an individual’s working 
life. Unlike Alzheimer’s and Huntington’s, these conditions are not degenerative, 
and individuals do not lose permanent functionality which might prevent them from 
being able to perform duties they performed previously. 
 
Again, recall that we are concerned with departures from normal functioning 
that shrink shares of primary goods below what is fair.
28
 In this case, although the 
individual does undoubtedly depart from normal functioning here, they do not depart 
in a way which significantly affects their ability to obtain nor maintain employment 
long-term.
29
 As such, their departure is unlikely to shrink their share of primary 
goods, and fair equality of opportunity is not meaningfully compromised, they still 
have roughly equal prospects of achievement as compared to an individual who has 
not suffered from the condition. Specifically, their expectation of wealth over the 
course of a whole life is similar to an identical individual who does not suffer from 
the condition. 
 
5.4.3 – Is capability compromised? 
 
 Again, although an individual’s fair equality of opportunity is not 
compromised by possession of a BRCA mutation and subsequent development of 
cancer, it may be that their capability to actualise their goods into ends is. Much like 
with Haemochromatosis, the individual can receive effective treatment in this case, 
meaning that their long term prognosis is good, and they receive no permanent 
compromise to their ability to convert primary goods. However, what differentiates 
this example, and one of the reasons for its consideration, is the fact that the 
individual does suffer significant short term symptoms. Not only must they attend 
hospital regularly, and often undergo surgery, but the side effects associated with 
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adjuvant therapy such as chemotherapies mean that the individual may be somewhat 
unwell for a significant period of time. This will compromise their ability to fully 
utilise their primary goods, and to convert them into ends. 
 
It would therefore appear that their capability is somewhat compromised 
here, albeit for a short period of time. Further, this disadvantage again occurs 
through no fault of their own, and therefore, we owe them assistance to rectify this 
disadvantage (which we provide through the NHS). It may also be illegitimate to 
further disadvantage them through allowing use of their data. 
 
 Let us now consider how far this individual would actually be disadvantaged 
through allowing insurers the use of their data. If an individual must disclose a 
positive BRCA test result to insurers, their premiums will rise, however this price 
rise is likely to be relatively small. Individuals who carry BRCA mutations often 
possess family history or other demographic data which increases their risk profile. 
Even in the absence of genetic test data, their insurer therefore already likely has a 
relatively accurate picture of the risk they present to the pool, and they are already 
charged a loaded premium. Confirming this bias will only make them a slightly more 
risky prospect rather than a radical one, and premium pricing will reflect that. 
Therefore, they only suffer a small financial disadvantage. 
 
 So far then, we have an individual whose fair equality of opportunity is not 
meaningfully compromised, but whose capability is, at least in the short term. This 
individual therefore has the same expectation of lifetime wealth as an identical 
individual without the mutation, but a reduced capacity to use it during the period 
they suffer from cancer. Further, we know any disadvantage this individual suffers 
from allowing the use of their test data by insurers is likely to be small. Whether the 
use of their data can be justified depends significantly on the effect of adverse 
selection here. If there is no significant adverse selection effect, it may be justifiable 
to prevent the use of their data, as their capability is somewhat compromised. 
Equally, a large adverse selection effect may mean that their data is justifiably used 
in order to protect members of the least advantaged group. It is this that I will now 
explore. 
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5.4.4 – What level of adverse selection is likely? 
 
 In this case, the prevalence of BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations is surprisingly 
low. Although penetrant amongst those who possess the mutation, BRCA mutations 
are only responsible for approximately 6% of breast cancer within the UK (3.5% 
BRCA1, 2.4% BRCA2).
30
 Indeed, BRCA mutations only account for a small number 
of hereditary cancers.
31
 One might therefore expect the effect of adverse selection to 
be low. 
 
  However, unlike the other conditions I am considering, there is market 
simulation data available here. Hoy and Witt simulated a standard economic model 
of the life insurance market, assuming that insurance companies offer nonexclusive 
contracts and price linearly. The situations compared were between allowing the 
individual to hold this genetic information privately, and allowing insurers to use it 
to set premiums in a laissez-faire market. Within the study, they found that in 
situations where 5% or 20% of individuals possessed test data privately, adverse 
selection occurred to a level of approximately a 15% increase in price across the 
board. A situation where 100% of people possessed test data lead to substantial 
adverse selection, increasing prices by a factor of almost three (dependant on risk 
group). As access to data such as family history decreases, individuals are likely to 
cause more adverse selection.
32
 This can however be somewhat mitigated by insurers 
employing strict underwriting rules, for example, being diligent in requesting cancer 
history and onset age for all first degree relatives.
33
 Subramanian et. al. suggest that 
under these strict underwriting conditions, adverse selection may be able to be 
controllable, however, controllable in this context merely means that the insurance 
industry would survive. The study still suggests that under these strict underwriting 
terms, adverse selection could lead to an increase in portfolio cost, somewhere below 
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10%.
34
 This still likely means an increase in premiums across the board. Even if this 
increase is small, it may have a large effect upon those who are poorest, the members 
of the least advantaged group. There is also doubt as to how far strict underwriting 
terms can account for risk sufficiently to prevent adverse selection. If we look again 
at the evidence base within Chapter Four, we know that as many as 50% of BRCA 
mutations occur in individuals who do not have a first-degree relative affected with 
cancer.
35
 Strict underwriting terms asking for cancer history and age of onset for first 
degree relatives would therefore seem an insufficient mechanism to account for 
adverse selection. 
 
 Even under the NHS where tests for the condition are offered free at the point 
of service, it would seem unlikely that we reach a level where 100% of individuals 
hold data about their BRCA status, as testing is expensive and only offered to those 
who already thought to be high risk. However, the fact that these individuals are 
aware of their genetic status will cause some adverse selection as they purchase more 
insurance due to being high risk. This is exacerbated by the fact that, as established 
earlier, individuals are likely to want to undergo testing in this case, and are unlikely 
to be disincentivised from doing so, which means more individuals will be aware of 
their genetic status. As such, information asymmetry is likely to be relatively high. 
Even 20% of insured individuals possessing information about their genetic status 
could cause premiums to increase by 15%, therefore harming those who are 
members of the least advantaged group. The effect of adverse selection is therefore 
strong. 
 
5.4.5 – Conclusions 
 
 In conclusion, it is again in this case unlikely that an individual will be 
disincentivised from obtaining a genetic test result. If they obtain a test and insurers 
are allowed to use the resulting data, they will only receive a small increase in their 
life insurance premium, first because they likely possess family history or other 
demographic data allowing accurate risk assessment, and second, because possession 
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of a test allows them to be streamed into receiving care such as more frequent 
mammograms or preventative surgery. This means that their risk of mortality is 
lower than it would be had they not acquired the test, something relevant to life 
insurance risk assessment. If the individual does not choose to obtain a test, they will 
not receive this enhanced care, and as such, are more likely to suffer from a later 
stage cancer, for which mortality is significantly higher. A risk and loss averse 
individual would therefore likely choose to be tested. This means that the appropriate 
severity of condition to consider is that of early stage cancer. 
 
 The individual therefore does not have their fair equality of opportunity 
significantly compromised. Although they will likely need surgery, both statutory 
and contractual measures exist which mean that an individual is able to obtain paid 
leave from employment during this period. Ongoing adjuvant therapies (such as 
chemotherapy) can be arranged around an individuals working life. As such, the 
individual will not be absent from work for an extended period, and similarly able to 
obtain or maintain employment when compared to an identical individual who does 
not develop cancer. As such, they have the same expectation of wealth over the 
course of a whole life. However, unlike Haemochromatosis, it would appear that 
capability is compromised here, albeit temporarily. While receiving adjuvant 
therapies, the individual is likely to suffer side effects (such as fatigue and nausea) 
that mean they are unwell for a significant period of time. This will inhibit their 
ability to convert their primary goods into ends. When compared to the identical 
individual without the condition, their capability is therefore compromised, and they 
are disadvantaged in this way. 
 
 When we come to consider adverse selection, I find it plausible that 
significant adverse selection will occur here. First, the large incentive to be tested, 
when combined with the lack of disincentive effect means that, in a situation where 
use is prohibited, information asymmetry is high. These women are then likely to 
engage in purchasing behaviour which distorts the risk of the insured pool, and 
means that the insurer suffers a hit to profit. Market simulation data suggests that 
adverse selection will in this case lead to significant premium rises, even if the 
studies disagree as to the extent. Even the small premium rises projected by the 
Subramanian study would operate to significantly harm those members of the least 
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advantaged group who find themselves just barely able to afford their current 
insurance plans. It would therefore be justifiable to allow insurers use of this data in 
order to prevent adverse selection from operating to harm members of the least 
advantaged group contrary to the difference principle. However, in accordance with 
this principle, any use needs to also be limited so as to exclude using the data of 
members of the least advantaged group, as this would also harm them (through direct 
premium rises) contrary to the requirements of justice. If we are to allow use, we 
therefore need to establish what value X is in the case of individuals with BRCA. As 
I explained earlier, this is incredibly difficult to define specifically, but it should be 
possible to take a precautionary approach, and set the threshold for use of data 
significantly above where we think the value may be, and yet still at a level which 
allows the use of enough data to prevent adverse selection effects. Determining this 
value will require significant cooperation between government, policy institutes such 
as the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the insurance industry. This could be an 
interesting avenue for further work. 
 
Were the market simulations not to bear out, and adverse selection turn out to 
be controllable, then the conclusion changes. Much as with the Alzheimer’s case, we 
then have a situation where third party harms to the least advantaged group are 
prevented, and the appropriate concern is now for the individual whose capability is 
limited by the development of a condition for which they are blameless. Should 
insurers find strict underwriting terms which operate to prevent this adverse selection 
risk, then use should be prohibited in order to protect these individuals who possess 
mutations linked to the development of cancer. 
 
5.5 – Hypertension 
 
 Finally, we must consider Hypertension, the general state of elevated blood 
pressure. We know from Chapter Four that, properly treated, the condition is one of 
relatively low severity, low penetrance, and one which onsets on the pre-retirement 
side of my binary. Further, the condition can, in this case, be diagnosed easily 
through the use of a syphgmomanometer, and blood pressure is frequently checked 
by doctors. A genetic test result is not required to diagnose this condition and 
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provide appropriate treatment. As such, disincentivisation does not matter in this 
case, as even if no individual ever undergoes genetic testing due to the disincentive 
effect, this will have no effect on severity of outcome, and therefore no effect on 
either fair equality of opportunity or capability. Indeed, the penetrance for this 
condition is so low that genetic testing is not offered in the medical context, and is 
only available through outside private providers. The number of individuals who 
undergo testing even in a situation where there is no disincentive is therefore 
incredibly small. 
 
5.5.1 – Is fair equality of opportunity compromised? 
 
 Again, the relevant question is how far the individual’s ability to access or 
maintain employment may be compromised by the possession of the genetic markers 
in question. We know from above that the severity of the condition is low, and that 
treatment is available which reduces both risk and severity of outcome. Whilst risk is 
not quite equivalent to the general population (unlike with Haemochromatosis), the 
various management options available mean that the treated condition is one of low 
severity.  
 
 It would seem unlikely that there is any meaningful compromise of fair 
equality of opportunity here, for several reasons. First, the fact that effective 
treatment options are available means that should hypertension develop, it is unlikely 
to be severe enough to inhibit an individual’s ability to obtain or maintain 
employment. Mild symptoms such as brief periods of dizziness or shortness of 
breath will not compromise the ability to compete fairly. Indeed, it would seem an 
individual is able to obtain or maintain employment at a similar level to an 
individual who does not have hypertension with symptoms of such low severity. 
Secondly, penetrance becomes important for two reasons. First, due to the condition 
being of such low penetrance, there is only a 23% increased risk that the individual 
in question develops hypertension when an identical individual without the genetic 
markers would not. 75%+ of individuals will not develop hypertension due to their 
genetic characteristics. When considered alongside the low severity, it seems 
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unlikely that the possession of these genetic markers could be said to significantly 
increase the risk of fair equality of opportunity being compromised. 
 
Also with regard to penetrance, it is important to note that lifestyle factors are 
by far the most significant contributors to whether an individual develops 
hypertension. If an individual eats unhealthily, has high levels of cholesterol and 
does not undertake exercise, they are likely to develop hypertension, whether or not 
they are genetically predisposed to it. In contrast, an individual who does eat 
healthily and exercises regularly is unlikely to have hypertension, again regardless of 
their genetic status. As such, the major contributor to the development of 
hypertension is one which individuals can be held responsible for. Remember that 
one of the purposes of the theory is to “attempt to mitigate the arbitrariness of natural 
contingency and superficial fortune.”36 Unlike the other conditions, the development 
of hypertension is primarily associated with individual behavior rather than bad luck 
in either the natural or social lottery.
37
  
 
 It is therefore first unlikely that an individual does in fact have their fair 
equality of opportunity compromised, as the severity of the condition is too low, and 
they are unlikely to develop the condition specifically due to their genetic makeup. 
Secondly, if the individual does develop the condition, it is likely due to actions they 
have taken, either through an unhealthy diet or avoiding exercise, which means that 
they can legitimately be held responsible for their condition, and therefore we owe 
them no assistance as a matter of justice.  
 
5.5.2 – Is capability compromised? 
 
 Much like with the several of the other conditions studied, it may again be 
the case that although fair equality of opportunity is not meaningfully compromised 
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here, an individual’s capability to actualise their primary goods may be. We again 
know that we have a duty to provide healthcare services, and they are again provided 
adequately in this context. 
 
 With adequate treatment, the symptoms associated with the condition are not 
severe, and will not compromise an individual’s capability to convert their primary 
goods. As compared to an identical individual without the condition, this individual 
will have the same capability. Further, it is questionable to what extent the 
individuals are meaningfully different, as the penetrance is also quite low. It is 
unlikely that an individual will develop hypertension purely due to their genetic 
characteristics. This means that their capability is even less likely to be 
compromised, as they may not actually suffer from the mild symptoms associated 
with the treated condition at all. It is in fact more likely that the individual who does 
develop hypertension does so due to lifestyle factors. As these are not a result of 
either the natural or social lottery, but instead choices that an individual has made, 
we can again hold them responsible for their disadvantage. We therefore owe them 
no duty under the principles of justice to rectify this lack of capability. As the 
individual is not meaningfully disadvantaged, much like Haemochromatosis, there is 
no prima facie reason why the use of their genetic data by insurers would be 
unjustifiable. In order to assess whether the principles of justice require us to allow 
use of this data, we must again examine the potential for adverse selection. 
 
5.5.3 – What level of adverse selection is likely? 
 
 Taking into account the lack of incentive to test, and the fact that they would 
not usually be provided in the medical context, it is unlikely that a large percentage 
of individuals will know their genetic status in this case. The fact that few 
individuals know their genetic status limits the possibility of information asymmetry, 
and thus, the possibility of adverse selection. 
 
Second, the fact that the development of the condition is so influenced by 
environmental and lifestyle factors also hugely limits adverse selection. Any increase 
in premium through the use of this test for insurance purposes is likely to be 
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extremely small, as the test is not hugely predictive as compared to lifestyle and 
environmental factors which the company already possesses. Further, genetic risk 
can be (and indeed, is) somewhat already accounted for by taking a family history of 
cardiac events. It is likely that the risk of these individuals developing hypertension 
is already accurately assessed by insurers, and their premiums are unlikely to change 
much. Indeed, there is question as to whether this is even information which insurers 
would use, given it is less predictive than lifestyle and environmental data. When 
discussing significantly multifactorial conditions, MacDonald suggests that these: 
 
“…probably will not provide clear and reliable estimates of lifetime risk, distinguishable 
from lifestyle and environmental factors; they might therefore
 
not meet criteria of accuracy 
and reliability such as those
 
that govern discriminatory pricing in respect of disability.”38  
 
The possibility of adverse selection leading to price increases across the board is 
therefore almost nil. It is incredibly unlikely that insurers would even use this data, 
and even if they did, the effect of the data on the risk assessment means that 
substantial adverse selection would not occur. As such, there is almost no risk of 
premium rises across the board as a result of denying insurers this information. 
 
 5.5.4 – Conclusions 
 
 Briefly, we can therefore conclude the following. First, due to the relatively 
small influence that these genetic markers would appear to exert, an individual who 
possesses them is not guaranteed to develop hypertension, absent other 
environmental or lifestyle factors. Whilst these factors do influence risk, they are by 
no means the most important contributor. Further, we know that disincentives are 
irrelevant in this case, as the condition is easily diagnosed in the absence of genetic 
data, and treatment can be provided. This means severity is low. Given the fact that 
tests are unlikely to be offered in the medical context (as they are not useful); the 
number of individuals who are aware of their genetic status is likely to be relatively 
small. Following from this, information asymmetry between individuals and insurers 
is therefore limited, and so is the potential for adverse selection. Adverse selection is 
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limited further both by the fact that premiums (if they rise) are likely to only rise by 
a small amount, and there exists question as to whether insurers would even use this 
data at all. There is therefore no harm to the least advantaged group through denying 
insurers the use of this data. 
 
 However, we also know that the individual who does possess these markers 
is not meaningfully disadvantaged compared to the individual who does not. First, as 
I outlined earlier, the mere possession of certain genetic markers does not guarantee 
one individual will develop the condition when the other will not, especially if they 
share similar lifestyle and environmental factors. Moving beyond this, even if this 
were true, the relatively mild symptoms present at onset, and the fact that effective 
treatment options are available means that the individual who does suffer from 
hypertension does not have their fair equality of opportunity in terms of access to 
employment compromised. They also do not have their capability compromised 
either, again due to the lack of severity of the condition. Insofar as they do, it is 
likely to be due to their own actions, and therefore we owe them no duty under the 
principles of justice.  
 
Much as with Haemochromatosis, use of data relating to this condition is 
neither justifiable nor unjustifiable, but irrelevant. There exists no compelling reason 
why this data must be used, as adverse selection does not in this case appear to 
operate to the detriment of members of the least advantaged group. Equally, there 
exists no reason why this data could not be legitimately used, as the individuals are 
not relevantly disadvantaged. As with Haemochromatosis, I would suggest in this 
case a precautionary approach, and maintain the prohibition on use unless there is a 
compelling reason to remove it. This is not only due to the privacy and perception 
concerns outlined within 5.1.5, but also the lack of understanding of genetic data 
explored within Chapter One. Given this data is of such low penetrance, the fact that 
this data is not fully understood, and the fact that genetic data is culturally endowed 
with almost prophetic potential, it is possible that this information could be misused 
and treated with more relevance than it truly deserves. This could operate to 
disadvantage individuals through unfair revisions of their risk status and therefore, 
premium price. In the absence of reason to use this data, I see no reason to take these 
risks. 
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Chapter Six 
Final Conclusions 
 
 Within this final Chapter of the thesis, I will offer conclusions which follow 
from my analysis of representative conditions within Chapter Five. Specifically, I 
will explore and answer the final part of my thesis question, whether the position of 
the moratorium accords with the justifiable position outlined within the previous 
Chapter. I will first offer conclusions on conditions where the status quo is able to be 
justified, followed by those where it is irrelevant, and finally and most interestingly, 
those conditions where the current UK position is unjustifiable.  
 
Before I proceed, below is a table summarising the conclusions reached 
within the previous Chapter, again re-ordered to reflect the order of consideration 
within this final section: 
 
Condition Fair Equality of 
Opportunity 
Capability Use 
Justifiable? 
Alzheimer’s Disease Not Compromised Compromised No 
Haemochromatosis Not Compromised Not Compromised Irrelevant 
Hypertension Not Compromised Not Compromised Irrelevant 
BRCA Mutations Not Compromised Compromised 
(short-term) 
Yes 
Huntington’s Disease Compromised Compromised No 
 
6.1 – Conditions where the status quo is justifiable 
 
 Of the five conditions I have studied, there is only one where the current UK 
position is certainly correct from the perspective of the principles of justice. This is 
Alzheimer’s disease, and I will present my conclusions on this first. 
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6.1.1 – Alzheimer’s Disease 
 
 We know from the previous Chapter that there exists no great harm to the 
least advantaged through prohibiting the use of this data, as adverse selection is 
likely to be minimal. Given this, and give that the individual who develops the 
condition is at least somewhat less capable of converting their primary goods than an 
equivalent individual without the condition, it would seem justifiable to prohibit the 
use of genetic data in this case, out of moral concern for this reduced capability. 
 
 As a reminder, the current UK position prohibits the use of all genetic data 
for life insurance policies under £500,000 in value, and critical illness cover under 
£300,000 in value.
1
 Over this amount, only one test was ever approved for use by the 
GAIC, that for Huntington’s.2 The current position within the moratorium therefore 
allows no use of genetic data relating to these individuals who possess genetic 
markers suggesting the development of Alzheimer’s disease. As I explained earlier, 
allowing the use of this data by insurers would be unjustifiable under the principles 
of justice. Therefore, the status quo is, in this case, justifiable. 
 
 With regard to this specific condition, my conclusions do not differ radically 
from others in the area. Indeed, one of the applications received by the GAIC was for 
the use of a test relating to Alzheimer’s disease, an application which was never 
granted.
3
 During the Whose Hands on Your Genes? consultation, the GAIC received 
several pieces of feedback relating to the use of this data, from groups such as the 
Alzheimer’s society and Alzheimer Scotland.4 Whilst it is unsurprising that these 
pieces of feedback supported a prohibition on the use of the data, they share my view 
that adverse selection is likely to be small and controllable, citing evidence brought 
                                                 
1
 Association of British Insurers, Concordat and Moratorium on Genetics and Insurance, March 
2005, Accessible at: [http://www.abi.org.uk/Information/Consumers/Health_and_Protection/528.pdf], 
Accessed 10-02-2012. 
2
 Genetics and Insurance Committee, October 2000: Huntington’s Disease, Accessible at: 
[http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@ab/documents/digitalasset/d
h_087703.pdf], Accessed 30-07-2010. 
3
 Human Genetics Commission, Whose Hands on Your Genes: A Discussion document on the 
Storage, Protection and Use of Personal Genetic Information, (London:HGC 2000) para. 2.4. 
4
 Human Genetics Commission, Responses to the ‘Whose Hands on Your Genes?’ Consultation, 
Accessible at: [http://www.hgc.gov.uk/Client/Content_wide.asp?ContentId=419], Accessed 13-10-
2012. 
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before the Science and Technology Committee.
5
 The responses also suggest that a 
disincentive effect may be relevant here with regard to participation in research, 
something which could harm efforts to understand the condition.
6
 Looking 
specifically at Rawlsian approaches to the use of genetic information in the insurance 
industry, many of the concerns highlighted within my analysis are shared by Robert 
Card. Essentially; he concludes that genetic information should not be required to be 
disclosed to insurers, except where an individual is put in an unfair bargaining 
position through knowledge of the data. This is motivated by a concern for the 
effects of adverse selection.
7
 As he notes in the article, at that time, it was difficult to 
assess whether significant adverse selection would occur. With regard to this 
condition, I feel I have made a substantial case as to why it would not, and as such, 
he would agree with me in prohibiting the use of this data. 
 
6.2 – Conditions where the status quo is irrelevant 
 
 Within my analysis, there are two conditions where use and prohibition are 
both justifiable, meaning that whilst the position of the moratorium on these issues is 
justifiable, a removal of the prohibition on use would not necessarily be a problem 
either. It is these conditions I will consider next. First, Haemochromatosis. 
 
6.2.1 – Haemochromatosis 
 
Again, within Chapter Five, we learned that neither their fair equality of 
opportunity nor capability to convert their existing primary goods is significantly 
compromised by the condition. As such, it would not necessarily be illegitimate to 
allow the use of their data. However, the risk of adverse selection is, in this case, also 
very minimal, and likely to be controllable by insurers without necessitating 
premium price increases across the board. Therefore, there exists no disadvantage to 
the least advantaged group through prohibiting the use of this data by insurers. As far 
as the principles of justice are concerned, the question is therefore somewhat 
                                                 
5
 Ibid. Specifically Alzheimer’s Society, para 3.5. 
6
 Ibid. Para 5.4 
7
 Card. R, Genetic Information, Health Insurance and Rawlsian Justice, in Card, R. (ed) Critically 
thinking about Medical Ethics, (Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2004) 288-294. 
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irrelevant. The status quo currently prevents the use of this data and is justifiable in 
doing so; however equally, a change in position to allow the use of this data would 
also be justifiable. Whether this data should be disclosed to insurers might therefore 
be affected by other concerns, such as privacy concerns, and this may be an 
interesting avenue for further work. 
 
There is little material from others specifically discussing 
Haemochromatosis. A consultation on rare genetic disorders performed by the HGC 
in 2001 included the condition, and found that there were two examples of unfair 
discrimination occurring, arbitrary and harsh treatment with regard to travel 
insurance, and a general failure to take account of developments in treatment.
8
 
However, this was carried out over a decade ago, an incredibly long time in the field 
of genetics. In the absence of a follow-up study, it is impossible to know if these 
problems persist. Further, unlike for Alzheimer’s, the GAIC never received an 
application to use a diagnostic test for Haemochromatosis, indicating that insurers 
never considered its use essential. This would suggest that my conclusions re: the 
extremely low likelihood of adverse selection have some weight behind them. There 
is also no mention of the condition in the “Whose Hands on Your Genes?” 
consultation, nor any significant mention throughout the operation of neither the 
GAIC nor the HGC.
9
 Whilst not necessarily supportive of the idea that people are 
ambivalent about the use of this data, this lack of concern does suggest that the 
current moratorium position on this condition (use prohibited) is not one which 
anyone is strongly advocating changing. As the use or prohibition on use of this data 
is irrelevant from a Rawlsian perspective, I would suggest the status quo simply 
remain, especially given the potential concerns about privacy and confidentiality 
mentioned earlier. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Human Genetics Commission, Rare Genetic Disorders and Insurance: An Empirical Study, 2001 
Accessible at: 
[http://www.hgc.gov.uk/UploadDocs/Contents/Documents/iievidence_raredisorders_gigreport.pdf] 
Accessed 13-10-2012. 
9
 Human Genetics Commission, Responses to the ‘Whose Hands on Your Genes?’ Consultation, op. 
cit. 
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6.2.2 – Hypertension 
  
Much as with Haemochromatosis, neither fair equality of opportunity nor 
ability to convert existing primary goods is significantly compromised here, and it is 
justifiable to use their data, should an insurer deem it relevant. However, again 
similar to Haemochromatosis, it is would also be legitimate to prohibit the use of this 
data, as adverse selection would be controllable, and as such, the least advantaged 
group would not be harmed by this prohibition. The status quo is justified in 
preventing use of this data, but whether this data is in fact used by insurers is again 
irrelevant from the perspective of the principles of justice. 
 
 Conditions such as this have also been treated as an irrelevance by the 
community at large. From the perspective of the insurers, data relating to these 
multifactorial conditions provides such low specificity and accuracy that: 
 
“…they might therefore not meet criteria of accuracy and reliability such as those that 
govern discriminatory pricing in respect of disability.”10 
 
 There is therefore no great pressure from the industry to allow the use of this 
test, as it is one that they likely would not use anyway. They are already able to use 
lifestyle data, and it is this which is the predominant risk factor for Hypertension and 
associated complications. In the absence of demand from the industry, nor any 
evidence of adverse selection, I would recommend that the status quo again simply 
remain as a matter of precaution given our understanding of genetic data. However, 
without either significant adverse selection, or evidence that the condition 
compromises fair equality of opportunity or capability, the regulatory position is 
irrelevant from a Rawlsian perspective. 
 
6.3 – Conditions where the status quo is unjustifiable 
 
 Finally, within the thesis there are two conditions for which the approach 
taken by the moratorium is unjustifiable under the principles of justice. The current 
UK position is unjustifiable for different reasons for each of these, in one case 
                                                 
10
 MacDonald, A, Genetics and health costs: some actuarial models, op. cit. 
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allowing use of data which should justly be prohibited from use, and in another 
prohibiting the use of data which must justly be used. It is here that reform of the 
moratorium is required, and these conditions I will consider last. 
 
6.3.1 – BRCA 
 
 When considering BRCA mutations, an individual’s fair equality of 
opportunity is not meaningfully compromised, and although they suffer a loss of 
capability, this is likely transient and full capability will be restored. A prohibition 
on the use of this data may in fact operate to harm those who could legitimately be 
considered the least advantaged due to the operation of adverse selection. It is 
therefore justifiable to allow the use of this data by insurers.  The status quo is 
therefore unjustifiable in this case, as it prohibits the use of this data. A prohibition 
on the use of this data means that significant adverse selection occurs, and this harms 
policy holders who are members of the least advantaged group through increasing 
their premiums. As a matter of justice, the moratorium should therefore allow the use 
of this data. 
 
However, it is essential that, in allowing this use, we do not allow the use of 
data relating specifically to individuals who are members of the least advantaged 
group. Doing so would cause their premiums to rise in violation of the difference 
principle. If we are to allow use of this data, it is therefore essential that we discover 
where value X lies, and therefore, the policy value at which we are able to use data, 
secure in the knowledge that members of the least advantaged group do not purchase 
those policies. As we know from Chapter Three, finding this value is likely to be 
incredibly difficult, if not impossible. However, even a heavily precautionary 
approach where we only allow use for the top 10% of policies or so (similar to the 
current approach to Huntington’s) could operate to significantly reduce adverse 
selection, and therefore harm to members of the least advantaged group. This is 
because as policy value increases, the financial consequences of mis-assessing risk 
for the insurer also increase, and therefore their response is larger.
11
 Whilst the ideal 
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 Subramanian, K., et. al. ‘Estimating Adverse Selection Costs from Genetic Testing for Breast and 
Ovarian Cancer: The Case of Life Insurance’ op. cit. 
132 
 
position requires that we prevent any premium increases affecting the least 
advantaged, it will at the very least take significant time and work to discover what 
value X is in this case. A precautionary approach to using this data would, in the 
meantime, allow us to prevent significant harm at no risk to the individuals within 
the least advantaged group. 
 
 As we know from Chapter Five, this conclusion is heavily dependent on the 
existence or absence of a disincentive effect. If an individual is disincentivised from 
obtaining a genetic test, they are far less likely to be diagnosed and treated at an 
early stage, and therefore more likely to suffer significant effects on both their fair 
equality of opportunity and capability. We know from Prospect Theory (and the 
empirical studies cited within Chapter Four) that individuals are both risk and loss-
averse. In this case, such an individual would prioritise obtaining a test result and 
avoiding severe cancer over a small increase in premium price. This also links back 
to the genetic exceptionalism discussion within Chapter One. As we know from 
there, individuals perceive genetic information to be uniquely powerful or important, 
and studies demonstrate that they are more likely to make health decisions with this 
information than with information such as family history.
12
 When faced with a 
decision between obtaining information they consider incredibly important to their 
future health, and a loss of a relatively small amount of wealth, it is unlikely that a 
significant disincentive effect exists, and therefore, the above conclusion is the 
correct one. 
 
 An application for the use of genetic test data relating to BRCA status was 
made by the ABI, and subsequently sent for resubmission by the GAIC.
13
 The 
application was never resubmitted, and as such, was never explicitly rejected. 
Several responses to the GAIC consultation echo concerns present within my 
analysis, such as the idea that allowing use of tests may disincentivise women from 
undergoing testing.
14
 However, I believe that the analysis provided within Chapters 
Four and Five provides a convincing account of why a loss and risk averse 
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 LaRusse, Susan et. al., Genetic susceptibility testing versus family history-based risk assessment: 
Impact on perceived risk of Alzheimer disease, Genetics in Medicine, (2005) 7 (1) 48-53 
13
 Human Genetics Commission, Responses to the ‘Whose Hands on Your Genes?’ Consultation, op. 
cit. Specifically Association of British Insurers para. 39. 
14
 Ibid. Specifically Breakthrough Breast Cancer, para. 9.5 (ii). 
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individual would still choose to undergo testing in a situation where use was 
allowed. It was also put forward to the GAIC that insurers are able to gather enough 
information from family history, and this made genetic testing essentially 
irrelevant.
15
 There is however no empirical data provided to back up this claim. In 
light of this, I would again argue that studies such as those cited earlier by Hoy and 
Witt support my claim that significant adverse selection may occur should use 
continue to be prohibited.
16
 A 2003 study by Armstrong et. al. also supports this 
position, demonstrating that women informed of increased breast cancer risk 
demonstrate behaviour consistent with adverse selection, namely, an increase in life 
insurance purchasing.
17
 
 
 Of course, should adverse selection prove to be controllable, then the 
moratorium position would be justifiable. In that case, the prohibition would no 
longer harm members of the least advantaged group, and the fact that individuals 
who develop cancer suffer from reduced capability would become the issue of 
primary concern. Much as with Alzheimer’s, it would then be justifiable to prevent 
the use of this data out of moral concern for this reduction in capability. More 
empirical studies on the effect of prohibition on adverse selection is also needed. 
 
6.3.2 – Huntington’s disease 
 
 With regard to justifiability, the status quo would appear somewhat 
justifiable as it prevents the use of genetic test data relating to Huntington’s in most 
cases, consistent with the principles of justice. However, as we know from Chapter 
One, for policies over a certain value, genetic data relating to this condition is 
approved for use.
18
 So, is this use justifiable? First, it would seem that the 
individuals whose data can be used under the status quo are certainly not members of 
the least advantaged group, as they are looking to purchase large life insurance 
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 Ibid. Specifically Breast Cancer Care. 
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 Hoy, M. and Witt. J, Welfare Effects of Banning Genetic Information in the Life Insurance Market: 
The Case of BRCA1/2 Genes, op. cit. 
17
 Armstrong et. al. Life insurance and breast cancer risk assessment: adverse selection, genetic 
testing decisions, and discrimination. American Journal of Medical Genetics (2003) 120A (3) 359-
364. 
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 Genetics and Insurance Committee, October 2000: Huntington’s Disease, Accessible at: 
[http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@ab/documents/digitalasset/d
h_087703.pdf], Accessed 30-07-2010. 
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policies, a policy value that only 3% of the population hold.
19
 Given the link 
between policy value and individual wealth established in Chapter Three, it is 
reasonable to suggest that these are relatively wealthy individuals, and not likely to 
be found within the bottom wealth quartile. It is certainly not unjustifiable to 
disadvantage them for this reason. 
 
 However, we also discover within Chapter Five that it is unlikely that 
prohibiting the use of this type of genetic data would lead to adverse selection, and 
as such, premiums are unlikely to rise across the board. Therefore, preventing the use 
of this data does not act to harm members of the least advantaged group. 
Additionally, even the wealthiest individuals still have their capability severely 
limited by the development of the condition, and therefore are less able to use their 
primary goods through no fault of their own. Given that members of the least 
advantaged group will not be harmed by preventing the use of this data as adverse 
selection is controllable, the interests of justice require us to prevent the use of this 
data even for these wealthy individuals. As such, the status quo is in fact 
unjustifiable, as it allows the use of this data. 
 
Should adverse selection prove to be uncontrollable, and premium rises 
across the board become necessary, the position changes. At that point, it would still 
be unjustifiable to use the data of those individuals with Huntington’s who could 
legitimately be considered members of the least advantaged group. It would however 
become justifiable to use the information relating to those few wealthy individuals, 
as it would be legitimate to disadvantage them in order to protect the least 
advantaged group. In a situation where adverse selection does occur, and lead to 
premium increases, the status quo is the justifiable position. Indeed, under these 
assumptions, use would likely need to be expanded, as within the 97% of policy-
holders currently protected there will be many individuals who cannot legitimately 
be considered members of the least advantaged group, and who it would therefore be 
legitimate to disadvantage in order to protect the least advantaged group. 
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 We therefore have broadly two justifiable positions. Under the most likely 
scenario, where adverse selection proves to be controllable without premium prices 
rising across the board, the status quo is unjustifiable, as it allows the use of some 
data relating to this condition, when the justifiable position is to prevent all use. 
However, should adverse selection prove to be uncontrollable, the status quo is more 
justifiable, preventing the use of most data, whilst allowing the use of data relating to 
wealthy individuals in order to protect the least advantaged group. This is subject to 
the difficulties identified within Chapter Three, specifically, the difficulty of 
identifying where the boundary between the least advantaged group and everyone 
else lies. Of these positions, it is overwhelmingly likely that the first is the true 
position, as unless there is a huge uptake of genetic testing for this condition, 
information asymmetry is very low, and adverse selection therefore unlikely. 
 
It is this which I consider my most interesting conclusion, explicitly 
contradicting as it does the decision of the GAIC to allow the use of a test relating to 
this condition. This is however unsurprising, as the criteria considered by the GAIC 
when deciding whether to approve a test were merely the following: 
 
“• Technical Relevance: Does the test accurately measure the genetic information? 
• Clinical Relevance: Does a positive result in the test have likely future adverse 
implications for the health of the individual? 
• Actuarial Relevance: Does a positive result justify increased premiums?”20 
 
Of these, it is difficult to argue that the test does not fulfil the first two. The 
condition is highly penetrant, and therefore the test can accurately determine whether 
an individual will suffer from the condition. Further, a positive test result does not 
adversely affect the health of the individual, as they already carry a degenerative and 
terminal disease. I do however have significant difficulty with the third criteria, 
specifically, the understanding of ‘justify’ that the GAIC chose to adopt. If we 
examine the announcement approving the use of the test, the concern appears to be 
primarily for those whose premiums are adversely loaded due to a family history of 
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 Genetics and Insurance Committee, Fifth Report from January 2006 to December 2006, Annex C, 
Accessible at: 
[http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/d
h_074086.pdf] Accessed 14-10-2012 p.13. 
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Huntington’s, even though they do not suffer from the condition.21 There appears to 
be little concern within the announcement for those individuals who will suffer from 
the condition, and who may receive increased premiums through the approval of this 
test.  
 
 According to the GAIC consultation those individuals whose premiums are 
loaded inaccurately, “…find it very difficult, or in some cases impossible, to obtain 
insurance at affordable rates, based on their family history…”22 Whilst this is 
certainly a matter of concern, I would suggest that we should concern ourselves more 
with those individuals who have the condition. It is fair to assume that if these 
individuals who do not suffer from the condition and yet have family history find it 
difficult to obtain premiums, then those who actually carry the condition also find 
this difficult. However, unlike those whose premiums are loaded inaccurately, these 
individuals also have a much higher need for life insurance, suffering as they do 
from a terminal, degenerative illness which will substantially limit their earning 
potential, and condemn them to an early death. Further, the current position acts to 
further disadvantage these individuals who (although wealthy) have significantly 
reduced capability to use their primary goods from middle-age onwards. Given the 
absence of harms associated with prohibiting the use of this data wholesale, it is 
correct to fully prohibit use out of moral concern for this reduced capability. 
 
6.4 – Summary of Conclusions 
 
 Mindful of the difficulties identified with identifying the least advantaged 
group, and the assumptions outlined within both Chapter Five and Six, my 
conclusions are the following. Under the most likely scenarios, the moratorium is 
justifiable when examining Alzheimer’s disease. Through the use of the typology, I 
am also able to suggest that the moratorium is justifiable when considering 
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conditions which share similar characteristics to Alzheimer’s, those conditions which 
are severe, of mid penetrance, and onset post-retirement.  
 
For two of my conditions, Haemochromatosis and Hypertension, the current 
UK position is justifiable, but also somewhat irrelevant. Under the principles of 
justice, it would also be justifiable to allow use of this data. This is useful again 
because the claim can be expanded to conditions of a similar type. Therefore, should 
there exist a compelling reason to, it would be justifiable to allow insurers the use of 
data relating to conditions which are of low severity, and which onset pre-retirement, 
even if their penetrance is high. However, in the absence of reason to reverse the 
current position, I suggest a precautionary approach should be adopted, out of 
concern for both privacy and the general lack of understanding associated with 
genetic data. 
 
Finally, we find that the current position is unjustifiable in two key ways. 
First, when considering BRCA mutations, the moratorium acts to prohibit the use of 
data relating to conditions of mid to low severity, and causes large adverse selection. 
For cases such as BRCA, where a large number of individuals are likely to know 
their genetic status, it may be in the interests of justice to allow insurers the use of 
this data in order to protect members of the least advantaged group. The status quo is 
unjustifiable in this way. However, this use would have to ensure that those 
individuals who possess data relating to BRCA and who may also be considered 
members of the least advantaged group were adequately protected. This may be done 
through a mechanism similar to that already applied to Huntington’s, where 
information is allowed to be used for policies over a certain value, where that value 
is inaccessible by anyone who might be within the least advantaged group. This is a 
position suggested by Subramanian as one which may act to significantly limit the 
harm caused by adverse selection.
23
 
 
 Second, the status quo is also unjustifiable when we consider the one 
condition for which the use of data is actually authorised. Although the policy limit 
is set at a high level, and therefore only data relating to the wealthiest 3% of 
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individuals is used, the lack of adverse selection leading to price increases means 
that there is no harm to the least advantaged group from prohibiting the use of this 
data. Therefore, the justifiable position is to prohibit all use out of concern for the 
significantly reduced capability that even these wealthy individuals suffer from. 
 
Importantly, it is unjustifiable to use data relating to the wealthiest 
individuals only because doing so does not cause harm to members of the least 
advantaged group through the mechanism of adverse selection. The conclusions 
therefore act within a kind of hierarchy, where preventing harm to members of the 
least advantaged group is of absolute moral concern. As we know from the principles 
of justice, structuring inequality so that members of this group would be harmed runs 
explicitly contrary to our obligations. Therefore, if prohibition on use would harm 
members of the least advantaged group, the justifiable position is to allow use of this 
data. For example, I argue that data relating to BRCA status should be allowed to be 
used due to the potential for adverse selection. Whilst I accept that individuals who 
suffer from cancer will have somewhat compromised capability, and that some of 
them may then be denied insurance and subsequently harmed, the principles of 
justice do not allow their interests to be prioritised over the interests of members of 
the least advantaged group. Where it is possible to protect both groups 
(Huntington’s), it is both justifiable and correct to do so. However, where 
circumstances force one group to be sacrificed in order to protect the other, it is 
always the least advantaged that must be protected, as they are by definition the 
worst off. 
 
6.5 – Relation to the wider field 
 
Finally, it is important to again pull back from the specific examples I have studied 
and examine developments within the wider field. Only a month ago, the Presidential 
Commission for the study of Bioethical Issues published a report on whole genome 
sequencing. Although not explicitly concerned with the use of specific genetic test 
data, many of their concerns echo those within my analysis above. 
 
 When discussing the justifiable use of genetic data, the Commission express 
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concerns about genetic privacy and what whole genome sequencing could mean for 
knowledge of future disease. Amongst their suggested responses, the Commission 
consider it important that explicit commitments are made to justice and fairness. 
Specifically: 
 
 “A commitment to justice and fairness is a commitment to ensuring that the  
unavoidable burdens of technological advances do not fall disproportionately on any 
particular individual or group, and that the benefits are widely and equitably distributed.”24 
 
 The work I have undertaken above begins to flesh out what form this 
commitment to justice and fairness should take when we consider the use of genetic 
test data within the insurance context. By structuring the system in such a way as to 
protect the disadvantaged from adverse selection, we ensure that they are not 
disproportionately burdened by advances in genetic technology.  
 
 The idea that we should protect the vulnerable from disadvantage caused by 
technological advancement is present throughout the recommendations; as they 
consider it important to “ensure that the risks are not disproportionately borne by any 
particularly vulnerable or marginalized group.”25 Ensuring that the system is both 
just and fair is important when it comes to encouraging participation, another key 
feature of the report. Indeed, they suggest that in order to realise the potential that 
whole genome sequencing holds, we need large scale public participation and a 
public willingness to share genetic information (for example, through biobanks.) 
Such sharing is far less likely to occur if the public distrust the system, or feel that 
they would not be treated justly or fairly within it.
26
 My work is therefore important 
in ensuring that the system regulating the use of this information is one which is just 
and fair, and which is perceived as such.
27
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from the perspective of the principles of justice. For more, specifically in relation to biobanks, see: 
Taylor, M.J, and Townend, D, Issues in Protecting Privacy in Medical Research Using Genetic 
information and Biobanking: The PRIVILEGED Project, Medical Law International, (2010), 10 (4) 
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 This is especially important given the growth of genetic testing within the 
NHS. The UK Genetic Testing Network are assisting with the development and use 
of this technology within the service, and working closely with NICE to approve 
tests for use.
28
 The UKGTN work programme, the UKGTN commissioning working 
group and specialised commissioning groups have been (and are) engaged in 
developing national targets for test use, promoting equity of access, and dealing with 
test costs.
29
 Indeed, recently the UKGTN Steering Group have endorsed 
recommendations to allow tests for foetal sex determination for certain conditions, 
and have developed best practice guidelines and care pathways.
30
 It is clear therefore 
that, as we saw at the beginning of Chapter One, the use of genetic testing within the 
NHS continues to grow and develop. The report which opens this thesis, Building on 
our Inheritance, not only highlights the importance of genetic data, but provides a 
comprehensive future plan for the NHS, and recommendations on how to integrate 
genetic testing fully into existing clinical plans and programmes. This includes the 
development of a network of Genomic Technology Centres, Biomedical Diagnostic 
Hubs and Regional Genetics Centres to cover research, deliver diagnostic testing at 
an affordable scale, and engage with patients suffering genetic disease.
31
 Indeed, the 
Emerging Science and Bioethics Advisory Committee (ESBAC) recently met to 
discuss how to carry the recommendations within this report forward into the wider 
NHS. 
 
In this situation, the relevance and use of genetic information continues to 
grow, and an ever greater number of individuals possess information about their 
genetic status. Given this, the potential for adverse selection within the insurance 
                                                 
28
 UK Genetic Testing Network, Supporting Genetic Testing in the NHS: Second Report of the 
UKGTN, Accessible at: [http://www.ukgtn.nhs.uk/gtn/digitalAssets/0/929_SECONDREPORT.pdf] 
Accessed 31-10-2012. 
29
 UK Genetic Testing Network, Review of Commissioning Arrangements for Genetic Services and 
Strategic Recommendations, March 2011, Accessible at: 
[http://www.ukgtn.nhs.uk/gtn/digitalAssets/1/1034_UKGTNReviewofCommissioningArrangements.
pdf] Accessed 31-10-2012. 
30
 UK Genetic Testing Network, Non-Invasive Prenatal Diagnosis (NIPD): UKGTN Approval of 
Gene Dossiers for fetal sex determination for Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) and X-linked 
Conditions (excluding haemophilia), Accessible at: 
[http://www.ukgtn.nhs.uk/gtn/What_s_New?contentId=443], Accessed 31-10-2012. 
31
 Human Genomics Strategy Group, Building on our Inheritance: Genomic Technology in 
Healthcare, January 2012, Accessible at: 
[http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/d
h_132382.pdf], Accessed 14-08-2012 pp. 49. 
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context grows, and the ‘wait and see’ approach taken by the moratorium begins to 
look increasingly outdated. Given the importance of genetic data, it is time we move 
to a fully justifiable and comprehensive approach to the use of genetic data in the 
insurance context. It is here where I hope to have made a small contribution. 
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